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ABSTRACT
Attr ibu t ion  theory seeks to explain the ways in which humans ascr ibe  
causes to everyday events ,  e spec ia l ly  the observed behavior of o ther  human 
beings. This study seeks to apply the basic pa t te rn s  of social a t t r ib u t io n  to 
the ac t  of "pre-forrnance"-—the aes the t ic  ac t  in which a performer engages the 
voice of a l i t e r a r y  t e x t  and, through rehearsa ls  involving a t t r i b u t i o n ,  
embodies t h a t  voice for  some audience.
Theodore Newcomb's "symmetry theory ,"  a model th a t  contains  the 
e s sen t ia l  fea tu res  of human a t t r ib u t io n ,  i s  discussed within the philosophical  
perspect ive  of phenomenology, and the transformed model i s  used as the basis  
fo r  a" new theory of the ac t  of performance. Three e ssen t ia l  pa t te rns  of
a t t r i b u t i o n  are defined (con s i s t ency, consensus, and d i s t i n c t iv e n e s s ) and
applied to the au tho r ' s  "pre-formance" of William Faulkner 's  s tory  "A Rose For
Emily." Also, the fundamental a t t r ib u t io n  e r ro r  i s  defined as "the tendency to 
o v e ra t t r ib u te  o t h e r ' s  behaviors to d ispos i t ion  r a th e r  than to environment or 
con tex t ,"  and th i s  tendency of human perception i s  revealed to  be the cause of
much l i t c . a r y  (and soc ia l )  m is in te rp re ta t ion .
F ina l ly ,  the theor ies  of M. M. Bakhtin are appropria ted  to the model, to 
allow the engagement of the performer/reader and the l i t e r a r y  o ther  (e .g . 
n a r ra to rs  or charac te rs )  to  be described as the complex exper ien t ia l  phenomenon 
th a t  i t  i s .  The f in ished  model, which replaces the "textual  other" with the 
concept of "f igura l  voice ,"  describes a t t r i b u t i o n  as the most important 
p r inc ip le  in the psychological construct ion  of a response to a l i t e r a r y  t e x t .  .
Chapter One 
LITERATURE AS PHENOMENON:
ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND THE ACT OF PERFORMANCE
Introduction
A professional actor is assigned the role of Hamlet. He picks up the text 
of the play and begins the first of a long series of encounters with it. The 
clergyman experiences a familiar biblical tex t in a new way when he decides, for 
the first tim e, to use it as a eulogy. The poem that meant nothing in 
adolescence now gains a rich new layer of meaning each time it is encountered 
by the maturing consciousness of a reader. A performer preparing Faulkner’s 
story "A Rose For Emily" for the public decides that the narrator of the story is 
sexist. All of these cases illustrate the transactional nature of our experiences 
with literary texts. When we read a text critically and sensitively, we are 
engaging the voiced language of the tex t in much the same way that we 
encounter other people in the social world. Nowhere is this relationship more 
crucial than in the human embodiment of a tex t through performance and the 
response to that performance by an audience.
This study is based on the thesis that the experience of a text, whether 
printed or performed, is analogous to one’s human experience of an "other." That 
is to say, we encounter new texts in much the same way that we encounter 
potential friends or acquaintances. This analogy is especially apt if we intend to 
perform the work because, in such cases, we focus on the text not as an object, a 
thing-out-there, but rather as an act of telling—a disclosing by a narrator,
1
character, or an implied author. Therefore, the methods of studying interaction 
between two human beings are appropriate for studying interaction between 
performers and texts.
Perhaps the best possible description of the act of performance then, is a 
phenomenological description. Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy that 
seeks complete and essential descriptions of human experience rather than a 
testing of empirical laws. The goal of such descriptions is to fully describe the 
activity of the human consciousness as it experiences and responds to the world. 
As Sir William Hamilton defined it in 1866, phenomenology is a  "purely
i
descriptive study of mind." A phenomenological description of the act of 
performance, then, would count as data only the experiential'records of the 
performer, her subjective but rigorous examination of her own mental activity as 
she performed or rehearsed, rather than employing any empirical tests. Only a 
full and complete description of the experience of performing could be counted 
as phenomenological data. When people perform literary texts, they are 
communicating to others the results of their intellectual and visceral encounters 
with a unique "instance" of the tex t as it is mediated by a particular 
consciousness a t a particular time. The study of the consciousness of 
performers, then, is of great importance to the understanding of the act of 
performing. For this reason phenomenology is an appropriate methodology for 
the study of the performer’s experience of the "others" contained in a literary 
work.
The act of performing literature is a phenomenon that involves our 
encounter with an other—the tex t. Furthermore, it involves our conscious
*Sir William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, (Boston: Gould and
Lincoln, 1866), p. 86.
reflection on that encounter, including pre-reflective or visceral responses of 
which we may be only dimly aware. If I must embody Hamlet on stage, I must 
intuit certain of his qualities; I discover other aspects of the character by 
analyzing in my mind the critical thinking that was involved in the creation of 
my performance. That is to  say (phenomenologically) that I literally present my 
consciousness to my consciousness in order to think about how I have arrived a t a 
characterization of Hamlet.
Phenomenology also assumes that nothing is a true phenomenon unless it 
is presented to the human senses for analysis. When we read a tex t, it  exists 
only as it is presented to us—that is, as we experience it. The dyadic 
relationship between a reader and a tex t can be described phenomenologically; 
moreover, a phenomenological description of a performer’s act of "taking on the 
textual voice," can reveal unexpected relationships between seemingly 
incompatible fields of inquiry. In attem pting to fully describe a performer’s 
experience of a literary other, this study will highlight some of these surprising 
consistencies in the communication theories of dramatism, symbolic 
interactionism , and particularly attribution theory.
I will focus on the la tte r theory, an increasingly important psychological 
paradigm called attribution. Attribution theory deals with the ways in which 
humans assign or attribute causes to the behavior of others in the social world. 
Because it  is a theory of perception, because it seeks to describe the often pre- 
reflective dynamics of our perceptions of others, because it focuses on 
experiential records of those perceptions, attribution theory is firmly rooted in 
the  phenomenological perspective. This study will outline attribution theory's 
essentially phenomenological underpinnings and will then describe how
attribution functions in a performer’s experience of the various "speaking” voices 
of a literary  text. Highlighting the essential structures of attribution, as 
revealed in studies of social communication will help to produce a model that 
reveals how attribution functions in the critical response to a work of literature.
Attribution theory can prove to  be particularly helpful in describing the 
act of performance—the human embodiment of a literary text—especially when 
it is coupled with the perspective of symbolic interactionism; this la tte r 
perspective will be introduced briefly, in order to limit our application of 
attributional principles to the linguistic channel of communication. This 
linguistic parameter is necessary because the communication of literature to a 
reader, the type of communication that occurs when a performer "studies" a text 
she intends to perform, is almost exclusively verbal. When I read a soliloquy of 
Hamlet's, I am denied the nonverbal channel, and must depend solely on my 
perceptions of Hamlet’s words, his "linguistic behavior," if I am to get to know 
him well enough to recreate him on the stage or platform.
The subject of this inquiry is specific, although the implications are far 
reaching. My subject is the performative act: that is, the human activity of 
"conversing" critically with a tex t in order to create a performance of it for 
some audience. The act of performance can be divided into two distinct 
phenomenal phases: (1) "pre-forming," the formation of the performance by the 
performer during which aesthetic and critical choices are made and acted upon, 
a phrase commonly called "rehearsal," and (2) "performing," the physical 
embodiment of the tex t by the performer for an audience.
The purpose of this study is to develop a model that will describe how 
attribution functions in the act of performance. I will concentrate on the pre-
formative phase and the "interpersonal" relationship between the "voice” of the 
tex t and the performer. I will trace the development of the phenomenological 
theory of attribution and will apply it to this reader/text relationship. Several 
significant attribution patterns will be identified in the current literature of the 
social sciences. These patterns will also be revealed in selected student 
responses to literary texts. However, since this study seeks a phenomenological 
description of performance, I will rely heavily on my own response to exemplary 
texts, particularly the opening passages of William Faulkner's "A Rose For 
Emily.”
At the core of the proposed model is Theodore Newcomb's widely known 
"symmetry model," an attributional paradigm. This model will be placed in the 
context of the performer's lived experience of a text, forming a completed 
paradigm that will provide both a philosophical description of the act of 
performance as well as some practical prescriptions for the performer.
Attribution Theory and the Act of Performance
The performative act is a complicated process. Performance studies seek 
an understanding not only of the tex t being performed, but also of the act of 
performance. One behavioral theory that is particularly fruitful when applied to 
the performative act is attribution theory.
Briefly, this family of psychological theories is concerned with how human 
beings arrive a t determinations of the causes of everyday events—particularly 
the causes of the behaviors of other humans. It is a basic human tra it to 
perceive that our own actions and the actions of others are the result of either 
some external force or some human disposition. Attribution theory posits that
people insist upon attributing causes to the effects they observe in the world. 
Often, the assumption of cause is pre-reflective. I would add that performers 
and readers often attribute "causes” to the "behavior" of the speaking voice 
inherent in a work of literature.
The particular attribution paradigm used in this study is Theodore
Newcomb's symmetry theory, which seeks to  explain the essential ways in which
humans achieve feelings of "balance," "symmetry," or "cognitive consistency"
with an object or another person. Newcomb uses the term symmetry to mean a
general understanding of where a communication partner stands in relation to (a)
oneself, and (b) to whatever happens to be the subject of the discourse a t any
given moment. When discussing a Republican governor with a democrat, I might
attribute qualities to the democrat based on (a) how she feels about me
personally, and (b) how she stands in relationship to this particular Republican
governor. This feeling of "symmetry" is not unlike the feeling that
2phenomenologist Martin Heidegger refers to as "unconcealedness," in that it 
suggests that the motives of the other's behavior "stand forth" to me, 
unconcealed. Such feelings of consistency are crucial in our understanding of 
literary others as well.
Newcomb's symmetry model, when applied to the transaction between 
performer and tex t, would suggest that ambiguities in the text, such as gaps in 
the plot or multiple word meanings, or even ambiguities in a character's motives 
for "linguistic behavior," create a dissonance or feeling of psychological 
imbalance. Often, the attribution of causes or motivations for these ambiguities 
is a common method of resolving such imbalances between perception and
^Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, (trans. Albert Hofstadter 
(New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), p. 53.
understanding. For example, I might wonder why my prospective employer is 
explaining the company’s retirem ent policy in such detail during the employment 
interview. During the employer's discourse I might attribute the cause of her 
details to the fact that she has already made up her mind to hire me. Likewise, 
in my reflections on Faulkner’s story "A Rose For Emily," I might wonder why 
the narrator is so careful to conceal the shocking ending of the story until the 
final line. In both cases I am seeking a cause for the behavior of an other with 
whom I am engaged.
The Phenomenological Approach to Attribution Theory
Phenomenology provides an excellent method for describing critical and 
behavioral responses to texts. Attribution theory, in its focus on interpersonal 
perception, is a phenomenological theory that can illuminate the relationship 
between a performer and the fictional persona he embodies. As stated 
previously, the essential description of literary response that is the core of this 
study will be limited to "pre-formance," concentrating on the performer’s 
perception of the text as that text is prepared for performance.
Attribution, like many other theories of communication, while often 
tested empirically, is concerned with human perception—including the perception 
and evaluation of literary personae. In an effort to introduce attribution theory 
here, it might be helpful to clarify its philosophical underpinnings in 
phenomenology. Stephen Littlejohn has summarized what might be called some 
phenomenological principles of humanistic communication theories:
(1) What is happening to an individual or a group is best understood 
subjectively in terms of the individual's perceptions and feelings. 
(This suggests the use of subjective, paper-and-pencil responses
8that describe a subject's experiences rather than scientifically 
controlled experiments.)
(2) Principles governing communication behavior should be 
discovered inductively by examining personal experience rather 
than by applying abstractions deductively. (That is, we begin with 
the raw data of experience, and construct theories to explain them 
without reducing the varieties and complexities of the 
experiences.)
(3) Communication behavior is best understood in its complexity 
rather than rigid simplicity.
Attribution theory seeks to describe the ways in which we ascribe causes 
to observed behaviors of others. This study applies such descriptions to the 
communicative transaction which can be shown to exist between performer and 
tex t (as well as between performer and audience). The proposed essential 
description of the experience of a tex t, by a single reader or by an audience, will 
be based on a modified model of attribution that will be derived according to the 
methods of phenomenology.
Of course, books and people do not communicate in exactly the same way. 
Language is the sole medium through which a tex t speaks its meanings. When we 
converse with flesh-and-blood others we a t least have one other primary 
medium—the nonverbal channel. For this reason, the relationship between a tex t 
and a reader is essentially linguistic. If we are seeking an understanding of a 
narrator in a piece of prose fiction, our experience of that narrator is primarily 
an experience of her or his linguistic behavior. Texts ’’ac t’' via language. And 
even when we think about a tex t, when we contemplate it critically, we use 
language to do so. Therefore, the perspective of symbolic interaction, another
3
Stephen Littlejohn, Theories of Human Communication, 2nd ed., 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.), p. 194.
phenomenological communication theory, provides helpful support for an 
attributional theory of literary response.
Symbolic Interactionism as Support for the Phenomenological Perspective
The theoretical perspective of symbolic interactionism reinforces the 
phenomenological dynamic of the experience of another person (in this case a 
textual persona) or object (the text). This perspective, widely credited in the 
social sciences, posits human interaction as being conducted primarily through 
shared meanings conveyed by way of language.'* This interaction is dynamic and 
processual. Symbolic interactionism assumes a dialectic structure as an 
essential feature of communication; it is my thesis that such a structure also 
exists in a person/text dyad or in the performer/audience "partnership."
Stephen Littlejohn describes the goals of the researcher in symbolic 
interactionism as requiring him or her to "empathize with the subject, to enter 
the subject's realm of experience, and to attem pt to understand the value of the 
person as an individual." The aesthetic goals of the performer are no different 
in that they too rely on empathic understanding and what Wallace Bacon has 
called "a sense of the other."
This project rests on the argument of four claims. The first two are 
related:
(1) Attribution (a phenomenological theory of how humans ascribe 
causes to the behaviors of others) in the imaginative and critical 
act of forming the performance of a text is a phenomenon in the 
phenomenological sense.
4
Littlejohn, p. 45.
5
Littlejohn, p. 45.
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(2) Attribution, specifically that described by Newcomb’s 
"symmetry model," is an important part of the phenomenon of 
responding to the performance of a text.
(3) Symbolic interactionism (particularly the Burkean paradigm) 
helps to clarify the phenomenological term "intentionality." This 
term is important in describing which literary persona we are 
attending to or focusing on a t any given moment of the reading 
process.
(4) Theodore Newcomb’s symmetry model, a model that contains all 
of the essential features of attribution, can be modified so as to 
make it specifically applicable to the act of pre-formance and to 
justify its description as a phenomenological model.
8Phenomenology posits four essential criteria for a phenomenon to exist. 
First, phenomena are essences. They are constituted by those very qualities that 
make them the objects they are instead of some other, essentially different 
object. That is to say, humans recognize phenomena; we know that our 
experience of a flower is essentially unlike our experience of a novel; likewise, 
we may sense that our experience of the death of King Lear is not unlike our 
experience of the death of a flesh-and-blood leader such as Dr. Martin Luther 
King. Such experiences (such essences) are not discovered empirically, but by "a 
scrutiny of particular cases by seeing, intuition, or intuition of essences" 
(Wesensschau). The importance of intuition lies in its ability to free truth from 
the necessity of empirical proof. According to Richard Schmitt:
The point of introducing intuition is not psychological but 
epistemological. To appeal to intuition is not to make a 
psychological statem ent about the causal origins of certain 
statem ents but an epistemological one about the sort of evidence 
that will be relevant to them. To say we know essences by
g
Richard Schmitt, "Phenomenology," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1967), pp. 13940.
7Schmitt, p. 140.
intuition is to say, negatively, that the truth or falsity of 
statem ents about essences is not dependent on the truth about 
empirical statem ents.
This is not to say that empirical statem ents are not true or not self-validating. 
But the self-validation of the phenomenological description is that its goal is 
inherent in its object; one can search for the ontological essence (eidos) of an 
object only within the object itself.
The reader who prepares a short story, say "A Rose For Emily," for public 
performance, must be able to fully respond to the work as a separate entity, a 
thing-out-there that is presented to his/her consciousness. The intuitive 
description of the essential qualities of the work might contain many levels: it is
Q
a short story; it is in the inimitable style of Faulkner; it is a story of the 
American South; it is Southern Gothic; and, it  is a mystery story. Anytime that 
we place a work into a category we are beginning to intuit something about its 
formal essence. We know that "A Rose For Emily" is not a sonnet, a novel, a 
play, or a fantasy; it  is not a comic story—or in Hemingway's style. From 
generic essences, we move on to attem pt to realize in performance, those 
qualities which exist only in this particular story. What qualities, we ask, make 
this story unique.
^Schmitt, p. 140.
Q
M. M. Bakhtin, a theorist whose ideas will figure prominently in my 
proposed model, suggests that prose style is largely a function of an author's 
particular way of combining different voices (social, literary, professional, 
character voices, etc.) within a tex t. What Bakhtin says about the style of the 
English comic novel, might be applied, to a lesser degree perhaps, to all prose 
fiction: "It is precisely the diversity of speech, and not the unity of a normative 
shared language, that is the ground of style." Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination 
(Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981). p. 308.
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Much of the answer to this seminal question lies in the attributions we 
make about the behavior of the teller of the story. We might constitute this 
teller as the implied a u th o r^  or as a more or less defined narrator who exists in 
the context of the epic situation. The richest understanding of the work would 
likely come from investigating our attributions about both narrator and implied 
author. In order to focus this study, however, I will limit it to the performer’s 
attributions concerning the narrator, mainly because performers embody 
narrators, whether they are fictional characters, whether they are interested or 
objective, whether they are neutral entities or implied authors. The style of the 
narrator, the "manner" of the telling, is the crucial determinant of the essential 
phenomenon of our experience of a specific tex t, and therefore, a focus on the 
narrative voice, a voice constituted as a communicating other, is appropriate and 
of paramount importance.
The Phenomenological Reduction
The particular phenomenon under consideration then, is the performer’s 
experience of the narrator of "A Rose For Emily." We begin by constituting that 
narrator as an other who is communicating with us through the shared system of 
language. We focus on the text as the voiced behavior of that narrator. In 
phenomenological terms, when a performer holds any aspect of a text, say a 
narrator, in the mind, that performer is said to be "intentionally focused." The
I am grateful to Wayne C. Booth for his illumination of the idea of 
dyadic encounters between texts and readers. His approach to the metaphor of 
"engagements" with a text, however, posits the implied author as the other in the 
dyad. This is true, perhaps, when we read our favorite authors, but I would 
suggest that in a "pre-formative" reading, the relationship between the reader 
and the narrator’s voice is more crucial. To embody a text we must embody the 
narrator; only indirectly do we engage the implied author, a t least in many cases.
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principle object of consciousness then, the narrator, is formed in the performer's 
mind, constituted in part by the language of the text, and in another part by the 
lived experience of the performer. The performer in this case would concentrate 
on the voice of the narrator, allowing that voice and all that it suggests of that 
physical narrator, to  become the figure in the field of his or her immediate 
experience. Conversely, other elements of the text, such as typography, 
authorial intention, formal qualities, would remain in the performer's 
consciousness but would form the background against which the performer 
constitutes the figure of the narrator.
What we have done in such an act of intentionality is to bracket, or 
suspend for the moment, all critical perspectives other than dramatism, in order 
to  fully experience the text as the utterance (the linguistic behavior) of a 
narrator. This step allows our intuition of the essential qualities of Faulkner’s 
story. We are now interested in the essential qualities of this type of literary 
experience, what we know of the narrator from the tex t, and what we attribute 
(often by intuition) about that narrator as we attem pt to fully constitute him in 
our mind. Our experience of the story-teller as a story-teller is the phenomenon 
to  be described.
Accepting that phenomena are essences and intuited, that they have 
necessary elements which we can recognize, leads us to a self-reflexive, 
essential (eidetic) description of the phenomena of literary response. This 
description is derived by performing an operation called the phenomenological 
reduction (or epokhe). The crucial step in this method is "bracketing’’ or the 
"suspension of existence."
Phenomena, says Husserl, can only be described when we have suspended 
our belief in the existence of objects. To describe our experience of a table, for
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example, we might suspend all previous experience of tables and begin our 
description of the object naively. In such a way its essential features would be 
revealed to us without any experiential interference. In a sense, performers of 
literature bracket or suspend the physical text, the book, as an entity when they 
perform that text from memory. Perhaps such an act is easier when performing 
prose than when performing poetry; in the former case the physical image of the 
words on the page is less important; in the case of poetry however, the physical 
image of the text is more essential to the ontology of the work of literature and 
is therefore much harder to bracket. To use a more specific example, we would 
probably be unlikely to look a t a page of Thomas Wolf’s Look Homeward Angel 
and call it poetry. We have been trained to call paragraphs prose. However, if 
we had never read the book, and heard a descriptive passage performed well, we 
might easily experience its sounds, rhythms, and perceived ’’shape" for poetry. 
Reflecting on such an experience might provide us with many clues as to what 
we intuit the essential qualities of "poetry" to be.
We do not doubt the existence of things when we bracket, we simply put 
all presuppositions about existence "out of action" so that they do not enter into 
our eidetic description of the object of our intention.
"Bracketing" in this sense means that I become aware of the 
possibility that something which I believed to exist does not exist 
as I thought it did, that a statem ent which I considered true is not, 
or that some ac t which I considered right when I did it might have 
been wrong. Once I have become aware of that possibility, I am 
ready to reflect.
^S chm itt, p. 143.
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Certainly, no performer completely forgets the sense of the complete 
work of literature when he or she performs it. However, while the performer is 
embodying the narrative voice, the "act of telling," he must, of necessity, 
concentrate to an extreme degree on the unfolding words of the text, as they 
issue from his mouth. The constantly shifting present moment of the "telling" is 
the focus of the performing consciousness while it performs the text. The 
objectivist perspective to the literature is therefore not possible in the unfolding 
embodiment of the text. It is this sense of the work as a complete whole, then, 
that the performer "brackets" or suspends when he performs. In rehearsal, the 
performer can stop and ask himself or herself about the causes about the 
linguistic behavior of the narrator he or she is embodying. This is where the 
reflection occurs in the act of pre-formance.
This reflection is the next step in the phenomenological method. We 
reflect about the essence of an object, and in bracketing the presuppositions of 
the world-as-we-know-it (Husserl’s term is "natural standpoint"), we are able to 
discover those features without which the object would cease to be what it is. 
Husserl describes this reflection as an "attem pt to doubt." The cognitive 
activity involved in attem pting to doubt he called "free fancy" or "free 
variation," a kind of "counter-example" in which
we describe an example and then transform the description by 
adding or deleting one of the predicates contained in the 
description. With each addition or deletion we ask whether the 
amended description can still be said to describe an example of the 
same kind of object a& that which the example originally described 
was said to exemplify.
12Schmitt, p. 14.
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Bracketing has a more specific and relevant application to the pre- 
formance method I hope to describe in the fourth chapter of this study. If we 
posit a transactional flow of communication between tex t and reader, or, more 
specifically between narrator and reader, we are arguing that the performer’s 
encounter with a narrator is governed by the same attributional behavior as 
encounters between flesh-and-blood beings. If we concentrate on the narrator 
and attend to that narrator as the sole source of the discourse, then we are in 
effect bracketing the implied author (along with formal qualities, typography, 
and other conventions of writing). In order to embody the narrator of ”A Rose 
for Emily,” it is not required that we know anything about Faulkner himself. 
Faulkner's life and other works, particularly the intertextual history of 
Yoknopatawpha, might illuminate and inform a performance, but they would be 
likely to remain on the periphery of the performer’s (or audience's) experience of 
the narrator. When I rehearse a narrator's voice I am playing out a dialogue 
between myself and the narrator. In the rarefied solitude of solo rehearsals, 
Faulkner ceases to exist as I imaginatively enter the narrator's consciousness and 
his world. This is, a t least, one possibility of the performance.
The third step in the phenomenological reduction is the free variation of 
ideas. Once the bracketing step of the reduction has been performed, free fancy 
takes over. Husserl's concept of free fancy is simply the procedure of positing 
counter-examples to the phenomenon under inquiry. It is, incidentally, by this 
Nietzschian reversal in subject and predicate that the post-structuralist critic 
seeks to deconstruct the language of texts, offering various different readings by 
the sheer force of logical, free, cognitive variation. A similar deconstruction 
occurs in the current trend of "reader-response" criticism, in which the a priori
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privilege of the text is suspended in order to fully concentrate on readers’ 
experiences of that text. The phenomenological suspension of the natural 
standpoint leaves us with a world-out-there that can only be described as 
"correlates of consciousness," as something not separate from, but presented to 
consciousness. The cognitive act of bracketing forces us to direct our attention 
to the acts of consciousness (cogitationes) which become the experience of 
consciousness involving objects (in the present case, a narrator). We are now 
only interested in this object as an intentional ac t of consciousness.
After determining the essential qualities of a phenomena, and suspending 
the world as we know it in order to allow for the free variation of ideas, we must 
focus on the narrator’s behavior. In phenomenological terms we must attend to 
the narrator’s linguistic behavior. The fourth and final phenomenological 
requirement for a phenomenon is intentionality. Pure reflective consciousness 
(cogito) means that "which is capable of intentional action." According to 
Husserl, we are always conscious of something. The performer in the process of 
building the performance is conscious of the details of the tex t (the images, 
sounds, allusions, forms, etc.). Consider for a moment the individual performer 
who prepares a public reading from Hamlet. The performer chooses the second 
scene of the play, in which Hamlet listens to Claudius' address to the court a t 
Elsinore. The performer is conscious of the fact that Hamlet is conscious of his 
uncle's insincerity in the scene. During the actual performance, the performer 
must "live through" or embody Hamlet's intentional act a t this particular 
moment in the drama.
Intentionality can be clarified by reflecting on Richard Schmitt's 
comments on the intentional act in terms of our specific subject. Consider the
actor or reader who is trying to determine the object of Hamlet's intentional 
focus when he first enters his uncle's presence in the aforementioned scene. Is 
he "self-conscious?" Is his mother the focus of his attention or is it Claudius or 
Ophelia perhaps? What is the figure and what constitutes the background or 
context of his lived experience a t this moment? In this case there are many 
intentional choices that can be made in the performer's encounter with the 
character, many of which would involve the embodiment of Hamlet's 
attributional behavior. In fact, we can read Schmitt's theoretical description of 
the intentional act in light of these different "pre-formative" choices:
Of some performances I can say: This time I did it right; last 
time I did i t  badly. Therefore, I possess criteria for proper 
performance. If asked what these criteria are, I may not be able to 
put them into words, but I know them in the sense that I use them 
and, in many cases, I can, upon reflection, sta te  what they are. I 
have then, by means of reflection, produced knowledge that
___________corresponding to the knowledge how __________ which I
possessed all along. This is what happens when I vary an example 
freely in imagination: I am always able to discriminate between 
the thing that I would recognize as a certain object and the thing 
that I would either take as a different kind of object or about 
which I would not know what to say. But only upon reflection can I 
verbalize the criteria implicit in such a recognition by stating the 
essential features of any given kind of object.
This description of phenomenological intentionality reads very much like an ideal 
description of what the performer does when she or he tries out different 
interpretations and performance choices during the rehearsal period.
Contrary to popular belief, Husserl did not think that a person is always 
conscious of some thing, but that a focal object is always present to 
consciousness. The mental act of constituting this focal object is what Husserl 
refers to as intentionality. A person is conscious of a peripheral "ground" as
^Schm itt, p. 142.
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well, or what Husserl called a "co-present margin." This margin can be 
transcendent such as the performer's awareness of is own clenched hand as he 
performs his opening scene as Hamlet or, it may be immanent, as in the 
performer's marginal awareness of Hamlet's memory of his father when he first 
addresses Claudius. Put simply, Husserl is saying that we are always conscious 
of a ground as well as a figure, of the whole field of consciousness as well as the 
intentional focus, just as this young prince in scene two must be aware of 
Elsinore as well as of Ophelia, of God as well as of Gertrude.
L iterature as Phenomenon
As we read a text, as it unfolds in our consciousness, we attend to it, word 
by word, image by image, device by device, one experiential moment a t a time. 
As we prepare a tex t for performance, we attend to different nuances in each 
critical re-reading of the text. Let us illustrate this by describing the 
imaginative creation of a performance of a specific text, say Hamlet. The 
essential features of the tex t, those features that define and characterize it, are 
intuited by the performer who can bracket any presuppositions about himself and 
in doing so can "experience" the text through the use of choices derived from 
free  fancy. Intentionality is the key to the essential description of such a 
method. The reader is "intending" the tex t as a blueprint of choices; but, in an 
experiential sense, the tex t is intending the reader as well. They enter into a 
unique transactional relationship in which they constitute each other. They do 
this by way of mutual attributions, as I will show later. The reader seeks to 
discover the essential features of the tex t in order to communicate them to an 
audience; the "gaze" of the reader, to use a Husserlian image, is returned by the
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tex t which is constituted, not as a thing-in-itself, but as the reader’s intentional 
experience of it.
In phenomenological terms, what we intend is present to us. The text is a 
presence to the reader, and presence is the beginning of clarity. David Michael 
Levin has stated succinctly the relation of the phenomenological presence of 
tex t to its apprehended clarity: as is often the case with the performer, Levin 
sees the presence of the tex t as visceral and pre-reflective.
Presence is not discursive; it is an unspeakable lucidity, a dis­
closing so close to the truth that the mediation of language, of
concepts, could only be an intervention, hiding the truth forever. 
Obviously then, presence cannot be represented; nor can it
represent, unless what it represents is mere absence. Presence is
therefore an event; or, more specifically, it is a performance: for 
it in-stances and reveals an essence, being so close to the essence 
of what it instances that it suffices, and is there instead.
In all fairness it must be pointed out that Levin is here discussing the 
embodied presence of the theatrical performance of avant garde dance, but his 
description of presence applied to a textual presence as well. Only the text can
fully present itself; the totality of any tex t cannot be captured by a performance
(as any actor of Hamlet can appreciate). But an individual instance of an
encounter with the text of Hamlet does indeed possess essential features unique
to that performer with that text a t that particular moment. By bracketing the 
world, in this case critical presuppositions about Hamlet, performing techniques, 
and so forth, the performer can ’’attend to" or reflect on his or her experiential 
relationship to the tex t through free fancy. This method of deriving a
14David Michael Levin, "The Embodiment of Performance," Salmagundi, 
31-32 (Fall, 1975-Winter, 1976), p. 129.
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performance strategy contains all the necessary features of a phenomenon and of 
the creative, individualized act of forming a performance. A performer’s 
reflection on his relationship to the character he will embody involves 
attribution in a fundamental way.
Roman Ingarden has developed a detailed and interesting perspective of 
the structure of a pre-formative encounter with a text. Fictional objects, he 
maintains, possess a unique kind of ontological incompleteness. Of course, all 
objects, even concrete ones, cannot be considered ontologically or 
epistemologically complete.*® Husserl, Heidegger and others constantly remind 
us that the back of the object of our gaze, that is, what is behind what we see, is 
cognitively assumed rather than constituted in sensual reality. But, as Ingarden
1 C
says, the tex t contains ’’spots of indeterminacy” due to the nature of the 
limitations of literary form. The author carefully selects and arranges images, 
plot elements, time sequences, e tc . The reader fills in (or simply accepts) these 
gaps according to his or her experiential intention. Pre-formance of a text then, 
is a phenomenon involving an intuiting of textual essences in conjunction with 
the conscious reflection on the discrete details (such as events, characters, 
objects) of the text as the intended objects of that reflection.
The Phenomenology of Attribution
My second claim is that attribution, or more specifically the "symmetry" 
model of Theodore Newcomb, describes an essential element in the experience of
15Barry Smith, ’'Ingarden vs. Meinong and the Logic of Fiction," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 41 (Sept.-Dee., 1980), p. 97.
^Sm ith , p. 96.
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a tex t. Given Levin’s description of the tex t itself as a "performance" and 
Ingarden's description of its "ontological incompleteness," we might assume that 
a given reader fills in those gaps of indeterminacy and thereby performs an act 
which is intentional and dialogically related to the act of telling that is 
represented by the words on the page.
Another way of describing this phenomenon is to see the encounter with 
the text as a series of effects. Effects are perceived to be related to causes in 
the human mind; and, the causes given to explain critical choices in a 
performance are never simply assumed; rather, they are correctly or incorrectly 
attributed by the reader or the audience member. These attributional choices 
may involve intrinsic m atters ("Why does Hamlet insult Ophelia?"), or extrinsic 
m atters ("Why don't I, as performer, like Laertes' behavior at his sister's 
funeral?"). On a more mundane level, many an audience member has attributed 
a staged fall to the accidental clumsiness of an actor instead of to the craft of a 
good fight director. Attribution theory seeks to define the structure of human 
attributional behaviors such as those involved in critical or performance 
responses.
Newcomb's symmetry model is an attem pt a t a diagram of an 
intersubjective human experience. Its focus on the structure of the experiential 
phenomenon of social encounters renders it legitimately phenomenological. 
There are only three essential elements in the model: a person (P), and other 
(O), and an object (X). The model can function without the other (O), in which 
case it is a simple schematic of the Husserlian paradigm with P focusing 
intentionally on the object (X) and X returning the gaze of P. The double arrows 
between P and X connect the object experientially to P, so that they cannot
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exist independently of each other and retain their "is-ness." X is X only as it is
17presented to P's consciousness.
P
The model is complicated yet made more relevant and generalizable by 
the addition of another person (O) to the experience. The model now diagrams 
an interpersonal encounter, a particular type of phenomenon in which two people 
(or one person and a text) ''discuss” or encounter some other object. This object 
can be either transcendental or immanent. For example, two critics discussing 
the performance they are watching are mutually encountering a transcendental 
object; they can both see and hear the object of their discussion. On the other 
hand, an actor who "questions” the tex t for clues to Hamlet's "problem" is 
attending to an immanent object—Hamlet's disposition. That is, the character 
Hamlet exists only in the performer's imagination as it is mediated by the 
physical tex t, the words on the page.
The situation in which a performer reads a poem to an audience is another 
excellent example of the interpersonal encounter involving an immanent object. 
The performer encounters the audience and the mutual intentional subject of 
tha t encounter might be, for example, the textual images of Hamlet's father's 
funeral. In the theatrical situation, a performer (P) engages an audience (O)
17Newcomb actually labels his dyad A and B rather than P and O as his 
predecessor Fritz  Heider labelled them. For our purpose the la tte r designation 
will be retained in order to emphasize the experience over the theory.
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concerning a tex t (X). In these circumstances, the tex t becomes an immanent 
object, or rather a series of immanent objects, which are subject to the valid or 
invalid attributions of performer and/or audience. The P and the O must intuit 
the essence of X as they imaginatively focus their attention on it. An eidetic 
description of the pre-formative act or the performative act must privilege the 
term s, text, performer, and audience.
Because the symmetry model is phenomenological, it allows us to probe 
the ’’interpersonal" experience of performing. It requires that we focus on the 
arrows that represent the structure of the ’’lived’’ encounter—the encounter of 
the actor with the character of Hamlet, or the encounter of a performer with 
the narrator of a short story.
Newcomb’s symmetry theory asserts that "we attem pt to influence one
18another to bring about symmetry (balance or equilibrium)." Newcomb argues
that the attem pts to influence another person are a function of the attraction
one person has for another. Newcomb is in no way referring to physical
attraction only here, but the feeling of psychological comfort and
consubstantiation (or lack of these qualities) that the perceiver experiences in
regard to the other consciousness with whom he or she is engaged. If we fail to
achieve symmetry through communication with another person about an object
important to both of us we may then change our attitude toward either the other
19person or the object in question in order to establish symmetry. The
^L ittlejohn, p. 203.
^W erner J . Severin and James W. Tankard, Jr., Communication Theories 
(New York: Hastings House, 1979), p. 157.
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performer who rehearses Faulkner’s "A Rose For Emily" seeks to achieve a 
feeling of symmetry if not only between himself and the narrator, but also 
between the narrator and the objects and events of the narration (for example, 
Miss Emily’s house). The performer must be able to embody these relationships 
for an audience. To accomplish this, the performer completes the symmetry 
model by "coming to an understanding" of his own relation to objects immanently 
present in the tex t. To realize the narrator’s ambivalent feelings towards Miss 
Emily’s house, the performer must go beyond empathy. Not only must the 
narrator's relation to the house be embodied, but it must be balanced by the 
relationship between the listener/perform er and that very house. How the 
performer feels about the narrator (or the implied author), and how that narrator 
feels about the house, will determine how the performer feels about the house.
According to most theories of attribution, a person perceives and collates
information about an other's behaviour from three sources: consistency
information ("How often has the actor done this in the past?" or "What is the
proper 'behavior' of a sonnet?"); distinctiveness information ("How often has the
actor or the text done this sort of thing in different circumstances?" or "Does
the text remain the same when assuming different modes of given-ness such as
individual versus group performance?"); and consensus information ("How many
other people or texts have done that sort of thing in those sorts of
circumstances?"). All of these three bear on one question: "Did the behavior
20covary equally with the actor?" Stated phenomenologically, people use the
20Charles Antaki and Chris Brewin, Attributions and Psychological 
Change (New York: Academic Press, 1982), p. 8.
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three aforementioned attribution patterns to direct their intentions of other
people or objects.
Attribution as Symbolic Action
My third claim is proposed primarily to provide support for my first two
and to remind us that literature is primarily a linguistic construct. I will
appropriate the theoretical presuppositions of symbolic interactionism to reveal
that movement's phenomenological analysis of intentionality. As stated earlier,
symbolic interactionism is a theoretical perspective that sees interpersonal
encounters as a humanizing social process in which people become active in
21shaping their own behavior through the medium of symbols and their meanings.
Kenneth Burke's particular form of symbolic interaction is called ''dramatism''
because it is based on a theatrical metaphor. People, says Burke, perform for
each other in everyday communication. He sees humans alone as possessing what
he calls "action" and which he differentiates from animalistic "motion." "Action
consists of purposeful, voluntary behaviors of individuals. Dramatism is the
study of action in this sense. Burke believes that a dramatistic (teleological)
view of people is needed in all of the human disciplines, for human behavior
22cannot possibly be understood without it."
Burke's theory contains several key parallels with attribution theory and
phenomenology. Burke sees human communication as "a direct function
23of . . . consubstantiality," or shared meaning of signs and symbols. The 
attem pt to achieve consubstantiality is similar to  Newcomb's "strain toward
^L ittle john , p. 45. 
22Littlejohn, p. 56. 
23Littlejohn, p. 56.
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symmetry” and the attributional behaviors we employ to reach this sta te  of 
balance (i.e. consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness) have been shown to be 
analogous to phenomenological intentionality. Burke uses a "pentad" to analyze 
communication. It consists of five elements: act, scene, agent, agency, and 
purpose. The essential structure of the act of encountering a text is our subject 
of inquiry. The scene of this encounter, whether immanent or transcendent, 
whether pre-formance or performance, is analogous to the phenomenological 
concept of the horizon or situatedness. Once again we are reminded that 
context is crucial in encounters. Burke’s third component, the agent, is the P of 
our attribution model, the consciousness that engages the text. Burke 
uses the term agency to designate the means by which the agent carries out the 
ac t. In the pre-formative act, the agency is no less than the transcendental ego 
as it makes reflective critical choices based on the information presented to it 
by the text. In an actual performance, the agent also would include the physical 
body of the actor or performer as it mediates between tex t and audience. 
Burke's fifth and final element is the reason for the act itself, the purpose, or 
the goal of the communication. An actor preparing the role of Hamlet intends it 
as a full performative embodiment of textual material and the audience 
watching such a performance often intends it in the same way. Misattribution 
can occur when spectators intend the textual Hamlet as heroic and are present 
with an actor's anti-heroic intention of the same text.
Burke's theory of dramatism is, therefore, a context-oriented theory of 
communication that privileges the shared system of language. These qualities 
allow us to view symbolic interactionism as another phenomenological
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perspective on the performance of literature. Richard Schmitt, in defining the 
"intentional act" of consciousness makes obvious some of the parallels:
The intentional act, having four elements, is a tetradic relation. 
So, for instance is the relation described in the sentence "I placed 
the book on the table." Here also there are four elements: the 
subject or agent (myself), my action iplacing, what I place (the 
book), and the table on which I place it.
Likewise when I, as the performer of Faulkner’s "A Rose For Emily," 
attend to the narrator of that story as a communication other, I listen (act) to 
the language (agency) of the narrator (agent). In another sense, the narrator is 
performing the principle act (the act of "telling"). In the transactional flow 
between narrator and performer, it may often be difficult to tell whether the 
listening performer or the speaking narrator is the principal actor a t a given 
moment. Here we will concentrate on the narrator as the primary agent, for it 
is the act of telling that the performer must eventually embody and "live 
through" in performance.
Some purpose can usually be attributed to this narrator—a reason why he 
is telling the story in a particular way. Also, the telling usually takes place in 
some more or less highly defined context or environment (the scene, in Burkean 
terms). If the scene is not highly defined, it is often helpful for the performer to 
imaginatively flesh out and specify the real or psychological context of the 
telling. In any case, the perspective of symbolic interactionism simply reminds 
us that we are looking a t the encounter between a performer and the fictional
24Schmitt, p. 144.
29
personae as a transactional dialogue, meaning that both parties in the encounter, 
in the above case a narrator and a performer, mutually influence each other as 
the communication progresses. The structure of this transaction will be shown 
to be essentially the same in structure as those social encounters described by 
Theodore Newcomb's symmetry model of social communication. And, the strain 
toward symmetry diagrammed by the model, motivates the attributional patterns 
through which we determine the motives or causes of the fictional speaker.
By modifying Newcomb's symmetry, that is, by replacing the flesh-and- 
blood other (O) with a fictional speaker and adding to the model the 
figure/ground concept of intentional consciousness, we can render the model 
phenomenological and specific to the pre-formative experience of a tex t. This 
can be done with the simple addition of the phenomenological "ground," context, 
or horizon to the existing model.
First, and perhaps most important, is the communicative context, or what 
Husserl might call the "co-present margin" of the performer; this would include 
any past or present experience or knowledge that consciously or even 
subconsciously affects the performer's perception of the text.
Performer
All co-present experience 
of the reader/perform er J
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As stated above, this attributional theory of the act of performance, will 
privilege the performer’s constitution of the text as the voiced utterance of an 
other consciousness (O). Newcomb’s model also includes the subject of the 
discourse or the subject of the ’’conversation" between the two parties in the 
communication. This subject may be a concrete object (a house, an other person) 
or it may be an idea or a concept (such as love, honor, the South). Of course, 
this element of the model changes from moment to moment as the tex t is 
performed or read. Further, the speaking voice of the text, whether it is 
constituted as the voice of a narrator, a character, or an implied author, also 
exists in a communicative context, a field of fictional co-present experience 
tha t influences the communication of, say, a narrator, with a performer.
P - i r —  
Performer arrator
T H E
T E X T
Subject of the discourse 
between P and O
The dynamic and intersubjective nature of the pre-formance of literature 
is illustrated in the model by the two-way arrows that will be shown to represent
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the flow of attributions between performer and, in this case, a narrator. The 
arrows remind us that the performer’s encounter with a literary text is a 
transactional process. It is dynamic, ongoing, and ever-changing. Both parties in 
the "dyad" mutually constitute each other, primarily by attributing causes for 
each other’s behavior. If we view a performative encounter as a "dialogue" 
between a narrator, say, and a performer, both partners—the narrator as well as 
the performer—are intentionally focused on the specific events, images, and 
ideas in the text. When the narrator of "A Rose For Emily" describes the 
Grierson house, that narrator could be said to be intentionally focused on that 
house, as is the "listening" reader. This experience may well be heightened when 
the performer has advanced sufficiently in the building of his or her performance 
to  put away the tangible script. After this point the individual constituents of 
the tex t, its ideas, images, language, characters, and so forth, are immanent 
objects in the performer’s mind. Likewise, in the recital hall, both audience and 
performer attend to the tex t as the temporal flux of word, image, symbol, and 
gesture.
Certainly, the individual constituents of a tex t are never the whole 
experience of that text; rather, they are figures in an experiential ground. The 
performer is also aware of his or her audience, of the stage, the lights, and his or 
her own distracting thoughts or lapses of attention during the performance. The 
audience often has similar distractions. Bert O. States has written cleverly and 
insightfully about the phenomenon of the theatrical performance. He cites the 
phenomenological example of how the sight of dogs, children, or fire on state 
often forces the audience to  lose its intentional directedness to the tex t by
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25suddenly bringing into focus the "theatrical convention.” In such cases the 
tex t is replaced in intentional consciousness by the "production."
The arrows in our first model indicate all the complicated and numerous 
relations that exist between performer, tex t and immanent objects of that text. 
What must be added to complete the experiential picture in the model is the co­
present margin, the horizon or ground of the intentional experience. When the 
parties in the communicative transaction of a performance, that is the reader 
and the audience, focus their consciousnesses on the text, the "other" recedes 
into the co-present margin. An audience member, for example, may have 
watched Sarah Burnhart give dramatic readings from Hamlet. The spectator, 
having in a sense bracketed the natural standpoint in order to achieve the 
"willing suspension of disbelief," attends to the words of the tex t as Hamlet’s 
words, not the actor’s. Burnhart becomes part of the ground in which the figure 
of the tex t functions. For this reason, the co-present margin is situated in the 
model so as to place the performer and the "other" (the text) in respective co­
present margins. The immanent content of the text, the text as it is constituted 
in the consciousness during the pre-formative and the performative act, is the 
aesthetic goal of the intentional gaze of each consciousness involved, the 
performer’s and the other’s. Only when this intentionality remains on the 
immanent tex t can the world of performance technique, theatricality, authorial 
intention, and the like stay firmly within the brackets allowing the tex t to 
present itself to be appropriated by performers and audience members.
25Bert O. States, ’The Dog on Stage: Theatre as Phenomena," New
Literary History, 14(Winter, 1983), pp. 373-88.
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It has been demonstrated that human beings attribute causes to the 
behavior of others. It has been suggested that such attributional behavior is a 
phenomenon manifested in the performer's response to  a tex t or the audience's 
response to a performed text. The perspectives of phenomenology and symbolic 
interaction have been presented as viable descriptions of the structure of pre- 
formative and performative events. In these two aesthetic "situations" the text 
is mediated by human experience, particularly the experience of attribution in 
determining the causes of a text's "behavior." The text, as it is 
phenomenologically presented to  the intentional consciousness, assumes the 
privileged position which enables it to become the subject of reflection, a 
reflection that justifies the original purpose of most performances: the mutual 
sharing and enrichment of literary encounters thorough human experience.
Directions for this Study
The following chapters will attem pt a phenomenological description of 
how attribution functions in the performance of literature, concentrating on 
"pre-formance" encounters with a text. The second chapter will provide a more 
detailed analysis of attributional patterns described in current literature. 
Chapter three will explore the concept of the text-as-an-other, and introduce 
some helpful theories of M. M. Bakhtin and Martin Heidegger. Chapter four will 
place Newcomb's symmetry model into a phenomenological context, and produce 
a descriptive model of the "pre-formative" encounter with a literary  work. A 
brief concluding chapter will review the new attribution-based theory and will 
adapt the model to the situation of the public performance of a tex t. It is the 
goal of this study to produce a model that will illuminate the experience of
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performance, and also to suggest some rehearsal methods which will aid 
performers in fuller, richer interpersonal experiences with the narrators they 
meet in literature.
Chapter Two
THE FUNCTION OF ATTRIBUTION IN THE PERFORMER’S 
EXPERIENCE OF A NARRATOR
An unemployed man is turned down for a prospective job. He comforts 
himself with the knowledge that the employer "must have been trying to fill a 
quota of women." A high school student with high math scores on standardized 
aptitude tests is failing algebra. When questioned by her guidance counselor 
about a possible explanation, her reply is that she "has just never been able to do 
math." The dem ocrat-on-the-street decides that he "just doesn’t like 
Republicans" and term inates his weekly racquetball game with a Republican 
friend. A performer preparing a public reading of William Faulkner's "A Rose 
For Emily" decides that the story's narrator is sexist.
All of these individuals are exhibiting an extremely common psychological 
behavior called attribution. Attribution theories are concerned with how human 
beings arrive a t determinations of the causes of everyday events, particularly 
the causes of the behavior of others. A person's attribution of cause may be in 
response to an event ("Why didn't I do well on that test?"), to an object ("Why 
can't I learn about cars?"), to the perception of some other person ("Why is she 
hiding the fact that she doesn't like me?"), or even to one's self-perception ("I 
just don't get along well with children").
Any one of these beliefs about causation is an example of one of the many 
varieties of attribution. In the last twenty years, research and inquiry 
concerning attribution has become increasingly important to such varied 
disciplines as psychology, sociology, communication, education, and even
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philosophy. Kelley and Miehela report that there have been approximately 900 
pieces of work in attribution theory since its official beginning in 1958.* Another 
recent text asserts that, "Based upon the sheer volume of empirical research, the 
attribution theory perspective can be regarded as the primary paradigm in
o
contemporary social psychology."* Most attribution studies concern either 
intrapersonal or interpersonal communication. Not surprisingly, attribution 
theory incorporates several important interpersonal theories into its field of 
inquiry, particularly the theories of cognitive dissonance, balance and 
congruence.
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief history of the 
development of attribution theory in order to describe the concept of 
psychological imbalance (assymetry) which is central to this study. This short 
review of attribution literature will provide the basis for the summary list of 
attribution patterns that conclude the chapter. This list is prefatory to chapter 
three, which will describe how these attribution patterns work in the dyadic 
encounter between a performer and the narrator of a given text, William 
Faulkner’s "A Rose For Emily." At the end of this chapter, a basic model of 
attribution (Newcomb’s Symmetry Model) will be proposed as the core of a model 
that will describe how attribution functions in the engagement between narrators 
and performers.
Charles Antaki, "A Brief Introduction to Attribution and Attributional 
Theories, in Attributions and Psychological Change, ed. Charlies Antaki and 
Chris Brewin (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 19827, p. 6.
2
Marvin E. Shaw and Phillip R. Costanzo, Theories of Social Psychology, 
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 232.
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Basie Assumptions of Attribution Theory
Stephen Littlejohn reports that attribution theory "uses a
phenomenological view of interpersonal perception, investigating the processes
by which people make inferences about themselves and others."5* Unlike other
psychological theories of communication, attribution theory assumes an
experiential rather than an empirical world view. That is, its subject is
experience rather than objective phenomena. At the risk of over-simplification,
this world view may be described as subjective (as opposed to empirical) or
inductive (as opposed to deductive). The attribution theorist assumes that "part
of knowledge is a priori; that reality results from human interpretation. Reality
is in flux and exists only in context. Most knowledge is implicit or tacit. Reality
4
is in personal experience." The world view of such theorists then, sees human 
knowledge as a construct of the individual which results from the "symbolic 
interaction" between persons or, more generally, from "transactions between the 
knower and the known."5’ It is crucial to the understanding of the attribution 
process to keep in mind this experiental view of the subject because it accounts 
not only for the broad range of attribution studies, but also for the difficulty 
researchers have had in measuring and quantifying results of the more 
empirically-styled experiments.
Bernard Weiner, one of the more empirical researchers, defines another
3
Stephen W. Littlejohn, "An Overview of Contributions to Human 
Communication Theory from Other Disciplines," in Human Communication 
Theory, ed. Frank E. X. Dance (New York: Harper and Rowe Pub., 1982), p. 264.
4Littlejohn, p. 264.
5Littlejohn, p. 264.
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basic assumption of attribution. Weiner's field of inquiry, like that of the actor 
or performer, is human motivation, and in his description of attribution he 
echoes other theorists in aligning the mental process of attribution closely with 
logic:
A central assumption of attribution theory, which sets it apart 
from pleasure pain theories of motivation, is that the search for 
understanding is the (or a) basic "spring of action." This does not 
imply that human beings are not pleasure-seekers, or that they 
never bias information in the pursuit of hedonistic goals. Rather, 
information seeking and veridical processing are believed to be 
normative, may be manifested in spite of a conflicting pleasure 
principle, and, a t the least, comprehension stands with hedonism 
among the primary sources of motivation.6
Weiner is referring to dyadic encounters between human beings here, but 
his description can also be applied to the experience a reader has with the 
narrator of a novel, short story, or poem. This observation is particularly true 
when the reader is planning to give a performance of the text. In such cases, the 
reader experiences the narrator many times during rehearsals and must 
consciously reflect on that narrator's verbal behavior if the performer is to 
successfully embody, or become, the narrator in performance.
When I seek a full understanding of a prose text, one that I wish to 
perform for an audience, I might do well to begin dram atistically. I might ask 
myself who this narrator is. I must also make inferences about who the narrator 
is addressing and about the situation or context in which the utterance occurs. 
Weiner implies strongly that logical cognitive processes have a great deal to do
g
Bernard Weiner, "A Theory of Motivation for Some Classroom 
Experiences," in Perspectives on Attribution Theory and Research: The Bielefeld 
Symposium, ed. Deitmar Gorlitz (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1980), p. 40.
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with the attributions we make about an other’s behavior. This "logic" is present 
even if the other's behavior causes us discomfort, sadness, pain, outrage, or any 
other emotion that is not pleasurable in the simplest sense of that word.
William Faulkner's novel The Sound and the Fury, for example, is narrated 
in part by Benjy Compson, a retarded man in his thirties. As a performer, I 
experience Benjy primarily on a verbal level, since I must read rather than hear 
his discourse. His behavior may exasperate or shock me; but if I am going to 
fully know Benjy's experience, I must infer motives for his actions. In doing so, I 
will be using the quasi-logical process called attribution.
Other than the fact that attribution is experiential, phenomenological and 
closely related to logical cognition, there are widely differing perspectives on 
the attribution process which are perhaps most apparent in the descriptions of 
models of types of attribution. These models have evolved in the direction of 
increasing complexity, but have revealed a surprisingly small number of 
attributional "patterns." A brief chronological overview of the development of 
these models reveals the richness and diversity of this generic and 
comprehensive "mother-theory." Such a history will also reveal the degree to 
which intrapersonal experience depends on deep feelings of "balance," 
"congruence," or "symmetry" within the perceiver. Finally, this summary will 
introduce the seminal work of Fritz  Heider and Theodore Newcomb, which is 
crucial to my proposed model.
A Very Brief History of Attribution Theory
The study of the causes of human behavior is a t least as old as recorded 
history; Tragedy (arguably the oldest form of literary art) seeks to justify (i.e. to 
discover the causes of) "the ways of God to man." However, the contemporary
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investigation into the process of attribution can be said to have had its genesis in 
the balance theories of Fritz Heider. In 1958, Heider, an early German Gestalt 
psychologist who emigrated to America in 1931, published his major statem ent 
on what was to become a primary theory of attribution. Heider's proposition was 
that "a major, if not the major job of the perceiver in understanding the world, 
social as well as physical, was to find the underlying causes of the things that he 
or she saw happening within it . . . ."^ Heider's work has channeled all 
subsequent research into two primary attribution patterns. What Heider did was 
to break down ordinary explanations into two sorts—personal and environmental 
causes. In other words, Heider believed that persons find the causes of things to 
be the product of either external environmental forces or internal behaviors of 
individuals. This breakdown has been a common element in most of the recent 
work in attribution.
Heider arrived a t his theory in an interesting way. In his very first paper 
on attribution, published with Marianne Simmel in 1944, he describes an 
experiment in which deaf children were shown a film in which several abstract 
geometric figures (a circle and two triangles) moved about randomly. When 
questioned about their reactions to the film, nearly all of the children perceived
Q
the movement "in terms of some kind of give and take between persons." Heider 
reports that the subjects found it all but impossible to discuss the film without 
anthropomorphic descriptions of the interaction of the geometric shapes. This
7
Charles Antaki and Chris Brewin, Attributions and Psychological Change 
(New York: Academic Press, 1982), p. 6.
g
Fritz Heider, "On Balance and Attribution," in Perspectives on 
Attribution Theory and Research: The Bielefeld Symposium, ed. Deitmar Gorlitz 
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1980), p. 12.
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study made Heider realize "the great importance that attribution places in
person perception, attribution understood here as the connection between a
perceived change (Geschehen) and a person conceived of as causing the change by 
g
some action."
There is an abundance of more recent studies which similarly suggest our 
human tendency towards anthropomorphism and attributions of cause. 
Experiments such as those of Michotte reinforce the notion that our perceptions 
of real or fictional others, are quite similar.
The Belgian psychologist Michotte (1963) reports a number of 
simple experiments which show that people immediately perceive 
causality. A small object, A, glides along and touches a stationary 
object, B. A stops and B immediately begins moving in the 
direction A would have taken. In this situation subjects say that A 
pushed B or caused B to move. If, on the other hand, the 
movement of B is delayed for a brief time (more than 0.2 seconds) 
after A strikes it, the perception of causality is destroyed. From 
this small demonstration we can a t least say that subjects have a 
bias toward using causal language; moreover, there is every 
evidence that the perception of causality in this situation is direct 
and immediate.
If humans perceive geometric objects anthropomorphically and attribute 
causes to the "behavior" of these objects, likewise we may do the same thing 
when we encounter Faulkner’s Benjy, Melville’s Ishmael, or even Jane Austen, as 
she narrates her novels. Phenomenological descriptions of our experiences of 
real or fictional others can help us to focus on the mental processes which 
control our perceptions. If I wish to embody my perception of Ishmael, I must be
9Heider, p. 12.
^ A lb ert H. Hastorf, David J . Schneider, and Judith Polefka, Person 
Perception (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970), p. 63-64.
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able to describe it, and my description is likely to include what I perceive are 
causes.
Attribution theory can reveal to me the structure of that perception, 
allowing me to study my own response to Ishmael. If I can discover why I 
perceive his behavior in a certain way, I can clear my mind of presuppositions, 
prejudices, and expectations, and perhaps get closer to the inner life of this 
character by attributing motivations for his symbolic actions. Only then can I 
honestly embody him in performance. Heider's work, since it is essentially 
intrapersonal, can aid the performer in categorizing his or her attributions 
concerning a narrator’s behavior.
Heider's second paper, also published in 1944, is based on Wertheimer’s 
famous laws of unit-formation which sta te  that ’’parts of a visual field which are 
close together or are similar to each other will be seen as belonging together, as 
forming one unit.'’** Heider extends these factors to influence any phenomenal 
causation. For example, an aesthetic judgment of high artistic  value will carry 
more weight if given by someone of high prestige because that ’’prestige’’ will 
place the critic in closer proximity to the concept ’’a rt’’ or ’’great a rt’’ than one 
would perceive an unknown critic. Similarly, in Browning’s poem "My Last 
Duchess," the narrator, the Duke of Ferrara, is placed in close proximity to his 
a rt collection. But it is this very closeness that causes me to  perceive him as 
distanced from human and personal considerations. I feel a psychological 
imbalance or lack of moral similarity between myself and the Duke. The Duke's 
closeness and affinity to his wife's portrait are causes of my attribution of
1 B e id e r, P. 12-13.
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coldness and aestheticism to his character. On a more literal level, a man 
running down a street one block from a bank that has just been robbed could 
easily be perceived as a suspect simply because of the physical proximity 
between object (bank) and person. Heider's formula for this important law of 
attribution is written thus:
If a ^ p ,  there is a tendency to attribute a to p.
(a=act, p=person,/-^= "is related to").
Heider's term "balance" then, deals with the fundamental human tra it of
attem pting to make order out of the chaos of sensual phenomena. This attem pt
often takes the form of attributing similarity to objects because they are close
in proximity, or attributing close proximity to objects because they are similar.
All human stereotypes are based on this principle. Attitudes, feelings and
emotions are not considered in Heider's balance model, only "interactions
between causal units and other units. For instance, how may the appearance of a
causal unit be induced by similarity or how may a belief in a causal unit induce
13phenomenal similarity?" A freshman who believes that a major interest in the 
fine arts induces snobbery, may actually perceive the phenomenon of snobbery in 
graduate students of the music department. The fact that Browning's Duke is so 
much prouder of the painting of his wife, than he was of the lady herself, causes 
me to attribute coldness and aestheticism to his character. Describing reasons 
for the behavior of others makes it possible for me to understand them better. I 
am lead to a feeling of psychological balance when I can say "I know why he did
12Heider, p. 13.
^H eider, p. 16.
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that and I can cite the behavior that lets me know it."
As Heider himself defines it, "balance deals with relations of relations;
and dyadic arrangements in which the relations of the two items are all positive
1Aor all negative will be harmonious,"1 and seem to have order. When I see the 
Duke's relation to the portrait and to his wife as negative, I feel that I 
understand his essential character and therefore feel comfortable with my 
attributions because I understand their causes.
Attribution and Person Perception
In 1965 Jones and Davis developed a more specific model based on
Heider's balance theory. Their model was restricted to human behavior and
concerned itself with "how people decided that what a person did was due to
15some long lasting tra it the person possessed." The major proposition of the 
model, called the Theory of Correspondence Inference, is that the more a 
perceiver could discount external causes, the more he or she could explain 
another's behavior by internal or dispositional causes. Here again is the 
distinction between the two basic types of attributions, external/environmental 
and internal/dispositional. The former is how I come to understand situations. 
The la tter is how I come to know characters.
The correspondence model is based on two simple formulas. The first 
deals with the number of unique features of a behavior, which Jones and Davis 
refer to as non-common effects. The perceiver first calculates the range of 
effects likely to be produced by the other's action, then reckons the effects of
^H eider, p. 18.
^A ntaki, p. 7.
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whatever actions he or she had decided against. If there is little  or no 
overlapping in the two sets of effects, those actually produced and those which 
were consciously decided against by the other, then the perceiver cannot be 
accurate in deciding "which of the effects of the chosen action had been 
specially significant in making the (other's) mind up."16 In other words, the less 
unique the effects of a person's actions are, the less likely is an observer able to 
decide on the motivation for that action. In the Browning poem, the Duke insists 
tha t only he can draw the curtain revealing the portrait of his last duchess. This 
action is distinct enough to allow me to attribute a disposition for "ownership" 
and "privilege" to his character. The Duke's most reasonable alternative would 
be to allow a servant to draw the curtain, but he has consciously decided against 
this action. His insistence about reserving this particular task for himself 
produces an effect of submission on the part of the emissary who is the listener 
to the Duke's discourse. It is the uniqueness (i.e. the degree) of this e ffect of 
submissiveness that allows me to attribute dispositional qualities to the Duke.
The second formula in the Jones and Davis model concerns desirability; 
How socially desirable is the unique (or non-common) e ffect of a particular 
action? For many years in this country, "pornographic" literature was defined as 
literature that was consciously designed to have one (and only one) unique 
e ffect—to arouse sexual desire in the reader. This e ffect was socially 
undesirable. Many writers of the realistic period (such as Ibsen, Gorky, or Zola) 
dealt with socially undesirable subject m atter such as venereal disease and 
prostitution. These writers might have chosen to explicitly describe physical
^A ntak i, p. 7.
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symptoms of syphilus or the details of the sexual ac t. According to the Jones 
and Davis Model, the fact that these writers did not choose to be explicit about 
these m atters, is not likely to be due to some particular disposition on their part 
to avoid such description, but rather to the external constraints placed on them 
by social desirability. In short, "people use information about a person’s choices 
and their consequences to arrive a t a decision about his or her personal 
dispositions."1  ^ These inferences are rationally connected either to dispositions 
of the person, or to environmental and social forces beyond the person’s control.
Both Heider and Jones and Davis assume that perceivers make logical (if 
not always correct) inferences based on received information. But it was H. H. 
Kelley who, in 1967, devised a model that combined Heider’s internal and 
external bases for attributions under the principles of logical mental analysis. 
Kelley's work analyzed a particular type of communication situation. Whereas 
Jones and Davis had dealt with instances in which the perceiver could discover 
information about only one behavior of the other, Kelley extended his model to 
include those cases in which the perceiver knew something about the history of 
the other person’s previous behaviors. This is often true of our experience of 
literary  narrators. Even in so short a poem as "My Last Duchess," I infer that 
the second wife's fate may be similar to that of the first wife because I have 
already attributed certain stable dispositions to the Duke. As I read a novel, I 
build up in my memory a repertoire of narrative behaviors and use them to infer 
future behaviors. For example, I have grown accustomed to Jane Austen's 
tongue being in her cheek when she makes unqualified pronouncements. I know
^A ntaki, p. 11.
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that it will be profitable to read Austen's novel Emma, even though I am familiar
with a le tte r of hers describing the heroine as a character "no one but myself
will much like." Irony is a consistent behavior of Austen's narrators and of
Austen herself. Anyone who has read much Austen knows to take the first
sentence of, say, Pride and Prejudice with a grain of salt.
Kelley states that the perceiver collates information about behavior from
three sources: consistency information (how often has the actor done this in the
past?), distinctiveness information (how often has the actor done this in different
circumstances?) and consensus information (How many other people have done
that sort of thing in those sorts of circumstances?).*®’*® All these three bear on
one question: Did the behavior covary equally (that is, did it vary
isomorphically) with the actor? In other words, Kelley is stating that in
searching for the causes of other people's behaviors, a person tends to look
(either consciously or unconsciously) "for the causal candidate which is most
20closely associated historically with the event being explained."
Thus far I have concentrated on how attribution functions in the pre- 
formative act, when the actor is the textual narrator and the observer is the 
rehearsing performer. But attribution is also a t work in the recital hall or 
theatre  during the performance; the only difference is that the performer
*®Antaki, p. 8.
19These three elements are combined into "high Consensus" and "high 
consistency" in Robert Raron and Don Byrne, Social Psychology: Understanding 
Human Interaction, 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1977).
20Antaki, p. 8.
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becomes the "actor" of the model, and the audience takes the part of the 
observer.
Actor’s Versus Observer’s Attributions; The Performance Situation
The terms actor and observer can become confusing unless we remember 
the dual focus of this study. We are investigating the functions of attribution in
(1) pre-formance and (2) the actual situation of public performance. In the 
former situation, the narrator is the actor, and the performer is the observer 
who listens and attributes causes to the narrator’s behaviors. In the recital hall, 
the performer becomes the actor as she/he embodies the narrative voice. The 
audience members observe the performer’s behaviors and attribute them, either 
to the environment of the performance, or to the "stable" disposition of the 
performer.
As a performance progresses, audiences usually shift the focus of their 
attention from the performer to the fictional personal embodied by that 
performer. That is, audiences privilege the fictional characters over the 
performer as performer. When this event occurs, the audience’s attributions are 
to these fictional persona and are still of two basic types—dispositional or 
environmental. In the former case we attribute a character’s actions to some 
stable disposition of his or her personality; in the la tte r case, we see the fictive 
world as the primary cause of a character's actions.
Of course, in the performance of non-dramatic texts, there is often little  
or no conscious differentiation in the minds of the audience, between the 
performer and the narrator. In the eyes of the audience, the two often coalesce 
into one actor: the narrator of the tex t. Nevertheless, when we attend to the 
performance as the actions of a fictional narrator, we do not forget the
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performer, we simply de-privilege that performer, placing him or her in the 
peripheral consciousness while we attend to the fictional persona. 
Experientially, audience members often enter into a "dialogue" with the fictional 
narrator more than with the performer who embodies that narrator. It is true 
that we usually encounter the performer as performer first, and then gradually 
that performer recedes into the peripheral consciousness as we focus on the 
embodied narrator.
Consider, for example, the theatrical situation in which a well-known 
actor (a "star," if you will) steps out onto the stage in the role of Hamlet. It is 
not uncommon for an audience, upon recognizing the actor, to burst into 
applause, momentarily interrupting the dramatic illusion. The audience 
collectively experiences the actor as a performer, not as Hamlet. It may take 
several moments of concentration by both the performer and the audience for 
the "star" to recede and the audience to focus its attention on the character of 
Hamlet.
Attribution research suggests that the attributional patterns of actors 
differs from those of observers. This is true whether the actor is performing 
Hamlet or simply interacting symbolically through language in the course of a 
social conversation. In both interpersonal and fictional encounters, an actor is 
placed in relation to one or more observers. The current trend in attribution 
theory is to distinguish between the attributions of observers and those of actors. 
Using the terminology of attribution theory, we may define actor as anyone who 
is performing an action, whether in real life or in fiction. In this study, I am 
reserving the term "performer" to designate anyone who takes on and embodies 
fictional persona. The term "actor," while it includes the "performer" is simply a
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broader generic designation that can also include social encounters.
There is one crucial difference in the attributional tendencies of actors as 
compared with those of observers. K. G. Shaver, in attem pting to summarize 
research on the actor/observer distinction, concludes that "actors tend to 
attribute the causes of their behavior to stimuli inherent in the situation, while 
observers tend to attribute behavior to stable dispositions of the a c t o r I n  
other words, during those relatively passive moments when we observe others, 
we tend to look for personality tra its  to explain their behavior. But when we are 
acting (in everyday life or on a stage), we tend to see the social or physical 
environment as the primary cause of our behavior.
When performers embody the narrative voice in a work of prose fiction, 
they often focus their creative consciousnesses on the epic situation, the 
"telling" of the story. In such instances the narrator becomes the actor. 
Performers would do well to become aware that it is a human tendency to 
attribute one’s own actions to environment and to possibly forget the 
dispositional causes for their own actions. It is also true that narrators, like 
characters in a traditional play, are responding to a situational context rather 
than simply responding to their own internal dispositions. They tend to respond 
to the world rather than to themselves. Likewise, when I embody the narrator of 
"A Rose For Emily," I must place myself imaginatively in that narrator's 
experiential context and respond to that rather than to my own personal 
insecurities as a performer. I must forget my struggles with the narrator’s 
southern accent, for example, and respond to the audience as if they were the
21 Kelley G. Shaver in William D. Wilmot, Dyadic Communication 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1980), p. 58.
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narratee implied in the story. Or, if I decide to place a narratee on stage with 
me, and focus on him, I would bracket the audience and locate my fictional world 
solely on the stage.
In many ways, attribution is a process of mirroring, a mirroring of 
ourselves. We look to the others in literary texts for confirmation of our own 
beliefs, for reassurances about our fears, for advice, and for fulfillment of 
certain fantasies. One of the most basic problems of literary criticism is the 
tendency of readers to see in texts only those elements with which they can 
agree or feel comfortable. Psychological balance is something we all seek 
between ourselves and the others we encounter. There is ample evidence that 
people will go to great lengths to rationalize another's behavior in order to 
justify it, or to in some way bring it into balance with his or her own inner sta te .
One of the most common errors made in encountering others is projection. 
There is disagreement among psychologistat as to just what this term means,
but, for our purposes projection refers to the tendency to attribute to others
22feelings that are really our own. If I know, for example, that as a Southerner, 
I am chronically critical of what I assume to be the racial prejudice of other 
Southerners, I must be careful not to project those holier-than-thou feelings onto 
the Southern narrator of "A Rose For Emily." In this case projection (attributing 
to  others attitudes that are really our own) is merely a very strong form of 
attribution. Too much projection in social engagements is aberrant and can lead 
to misattributions with negative communicative consequences. For the 
performer, not only can projection result in the serious misinterpretation of a 
tex t, but it can prevent the performer (or the general reader) from the empathic,
99 Antaki, p. 10.
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experiential involvement that is required if literature is to expand our lived 
experience as human beings.
I must allow the narrator's discourse to disclose itself to me; and, in order 
to do this I must bracket my presuppositions, allowing the other to be as he or 
she truly and fully is. To avoid projection or other misattribution we must 
reflect carefully on our attributions about literary others. A knowledge of the 
structures and functions of attribution can aid the performer in the self­
reflection necessary to his or her understanding of the behavior of a narrator.
Many of the attribution theorists, regardless of their individual emphases, 
agree that the conscious mental processes of humans are essentially rational, 
th a t is, tha t the structures of our responses to others are logical structures, 
based on perceived connections between actions, dispositions, and environments. 
It must be mentioned here that several researchers such as E. J . Langer and 
Daryl Bern have called this notion into question. Bern (1967) goes so far as to
suggest that attributions are often no more than "guesses based on overt
23behavior." Bern brings the theories of attribution to bear specifically on self­
perception, using the models of Kelley and of Jones and Davis. In doing so, Bern 
opens up a new line of inquiry in the study of attribution. Kelley's and Jones’ and 
Davis' models concentrate on the judgments of an observer; Bern extends their 
models to cover the actions of the actor as well, suggesting that, in some cases, 
actors cannot rely on their own private information (about consistency, 
distinctiveness, or consensus) in explaining what they are doing or what is
23Antaki, p. 11.
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happening to them. "They use what they can see or hear (in the contextual
9dmoment), just as an observer would
This concept may prove helpful for the performer of literature. During a 
public performance, the good performer "forgets" or places into the peripheral 
consciousness her/his own ego and personality in order to become the narrator in 
the text. That embodied narrator does not reflect on his/her own attributions 
but rather, as Bern suggests, on the contextual moment, the "is-ness" of that 
moment. The narrator is caught up in the world of the story or poem.
However, what one experiences in performance, i.e. the lived experience 
of the literary other, is the result of a long process of self-reflection during pre- 
formance. As I prepare a performance of "A Rose For Emily," I react to a 
narrator; but I also reflect on my reaction and analyze my own attributions 
concerning the narrator's behavior. During the rehearsal period, a knowledge of 
the structures of attribution can being the performer to a fuller understanding of 
the interior life of the narrator and can also help the performer analyze his or 
her own deep response to that narrator.
Attribution theory is phenomenological in its insistence on the importance 
of context. As a performer, a knowledge of attribution can help to remind me 
always to check to see whether the other's behavior is a simple result of his or 
her own stable disposition, or, as is more often the case, a result of complex 
situational and dispositional factors. When I live through a narrator's 
dispositional tendencies and his or her situations context, I am doing something
24Irene Hanson Frieze and Daniel Bar-Tal, "Attribution Theory: Past and 
Present," in New Approaches to Social Problems: Applications of Attribution 
Theory, ed. Irene Hanson Frieze, Daniel Bar-Tal, and John S. Carroll (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1979), p. 5.
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close to what professional actors refer to as "creating a subtext." I am looking 
behind the narrator's utterance for the motivations and internal thoughts that 
cause the utterance.
Festinger and the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
One of the several important researchers who have concentrated on the 
attributions of actors rather than observers is Leon Festinger. He has proposed 
two theories crucial to the understanding of attribution. The first, published in 
1954, is Festinger's theory of social comparison which "assumes the existence of
a basic drive within individuals to evaluate their own opinions and to compare
25their abilities with those of other people." Festinger maintains that, when we
can find no objective or nonsocial means for evaluating our own behavior, we
26must resort to comparison with others. Admired people, whether real or 
fictional, become mirrors of what we hope to become and our self-esteem is 
largely dependent on the comparison of ourselves to these others. For example, 
an adult son might attribute professional failure to himself if he was not "as far 
along as his father was" a t the same age. Likewise, a reader might dismiss his or 
her own carefully considered interpretation of a soliloquy of Hamlet's because it 
was in opposition to the views of Coleridge, A. C. Bradley, or Northrop Frye.
In the pre-formance situation, the actor is the story's narrator who speaks 
to an observer, the reader. It may seem close to ridiculous to speak of a 
fictional actor, the narrator, say, of "A Rose For Emily," as making attributions. 
This difficulty is overcome if we keep in mind the phenomenological perspective
25Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford Univ. Press, 1957), p. 13.
26William W. Wilmot, Dyadic Communication (Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co., 1980), p. 49.
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which breaks down distinctions between subject (reader) and object (narrator). I 
constitute the narrator as an other and, although denied the crucial non-verbal 
modes of person perception, I am peripherally aware of that narrator’s 
"perception” of me, the reader. This concept has surfaced in recent literary 
theory as the "implied reader" or the "narratee." In many texts there are obvious 
clues that signal such narrative attributions to the reader or listener. A brief 
example will serve to illustrate.
There are many indications that the narrator of "A Rose For Emily," 
attributes a certain age and sex to the listener to his discourse. The women in 
the story are consistently referred to as "they" or "them" and are obviously a 
class of people from whom the narrator and the listener are excluded. Given the 
historical setting of the narrator's telling of this story, and the implied sexism of 
his language, it is probable that the narrator attributes "maleness" to the 
listener. Likewise, when the narrator refers to the "next generation, with its 
more modern ideas," it would not be irrational to infer that he is excluding the 
listener from that "next generation." Indeed, part of the power of this story lies 
in the comfortable relationship between the narrator and the listener, who seems 
to share the narrator's subtly sexist viewpoint as well as his approximate age. In 
short, the narrator attributes dispositional similarities to himself and the 
listener, making the narrative contract masculine, comfortable, and almost 
intim ate. There are, of course, other possible readings of this text. A case 
could be made for a female narrator, for example. This reading is a good 
example of textual probabilities arrived a t via attributional behavior.
All of these conclusions might be debatable. It is true that attributions by 
a reader are more frequent and obvious than those "attributions" made by the 
narrator within the text. The point here is that interpretations were achieved
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through attributional behavior of the part of the reader/performer. Knowledge 
of attributional patterns makes it possible for the performer to reflect more 
critically on his or her own interpretative strategies. In the above example, 
attributions about the narrator were based largely on the reader’s "social 
comparison" of himself with the narrator just as Festinger suggests people 
behave in the social world.
Festinger’s second theory, that of "cognitive dissonance," is closely 
related to his first. Published in 1957, the theory states that two elements of
knowledge "are in dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse
27of one element would follow from the other." The feeling of dissonance in 
such a case would be psychologically uncomfortable and the person would be 
impelled to rationalize this dissonant tension into a feeling of consonance or 
balance. This rationalization process is, of course, attribution. A famous 
historical example of dissonance occurred when the playwright Chekhov, who 
was on his death-bed, sent his final play to his long-time friend and collaborator, 
the director Stanislavsky. The production of the play, The Cherry Orchard, was 
one of the few theatrical failures of Chekhov's career. This failure was due 
largely to the fact that Stanislavsky did not receive Chekhov's instructions that 
the play was intended as a new kind of comedy, assumed that a dying man would 
write a tragedy, and therefore misinterpreted the play. In fact, a similar 
misinterpretation had occurred during the Moscow Art Theatre's earlier 
production of Chekhov's The Sea Gull. The playwright's dramatic works up to 
this point had been plot-oriented farces such as The Bear and The Marriage
27Jerry V. Pickering, Theatre: A History of the Art (St. Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Co., 1978, p. 492.
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Proposal. The attributional principle of consistency lead the company to expect 
a similar kind of plot-oriented drama in The Sea Gull. "The director and actors 
were unable to understand the concept of a drama in which mood and talk was
O O
more important than plot and action, and the play was a failure."'2'0 
Congruity Theory
The concept of psychological imbalance as a primary cause of attributions 
has taken many theoretical forms that are more apparent than real. According 
to  Severin and Tankard, "a relationship may be logically inconsistent to an 
observer while psychologically consistent to an individual who holds the obverse
O Q
beliefs." The doctor who is waiting for permission from parents to administer
life-saving medication to a dying child, might experience extreme dissonance
when confronted with the parents' refusal due to religious convictions. This
doctor might go so far as to attribute negative qualities to religion in general
and might angrily express his or her feelings to the already suffering parents.
This action would be in line with Festinger’s idea that "the greater the
dissonance, the greater the pressure to reduce it, hence the greater the chance
30for attitude change in the direction of the public act or behavior." Similarly, a 
young person with a feminist viewpoint, preparing to embody the narrator of "A 
Rose For Emily," might attribute negative sexist qualities to the narrator when 
he says that "only a woman would have believed" Colonel Sartoris's story to Miss 
Emily about her tax exemption. An older male reader, influenced by the
O O
Werner J . Severin and James W. Tankard, Jr., Communication Theories 
(New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1979), p. 161.
OQ
Severin and Tankard, p. 163.
30Severin and Tankard, p. 158.
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ideology of his generation, might attribute no conscious cause to this narrative 
behavior. Obviously, attributions are a cause of rich interpretive possibilities in 
different performances of the same text. Further, an awareness of attribution 
patterns helps the performer to overcome her/his presuppositional biases and 
blind spots, ultimately allowing a richer and fuller performance.
    - Attitude change has-been associated .with- attribution 'from the outset.
Wayne Booth and others have recently brought the idea of attitude change into 
respectability again in the field of literary theory with their new emphasis on 
ethical criticism. In 1956, two years before Heider's seminal paper, Osgood and 
Tannenbaum identified what they later called "a special case of Heider's Balance
Theory."^ * Their Congruity Theory "deals with the attitudes persons hold toward
32sources of information and the objects of the source's assertions." In the pre- 
formative situation, the source of information is, of course, the narrator and the 
objects of the narrator's assertions are the events and existents of the story. 
The Congruity Model is based on the assumption that simple (i.e. extreme) 
judgments are easier to make than refined or highly sophisticated ones. It is 
perhaps easier for the feminist reader to attribute sexism to Faulkner's narrator 
and the more conventional male reader to perceive a humorous shared attitude 
about the gullibility of women. A person feels a sense of congruence when the 
message that person receives and/or the source of the message agree with his or 
her world view. It has been shown, for example, that people tend to attribute 
feelings of dislike to bearers of bad news and vice versa. As a hypothetical
31Severin and Tankard, p. 158.
32Severin and Tankard, p. 159. In this sense their theory is similar to that 
of Cartwright and Harari (1953), who first introduced the term "degree of 
liking."
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example one might point to the blasphemous old joke about Easter being 
cancelled because the body of Christ had been found. The telling of this joke 
would be more than enough to create a lasting and extremely negative 
impression from millions of people. Osgood and Tannenbaum are interested not 
only in the facility with which people form extreme opinions, but also with the 
"degree of liking a person may have for a source and the object of an 
assertion ."^  it is easier, according to these theorists, to identify closely with or 
react strongly against persons, sources, or objects than it is to discriminate fine 
differences between ourselves and them. Attribution research suggests that we 
tend to make extreme attributions, such as "good" and "bad" rather than see the 
complex and sometimes contradictory motives or situational factors that govern 
behavior. It is easier to see the similarities between ourselves and Ishmael than 
to see those between ourselves and Ahab.
One of the common causes of the novice reader's misinterpretation of a 
character in a novel is stereotyping. Often, we tend to place characters in 
extrem e categories such as "good" or "bad," "protagonist" or "antagonist." In the 
complex form of the novel, such unqualified distinctions are often no more than 
simplistic stereotyping. Similarly, a common fault of the beginning performer is 
to decide on a given (dispositional) quality in relation to a character, say 
"nobility" or "greed," and to perform only that quality rather than the actions of 
the character which are richly complex and constantly changing. The performer 
of the novel must attend to a great deal of material.
33W. E. Henley, "Invictus," in The Communicative Act of Oral 
Interpretation, ed. Keith Brooks, Eugene Bahn, and L. Okey, (Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon, 1967), p. 106.
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The principles of "selective exposure" and "selective attention" are more 
well-known aspects of congruity theory. In the complicated process of selecting 
what messages, persons, or objects to which we will give attentional priority, we 
often avoid those elements which are not congruent with our world view. There 
are many behavioral devices (such as denial, incredulity, or attacking the 
credibility of the speaker) which we employ to deal with feelings of incredulity. 
All of these devices are attributions of causes for effects we cannot accept.
Dr. Francine M erritt, a professor of oral interpretation a t Louisiana State 
University, often tells her students a story of a former pupil's reaction to a 
particular poem, which will serve as a good example of the congruence principle 
a t work. The poem being discussed in class was W. E. Henley's Invictus. Nearly 
all critics agree that the speaker of the poem takes a pointedly agnostic stance:
t
Out of the Night that covers me,
Black as the pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever Gods may be 
For my unconquerable soul.
A young nun in Dr. Merritt's class presented a lengthy discussion of the poem as 
an exemplar of Catholic dogma. This is, a t best, a highly questionable 
interpretation, but it reveals the power that an individual's world view holds over 
his or her perceptions. The nun had brought this agnostic and humanistic 
statem ent into consonance with her religious beliefs and maintained her 
simplistic viewpoint rather than admit to subtleties of interpretation. The nun 
was experiencing cognitive dissonance with the world view of the poem's speaker
34John C. Condon, Jr., Interpersonal Communication (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1977), p. 167.
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and attributed meanings to it which would bring it into balance with her personal 
religious convictions. This is the kind of "doctrinal adhesion" that I. A. Richards
oc
so often warns interpreters to try to overcome. A knowledge of our own 
personal attributional tendencies can help us in this effort.
Process Versus Content in Attribution
In discussing Robert F. Bale's book, Interactional Process Analysis, John 
C. Condon sees as one cause of attributions a dissonance in the "dialectical 
theme of 'procedure and substance' or 'process and content.'"^® The implication 
is that we tend to read the discourse of others in terms of either the 
communicative process or simply in terms of the contents of the discourse. For 
example, the newcomer in a group of old friends will often experience dissonance 
and make attributions based on the fact that he or she must pay a great deal of 
attention to communicative procedure, whereas the old friends simply 
concentrate on content or substance. In such a case the newcomer (essentially 
an observer) would selectively perceive and attribute different causes to the 
behaviors of the group than would the old friends. To repeat Shaver's 
observation, the observer would attribute behavior to stable dispositions of the 
actors (e.g. "They're all just a bunch of football nuts.") while the actors would 
attribute behavior to stimuli inherent in the situation ("This is the first time 
we've all been together since the Alabama game.")
^A ntak i, p. 5.
Og
Antaki and Brewin, p. 14.
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For example, let us say that I am placing myself in the position of the 
listener to the narrator in "A Rose For Emily.” The narrator begins with the 
statem ent ’’When Miss Emily Grierson died our whole town went to her funeral." 
If I am going to use an interpersonal metaphor in my attem pt to live through the 
epic situation, I must assume that the telling of this story begins in medias res. 
That is, I have to assume that the opening line of the text is not the first 
utterance in this interpersonal encounter. There must a t least have been some 
social amenities that the author has chosen to leave out. I must fill in these 
interpersonal gaps in the narrative if I am to fully create the situational context 
of the telling. Therefore, I ask what this opening statem ent by the narrator 
might be in response to, that is, what has happened between the narrator and the 
listener just prior to this first sentence. I intuit that the listener has just made 
some reference to Miss Emily Grierson, and perhaps has even asked the narrator 
to tell him about her. In such a case, I could consider the narrator's first 
sentence a "process statement," delivered specifically in response to the 
listener's question. It is intended by the narrator to carry on the communication 
situation.
However, the following paragraphs of the story are expositional and could 
therefore be interpreted interpersonally as "content statem ents" that are 
intended primarily to convey information. Content statem ents do not have much 
to do with the quality of the communicative relationship between the narrator 
and the listener. That is why the average reader would be likely to experience 
this story strictly as "content" or "exposition." But the performer might benefit 
greatly by asking whether the lines of the tex t imply content or relational 
messages, or both.
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The experienced reader of Faulkner revels in the constant references to 
other plots and characters of Yoknopatawpha, phenomenologically gathering 
more and more of the Faulkner canon into the reading experience; the hapless 
virgin Faulkner reader, attem pting to comprehend the narrators of Absalom, 
Absalom, is like a newcomer in a long-standing group. He or she may be so 
overwhelmed by the substance of the plot, that the process of the novel, that is, 
the narrator’s verbal behavior, is beyond his or her comprehension. This is why 
Faulkner readings, whether pre-formative or in actual performance, are often 
problematic. The performer who addresses the audience in his/her own person 
and explains carefully the necessary allusive background to difficult passages in 
Faulkner, is helping that audience to gather the requisite materials for adequate 
understanding. After such an introduction, the performer might more 
successfully recede into the horizon and allow the audience to foreground the 
narrator.
Attributional Theories: The Effects of Attribution
The ubiquity of attribution in the commonsense daily social lives of 
humans is apparent. However, simply investigating the ways in which people 
search for the causes of their own or others' behaviors fails to take into 
consideration one important aspect of attribution: that is, how these
attributions affect the individuals who made them. How do my pre-formative 
attributions affect my final performance?
A family of theories closely related to attribution has appeared more 
recently to deal with this question. Attributional theories, as they are called,
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07have appeared primarily in the field of motivational psychology. The most 
influential branch of attributional theory is probably Bernard Weiner’s 
attributional theory of motivation. As Antaki and Brewin sta te  it:
Weiner takes Heider's internal-external cause division and cross 
cuts it with two others: stability (a cause can be long lasting, like 
habitual laziness, or likely to change or go away overnight, like a 
causal mood) and control (a cause can be brought under someone's 
control or it cannot—effort, say, is something one can control, but 
luck is not). Once one has these three dimensions one can see what 
people attribute their successes and failures to, and one can make 
predictions about how that attribution is going to affect their 
future work. . . . unlike the first two dimensions, control is 
more applicable to attributions of other's behavior than it is to 
one's own.38
Weiner's experiments have dealt primarily with students' motivations (or 
lack of motivation) for tasks encountered in the classroom experience. 
Principally his experiments have sought to answer the question ''How do 
attributions of success or failure influence students' performances on classroom 
tasks?" Stated briefly, Weiner's results strongly suggest that "ability, effort 
(both typical and immediate), and task difficulty are among the main perceived
OQ
causes of achievement performances."
To evoke again an example involving the response to a literary text, a 
pre-med student who has made a low grade on a poetry analysis in an English 
class might rationalize her performance on the grounds that her ability lies in
37Bernard Weiner, "A Theory of Motivation for Some Classroom 
Experiences," Journal of Educational Psychology, 71, No. 1 (1979), p. 4.
38Antaki and Brewin, p. 15.
OQ
ovAntaki and Brewin, p. 15.
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the sciences rather than the humanities, that she would have done better if she 
had just expended more effort or that it was the instructor’s fault for assigning 
such a difficult poem. The effects of these attributions on this student’s self­
perception are obvious. The perceived causes are also in line with Heider’s 
balance theory and the congruity theory of Osgood and Tannenbaum.
Difficult or problematic author’s are often neglected by performers 
because of similar attributions. A general knowledge of attribution can help in 
the performance of these difficult but rewarding works by providing performers 
with a means by which they can analyze and reflect on their own response to the 
narrator of the text.
Summary
Attribution theory is based on three assumptions about people’s behaviors:
(1) We attem pt to determine the causes of behavior.
(2) We assign causes systematically.
(3) We are affected by the assigned cause.
Further, the theory assumes that humans are essentially homeostatic, balance 
seeking creatures. Attribution is the process by which we often achieve this 
desired feeling of balance, consonance, or congruity in relation to objects 
including literary texts. We look for information about the consistency or the 
distinctiveness of behaviors in order to arrive a t conclusions about the causes 
and motivations of that behavior. Another prominent attribution pattern is 
consensus or the degree to which the behavior of the other, in our case the 
narrator, complies with social and literary norms or conventions. But the most 
fundamental patterns of our attributional behaviors are the tendencies to see the
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actions of others as results of either some personal quality inherent in the other's 
personality, or of some element in the social or physical environment.
Attribution theory is a broad subject which can be applied to a vast range 
of intrapersonal and interpersonal human actions. It is crucial in our perception 
of others, whether real or fictional, and in our perception of ourselves. 
Attribution allows us to make order out of the chaos of our sensual world, and to 
achieve balance, congruity and identification with that world by refining our use 
of logic in discovering the causes of what we do and who we are. If attribution 
can so greatly inform our knowledge of our experience of the phenomenal world, 
it  can do the same for the limitless worlds of fiction and poetry, allowing those 
worlds to present themselves to us not as objects, but as experiences.
Summary; Patterns of Attribution in Literary Response
A performer in rehearsals of a non-dramatic tex t must embody the 
speaker of that text. It makes no difference whether the narrator is constituted 
as an implied author, as omniscient or limited, as actively or only peripherally 
involved in the story or poem. What does m atter most to the performer is the 
character's actions and the motivations that prompt them. To embody a narrator 
we must understand the motivations and live through the actions of that 
narrator. A knowledge of how attribution functions in our perception of others 
can provide the performer with a means of structural analysis of what she/he 
may already know intuitively; that humans seek a rationale for human behavior 
and we employ a kind of logical process in order to explain the causes of others' 
behaviors.
Attribution theory can aid in our understanding of narrators, and it can 
also help us to examine and reflect on our own interpretive strategies.
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Attributions to other's behaviors provide our principal means of knowing 
narrators; attributions to his or her own response can provide the performer with 
a self-reflexive tool for examining interpretive strategies and for making 
informed, less biased performance choices.
Attributions, whether to our own behaviors or those of others, fall into 
two basic categories: those actions that we attribute to the personality of the 
actor (dispositional attributions) and those actions that we attribute to the 
immediate context or environmental pressures on the actor. A major theoretical 
distinction exists between what Heider called internal and external causality.
Internal causality is more subtle, complex, and harder to analyze than 
external causality because it requires some degree of understanding of the lived 
experience of the other. Heider further divides internal causality into two 
subtypes: First, there is perceived personal causality, which means that the 
observer believes that the actor consciously tried to cause a particular effect. 
In contrast is what Heider called "perceived impersonal causality,"^* which 
suggests that, although an effect was produced by a narrator's actions, and those 
actions were motivated by his or her personality, the performer believes that the 
narrator did not consciously seek to produce those effects. Questions concerning 
what a narrator wants to do (intention) and how hard that narrator tries to do it 
(exertion) are crucial determinants of our attributions of cause for the narrator's 
lived experience. Some recent theorists have summarized Heider's distinctions 
this way:
40Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 67.
41 42’ This model is a specific application of Theodore Newcomb's 
Symmetry Model in The Acquaintance Process (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1961), p. 12.
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In his discussion of how people analyze action, Heider points to 
variables which are important determinants of our attributions of 
dispositional properties to others. We take into account 
information regarding the strength of environmental forces in 
describing whether or not the other caused the effects, and we 
then infer both how able he is and how hard he is trying. Heider 
focuses attention on the distinctions between internal and external 
causality, personal and impersonal causality, and on the fact that 
our perceptions regarding can and tr^  determine to a great extent 
the attribution of both intent and dispositional properties to 
others.
If we, as performers, attem pt to embody narrators, then we must live 
through the narrators' experiences. We must come to an understanding of the 
narrator's conscious or unconscious rhetorical strategies. To do this we must 
bracket or suspend the commonsense idea that the narrator is a fictional 
construct of words on a page, a compilation and expression of the real author. 
We must believe in that narrator, and constitute him or her as a living, 
breathing, motivated other. Therefore we must attend to a narrator's actions 
just as we would reflect on the behavior of a real friend or acquaintance. The 
performer must see narrative actions, then, as behaviors. It is when we are most 
attendant to a narrator's strategy that we become conscious of the behavior of 
the narrator and infer causes for that behavior.
When we gather these internal and external causes into our experience of 
the narrator, we are creating an inner life that allows us to live through the 
immediate experience of the narrator's telling of the story. Attribution theory 
can provide the performer with the knowledge of structures of behavior that can 
help that performer enter the narrator's experience. Rather than indicate the 
narrator's experience, we, as performers, should make every attem pt to live it. 
This is perhaps the central goal of interpretation: to allow students, through
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performance, to live through the experiences of literary personae and therefore 
widen their own experiential knowledge.
Toward an Attributional Model of the Pre-formative Experience
The goal of this study is to produce a model that will describe and 
illuminate the performer's experience of narrators and audiences. I have argued 
that, because attributional behavior is a t the center of our experience of 
narrators in literary texts, it can be situated a t the core of my proposed model. 
Although there are a number of variations, the basic attributional model is either 
intrapersonal, involving a person's (the performer's) experience of an object (the 
narrator), or interpersonal, in which case the narrator becomes the "other" in a 
dyad which now stands in relation to an object (X ).^
Performer /O th er
.Narrator)
Subject of the discourse
between P and O 
(fictional events and existents)
43Newcomb, p. 12. Newcomb presents the "strain toward symmetry" as 
an attributional law:
"In propositional form, the stronger A's attraction toward B, the 
greater the strength of the force upon A to maintain minimal discrepancy 
between his own and B's attitude, as he perceives the la tte r, toward the same X; 
and, if positive attraction remains constant, the greater the perceived 
discrepancy in attitude the stronger the force to reduce it. We shall refer to this 
force as strain."
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The object (X) in the above model is understood to be the subject of the 
discourse, or the immanent, imaginative events and existents of the text.'*'* If I 
decide to "study" a famous nursery rhyme, for example, I might find myself as a 
performer (P) engaged with the rhyme’s narrator (O) concerning a little  girl 
named Mary (Xi) and her lamb (X2>- Or, I (P) might engage the narrator of 
Faulkner's story (O) about Miss Emily Grierson (Xj) and the town (X2). In the 
pre-formative situation, there is usually a performer, a narrator, and a large but 
finite number of events and existents concerning which the narrator addresses an 
audience.
These three elements are the basis of Newcomb's Symmetry Theory, the 
attributional paradigm discussed in chapter one that forms the basis of my 
adapted model. If we remember that attributions are controlled by the degree of 
liking that exists between and among the three elements, we can begin to 
suggest how the model describes the experience of pre-formance. If I come to 
trust the narrator of "A Rose For Emily" and even to like him to a certain 
degree, this positive relationship will obviously a ffect my degree of liking for 
(i.e. my experience of) Miss Emily Grierson.
A positive relation between P and O will increase the likelihood that P
45will also perceive X positively. According to Newcomb this triangular 
relationship is controlled by a strain toward symmetry, the tendency of humans
44Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse (Ithaca Cornell University 
Press, 1978), p. 19.
Chatman identifies the event of a tex t as its "actions and happenings"; 
the existents of a text include its "character and items of setting."
45Newcomb, p. 12.
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toward balanced (i.e. similar) perceptions of the people with whom they 
communicate, and the subject m atter of those communications.
When I read Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, I am presented with four 
different narrators: Benjy, Quentin, and Jason Compson, and the omniscient
narrator of the final section. All of these narrators would be different others (Q) 
when I (P) encounter them. All have a very different relationship to Caddy 
Compson, who becomes the (X) of the model. Benjy worships Caddy and, because 
I encounter Benjy first in the novel and sympathize with him, I am inclined to 
sympathize with his sister also. However, I may question the inarticulate Benjy's 
ability to convey his true feelings. There is a positive symmetrical relationship 
that governs the "degree of liking" I have for Benjy and for Caddy.
By the time I have reached Jason’s section of the novel I have formed a 
very negative perception of him. When Jason, as narrator, engages me in 
reference to Caddy, the relationship is asymmetrical. My relation to Jason is 
controlled by my negative degree of liking for him. So that when Jason 
derogates Caddy, I attribute his remarks to generally negative and stable 
dispositions in his character.
This attribution is prompted by the assymetrical relationship described in 
the above model. Newcomb's general principle is that conscious rationalization 
or attribution is most likely when the observer (P) has different qualitative 
perceptions of the other (O) and the object (X).
My perception of Caddy Compson must gather in all the perceptions of 
her three brothers as well as the perception I form based on their descriptions of 
her, and the view of her I get in the final section from the omniscient narrator 
(who I may also constitute as the implied author).
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This example illustrates one of the most important ways in which 
attribution functions in the performer's pre-formative encounter with a narrator. 
It is not difficult to see similar relationships existing in the actual performance 
situation, wherein the audience (P) observes the mediated behavior of an 
embodied narrator (O) about one or more objects (X). The only major difference 
is literally who the audience is encountering. A given audience member may 
constitute (P) as a "performer" and never enter the text imaginatively; whereas 
the person sitting next to him may constitute the other as Jason Compson, 
allowing the performer-as-performer to recede into the phenomenological 
horizon. In either case, attributions are controlling the audience's experience of 
the text.
Conclusion
Attribution theory informs us about how we all tend to behave in relation 
to others. It can also inform us about how we "read," both literally and how we 
interpret the actions of others. A knowledge of the attributional patterns that 
influence encounters with literary others can aid the performer in his or her own 
responses to texts. In terms of the pre-formative experience of a text, 
attribution theory alerts the performer to common patterns of thinking that 
might easily lead him or her to reductive or unlikely interpretations.
If a performer remembers that psychological imbalance or any feelings of 
uncertainty about the events and existents in a text can produce a "drive state" 
that causes attributions, then that performer is more likely to reflect more 
carefully on his or her attributions, possibly making those attributions less 
reductive, simplistic, or extreme. When a narrator or character behaves in 
unexpected or "non-common" ways, the performer is wise to reflect on all of the
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possible causes for that behavior. Attribution theory provides the performer 
with some good questions to ask in analyzing his or her response: Is the behavior 
consistent for this speaker? Is the behavior normative or likely to be performed 
by other types of characters or narrators as well (consensus)?
Finally, the symmetry model of Theodore Newcomb alerts the performer 
to the dynamic, mutable structure of the triangular relationship that exists 
between performer, literary speaker, and the object of that speaker’s discourse. 
These three entities are not mutually exclusive in the act of pre-formance. They 
interpenetrate one another and influence one another. Major patterns of 
attribution, particularly dispositional and environmental attributions, gather in 
rather than reduce the experiential perception of literary others. The following 
chapter will investigate in more detail the role of symmetry and attribution in a 
pre-formative encounter with the narrator of William Faulkner's "A Rose For 
Emily."
Chapter Three 
THE TEXT AS OTHER:
THE MANY VOICES OF PROSE FICTION
The complexities of the reading experience will not be reduced in our 
attem pt to focus on attributions in pre-formance. Rather, we will keep 
constantly in mind the Gestalt of the performer's experience and make sure that 
our proposed model does not reduce it. It is precisely for this reason that 
attribution theory, with its complex phenomenological base, is such a felicitous 
paradigm for the study of literature in performance. Our goal is an eidetic 
description of pre-formance, not a parsimonious theory.* The experience of 
performing literature is extremely complex and phenomenology, particularly as 
it is manifested in attribution theory, can help to clarify those complexities. A 
phenomenological description of the conscious act of pre-formance can highlight 
the function of attribution in the interpretation of literary others without 
reducing the experience to summary theoretical statements.
When we encounter narrators, characters, and implied authors in texts, an 
important part of our experience is attributional. If we attribute motives to the 
behavior of one of these others, we are, in effect, interpreting the text. 
Attribution then, is fundamental to the conscious experience of literary 
interpretation. And we know from experience that every reading of a text is but 
an instance of that text. No two readings are exactly alike. Therefore, our 
description of the experience of literary others must embrace complexity rather
*This search for description rather than theory is, of course, the primary 
reason I have employed the methodology of phenomenology.
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than avoid it. This chapter, in attem pting such a description, will discuss various 
ways in which critics have constituted texts as other (i.e. separate) entities, and 
then will break down those distinctions between self and other by revealing how 
attributions of the individual performer actually help "create" a particular 
instance of a text.
A Phenomenology of Pre-Formance
Humans tend to concentrate their attention on one thing a t a time, even 
though this focus may change drastically from one second to the next. When I 
reflect on Faulkner's intentions during a reading of "A Rose For Emily," I am, for 
the moment, only peripherally aware of a dramatistically conceived narrator, the 
physical milieu of the story, or the way I might use dialects in a performance of 
the text. These are all a part of my Gestalt experience of the story a t a given 
moment, but they form a background or matrix for my focalization of authorial 
intention.
One of the cornerstones of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is the fact
O
that human consciousness is always conscious of something. When we 
adequately prepare a great text for performance, we might attend to any number 
of intrinsic or extrinsic elements, all of which are inseparable parts of our 
experience of the text—an experience we hope to translate into performance.
Human experience is fluid, mutable, and many-layered. It is controlled to 
a large extent by the flux of temporality and the environment of the perceiver. 
If, while preparing "A Rose For Emily" for performance, I focus my attention on
o
Edmund Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (1913; rpt. New York: 
Collier Books, 1962), p. 108.
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the physical appearance of Miss Emily Grierson, I would, in Husserl's terms, be 
"intending” Miss Emily as a focal object a t that particular instant. However, in 
the background of my consciousness, I might also see the room in Emily's house 
where I picture her standing, or I might dimly sense the narrator's valuation of 
Emily, my own personal experience of eccentric senior citizens of the South, and 
many other related perceptions. In phenomenological term s, I would be 
"intentionally focused" on the face and body of Emily, but this experience would 
also include the aforementioned related perceptions as part of the "ground" of 
my experience of the figure that is grounded in the general consciousness of the 
person—a combination of all of his or her lived experience up to and including 
that particular moment, and even incorporating the hopes and future 
expectations of the person. And at the instant that my consciousness focuses on 
another object in the tex t, such as Emily's eyes "like two lumps of coal," my 
intentional focus changes but retains the ground of Miss Emily's face within the 
field of my perception. My intentional gaze can shift from eyes to face to room 
to South to world as I think about what I read and intend to embody in 
performance.
Husserl used the term "intentionality" to denote the focus or the figure- 
in-the-ground of general consciousness:
It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual 
cogito to be a consciousness of something . . .  In so far as they 
(internal experiences) are a consciousness of something they are 
said to be "intentionally related" to this something.
As a performer reads a tex t, his or her intentional focus can shift an
3
Husserl, p. 108.
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almost infinite number of times. But the various intentional objects cannot be 
separated from the contextual ground of the performer's consciousness. The 
ground can give rise to figures and these figures are what they are because of 
the ground in which they are set. An eighteenth century whaling manual has less 
than universal appeal. But when it is set in the midst of a novel its essential 
nature as a whaling manual is changed; it becomes part of an artistic  work of 
epic proportions; and when we read this manual in exerpts in Moby Dick, we 
constitute it differently because of its context. It is, incidentally, in the same 
manner that our attributions about people are so heavily influenced by the 
context or environment. We often perceive others as figures in a complex 
contextual ground.
Phenomenologist Calvin O. Schrag provides an exemplary description of 
the essential inter-connectedness of figure and ground. He refers to experience 
as a "configuration" in which the various constituents of the experience are 
woven inextricably together. Schrag says that these constituents
. . . include experiencer, act of experiencing, figure, and 
background. The presentational complex of the experiential field 
is that of experiencer-experiencing-figure-with-background. The 
insertion of hyphens between the words is neither arbitrary nor 
accidental. They are grammatical indices of the bonds or 
connective tissues within experience and are essential for grasping 
the field notion itself. Experience, in its lived concreteness, is 
the act of experiencing figures (objects, events, situations, persons, 
moods, chimeras, hallucinations) not in isolation but contextualized 
within both determ inate and indeterminate backgrounds. Every 
experience has its figure and background.
The way in which these constituents are interconnected, says Schrag, is
^Experience and Being (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969), p. 18.
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the primary subject of the description of any experience. There is no way to 
separate the listener from the narrator in "A Rose For Emily" because objects 
and perceivers are part of the organic whole of the experience of perception. 
Everything that influences the perceiver—values, attitudes, beliefs, distractions, 
environment—is an essential part of the experience. We may focus on one part 
of the experience a t a time, say our attitudes toward the author, or the South, 
but as we do, we are seeing those attitudes themselves as figures in a contextual 
ground. We attend to the pattern of the weaving, even though our momentary 
gaze is on an individual thread. The pattern  is primary to consciousness; the 
thread itself is secondary.
The consciousness of a performer constantly shifts from primary to 
secondary levels during pre-formance. One moment I might "see" the image of 
Miss Emily as the narrator does, but if, in the next instant, I reflect, however 
briefly, on the narrator’s valuation of her, I have shifted my intentional focus 
from a primal "living-through" of the narrator’s telling to a secondary level of 
attention to the narrator’s attitude towards Emily. That is, I have shifted 
attention from an existent in the tex t (Miss Emily), to the narrator's reasons for 
describing her in the way that he does. This secondary attention, involves a 
reflective or pre-reflective attribution as I mentally posit reasons for the 
narrator's attitude. Either intentional object (Emily herself or the narrator's 
a ttitude toward her) is a momentary focus of my attention, and, as such, exists 
only in its relation to its phenomenal field. This field or "horizon" contains every 
constituent of consciousness, including memories and expectations, that have 
contributed to the complete experience of the figural object.
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Nowhere is the interpenetration of figure and ground more revealing than 
in the human experience of language. Words exist within context. They gather 
meaning from the historical, social, and psychological ground in which they are 
used. Prior to World War n, the word "aryan" had few, if any, negative 
connotations. As a word, that is, as a linguistic symbol that names one of the 
world’s numerous racial groups, the word produced a relatively neutral effect. 
But, for anyone who has lived through the middle of this century, the word 
cannot be divorced from the context of Nazi racial policies in the Third Reich. 
The word "aryan” now summons an entire world to our consciousness—a world 
that most of us never experienced directly, but which nonetheless produces 
powerful resonances that are an essential part of our experience of that word.
If it is to avoid reductivism, our proposed model of pre-formance must 
account for the complex figure-ground relationships in our experience of literary 
language. In order to accomplish this, I will borrow a literary theory proposed by 
M. M. Bakhtin, a Russian critic who also maintains that a given word or phrase 
summons many different contexts. He calls the theory "dialogism" because it 
stresses the inter-relatedness of the various contexts in which a particular word 
can figure. Later in this chapter Bakhtin's conception of literary language will 
be set forth and applied to "A Rose For Emily."
It is because of the situatedness of language that our literary  experiences 
can be as rich and as personally stamped as they are. Narrative is language and 
language gathers worlds unto itself. Narrators in prose fiction can communicate 
with us only through language. As others, these narrators are inextricably bound 
to  the world that their language summons. World and narrator constitute each 
other, in the same way that the image of an old woman is altered drastically
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when we place an infant in her arms. The juxtaposition of youth and age 
summons the temporal world, the human life cycle, the vague memory of our 
own childhoods and the expectation of death, and brings the poignancy of life's 
final moments into the "now" of our experience. Woman and child constitute 
each other and our intentional focus can shift from one to the other and then to 
a secondary level of more abstract and universal meaning.
When I, as a performer, undertake the first critical reading of "A Rose 
For Emily" prefatory to performance, the intentional focus of my consciousness 
is in a sta te  of constant change, flowing, and gathering the events, images, 
voices, and devices of the tex t into a complete experience. I hear the narrator's 
voice in the opening paragraph; in the second paragraph I sense the voice of the 
implied author; I see Miss Emily's corpse, vaguely, for she has not yet been fully 
described to me as a living being; I see for an instant, her funeral; I see the 
townspeople, the stiff men and the curious women; I see the Grierson house and, 
a sentence later, I set this house amidst old cotton gins and gas stations. With 
each new detail of the text, my intentional focus changes, and yet retains all 
that I have read up to that point. As the text unfolds in my consciousness, the 
words of the text call the peculiarly Southern world of the story into living 
presence within my consciousness.
If, on a second or third reading, I constitute the tex t as the speaking voice 
of a narrator, my experience of the text is no less complex. I begin by focusing 
on the narrator, and on his language as "speaking," as verbal "behavior." 
However, when the narrator describes something, such as the Grierson house, I 
momentarily attend to that house, making the reported architectural details the
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figure of my consciousness, and allowing the presence of the narrator to become 
part of the ground, or "setting" from which those details emerge.
Language is one of the principal modes by which we apprehend other 
human beings. However, in literature, language is the only mode of encountering 
the other consciousnesses contained in the tex t. In attem pting to know fully the 
narrator of a story, we are denied the nonverbal channel of communication and 
must therefore depend on the language employed by that narrator, constituted as 
his or her verbal behavior, to reveal the narrator to us.
At the same time, I experience the words of the text as a speaking that is 
much more than the expression of a narrator. Language does more than express 
thoughts. In the case of the literary work, language literally calls the fictive
5
world into being. In the words of Martin Heidegger, "Language speaks."
Heidegger's simple proposition, that "language speaks," is deceptively 
complex in its viewpoint. We might argue, for example, that language does not 
"speak," but, rather, it is people who speak by way of language. But the language 
of a literary text, is not the actual utterance of another consciousness. It can be 
attended to as such, and embodied as such, but it also remains as the original 
words on the printed page. As Georges Poulet characterizes it, the 
consciousness behind literary language differs from a flesh-and-blood 
consciousness in that it
is open to me, welcomes me, lets me look deep inside itself and
5
This concept is explored a t length by Heidegger in "Language," in Poetry, 
Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (rpt. New York: Harper and Row,
1971), pp. 189-210.
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even allows me, with unheard of license, to think what it thinks and 
feel what it feels.
It is in this way that printed words "speak.”
They speak, according to Heidegger, because they "name."^ Language 
names things; this naming calls the named things into presence and presents 
them to the consciousness of the listener. When I read the first paragraph of "A 
Rose For Emily," the words of the tex t call into presence and place near to me 
the once-living, but now dead Emily Grierson, her funeral, the men and women 
who attended it, and the "inside of her house." Moreover, it calls a social world 
into being. I read, "When Miss Emily Grierson died," and, as I read it, the use of 
the word "Miss" calls the world of Southern courtly traditions into living 
presence within my consciousness. It is in this way, Heidegger says, that 
language itself speaks:
The naming calls. Calling brings closer what it calls. However this 
bringing closer does not fetch what is called only in order to set it 
down in closest proximity to what is present, to find a place for it 
there. The call does indeed call. Thus it brings the presence of 
what was previously uncalled into a nearness. But the call, in 
calling it here, has already called out to what it calls. Where to? 
Into the distance in which what is called remains, still absent.
The calling here calls into a nearness. But even so the call does
g
"Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority," in The Struturalist 
Controversy: The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, ed. Richard 
T. Macksey and Eugene Donato (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1972), p. 57.
7
Martin Hiedegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 191ff.
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not wrest what it calls away from the remoteness, in which it is 
kept by the calling there. The calling calls into itself and 
therefore always here and there—here into presence, there into 
absence.
Miss Emily and her world are made present to me through the naming 
accomplished by the language of the tex t. This language brings her world near to 
me, and yet allows it to remain remote and separate from me a t the same time. 
The text literally calls the world to me by naming its parts, but somehow this 
tex t remains immanent and "other" within my consciousness.
Heidegger makes the point that everyday discourse is no less a naming and 
a calling than the language of literary works. In this he reinforces our analogy 
between social and literary engagements. However, he argues, literary language 
is often perceived as dwelling on a higher level, more ordered, more complete, 
and richer than everyday language. And yet, ontologically speaking, the 
language of a poem and the language of everyday discourse, differ only in the 
degree to which they call a world and make it present.
Mortal speech is a calling that names, a bidding which, . . . 
bids thing and world to come. What is purely bidden in mortal 
speech is what is spoken in the poem. Poetry proper is never 
merely a higher mode (melos) of everyday language. It is rather 
the reverse: everday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up 
poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer.
The opposite of what is purely spoken, the opposite of the 
poem, is not prose. Pure pnose is never "prosaic." It is as poetic 
and hence as rare as poetry.
To illustrate Heidegger's concept, le t us look briefly a t the narrator's use
O
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 198-99.
Q^Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 208.
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of one definite colloquialism in "A Rose For Emily"—the use of the title  "Miss" in 
front of Emily’s name. This device is used throughout the text. It is a 
nomination with which I am very familiar, because I grew up in a small Southern 
town not unlike the one described by the language of this story. When I return to
my home town and hear about "M iss___________ " and "M iss____________ I do
not experience the calling of a world. I have become so used to the title  "Miss," 
in the social context of my home town, that the word has used up its potential 
for gathering the world of that town into it.
But when the narrator employs the term in the first sentence of the story, 
it calls to mind an essential quality of the old South: that is, the courtly
deference and distance between men and women of the upper classes. The word 
also exists in a dialogic relationship with my experience of the current usage of 
the word in contemporary society—at least in those social circles in which I have 
gained my experience. From the perspective of 1984, the word "Miss" conjures 
up the social condition of sexism, and when it is used in the historical context of 
the story, the word gathers into itself the tension between the pre- and post­
feminist views of unmarried women.
Indeed, as I reflect on the narrator's use of it, the title  "miss" calls into 
being the tragic essence of Faulkner’s story.
When Miss Emily Grierson died . . .
I am confronted a t the outset of the story with a doomed woman—a 
"fallen monument." The tragic element in the story involves the reader in 
significant environmental attributions, for, if we see Emily as controlled to a 
large extent by fate  or social forces beyond her control, our estimation and
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valuation of her will likely be less critical than if we attribute all her actions to 
her own dispositions. Emily is described as old (I attribute age to her based on 
the word "monument") and she is also unmarried. I gather my post-feminist 
perspective on the social concept of "old maid," and my attribution of the 
narrator’s view of it as well. "Old Maid" is a term rarely used today because of 
its sexist connotations. But the use of "Miss" by this narrator calls into being the 
sexism of the old South, a social condition which contributes significantly to the 
tragic irony of Emily’s life—an irony that is crystallized in the final macabre 
description of the "bridal chamber" of Emily and Homer Barron.
I could reflect on the term "Miss" as a behavior of the narrator that 
places him in a comfortable relationship with the unintentional sexism of his 
tim e. In other words, I attribute his verbal behavior, i.e. his use of "Miss," to the 
social and ideological context in which he exists. Because of my knowledge of 
attribution theory, I realize that here I am making a typical "observer 
attribution." That is, I tend to see environment as the primary cause of an 
actor’s behaviors. However, I might also attribute dispositional qualities to the 
narrator based on his use of the term . He is respectful of "women’s place in 
society;" he is unconsciously sexist; he probably places himself a t some 
emotional distance from Emily herself, seeing her more as a symbol or a 
"monument" than as an other consciousness. As I attem pt to embody this 
narrator in performance, the language of the text, in Poulet’s words, lets me 
"think what it thinks and feel what it feels." As I move from reflection on the 
tex t to embodiment of it, I move from my own field of figure-ground relations to 
the experience of the narrator's consciousness of figure-with-ground. That is, I 
experience the narrator's experiencing Miss Emily.
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As Martin Heidegger says, individual "things" do not exist separately from 
the worlds in which they exist.
. . . world and things do not subsist alongside one another. They 
penetrate each other. Thus the two traverse a middle. In it, they 
are a t one. Thus a t one they are intim ate.10
This narrator, likewise, does not exist apart from the fictive world of Faulkner’s 
story. He is not merely an element in that world. Narrator and world penetrate 
and depend on each other. There is no better example of this than the 
Heideggerian notion that language—language conceived of as (the narrator’s) 
expression and language conceived of as fictive world—speaks by calling both 
thing and world into presence.
First, consider language as expression. It might be the expression of 
implied author, character, or, in our present case, language as the expression of 
a  narrator. In one sense, language is narrative behavior, but it is much more 
than just that. As Heidegger suggests, language calls the world of a literary 
work into a living presence by naming that world; it is a presence that brings the 
world near and yet, a t the same time, lets it remain absent (i.e. other and 
immanent). Language is expression, but language is also literally, world. In "A 
Rose For Emily," language functions as both thing (narrator) and world—and 
narrator and world interpenetrate and depend on each other. They cannot exist 
separately because they are formed from the same thing. In terms of 
phenomenology’s figure-ground perspective, language-as-narrators-expression is 
the figure in a groundwork of language-as-fictive-world.
10Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 202.
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When I focus on language as the expression of a narrator, I must 
remember that not only does the narrator speak, the language of the text speaks 
as well. Similarly, attributions are of two primary types—dispositional and 
environmental. As I proceed to constitute the tex t of "A Rose For Emily” as the 
expression of a narrator, I must be careful to uncover the world called forth by 
the language of the text. For it is this world that is responsible for much of a 
narrator’s behavior.
At some stage of pre-formance, it is common for a performer to focus on 
the text as an utterance—the spoken word of a narrator, an implied author, or 
characters. As intentional objects any one of these different expressive voices 
exists in relation to the other levels of voice that form part of the ground of the 
reader’s experience. I may, throughout much of my pre-formance, focus on the 
voice of the narrator in ”A Rose For Emily" and attribute qualities to that 
narrator based on his or her verbal behavior. But, these attributions to the 
narrator force me to consider other voices in the tex t—voices that call forth the 
fictive world. For example, if I attribute sexism to this narrator, I will likely be 
impelled to ponder the implied author's attitudes about feminism as well, and, 
perhaps more importantly, to speculate on the sexist attitudes and qualities 
inherent in the world of this story. Any sexism in the narrator is interpenetrated 
by the sexism of Yoknapotawpha. They traverse a middle; they are, in 
Heidegger's sense, intimate.
As the chapter progresses, I will explore more fully the ways in which 
attributions about narrators urge us to set the narrator in an experiential field 
th a t includes implied authors and characters as well as other textual and 
subjective constituents. As I proceed, I will attem pt to keep in mind that all of
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these constituents—implied authors, characters, narrators—are intimately and 
inextricably bound up in the world called forth by the language of the text. 
Attribution will enter the analysis as I speculate on dispositional qualities of 
individual constituents such as implied authors and narrators, and as I reflect on 
the degree to which the fictive world, the context in which these individual 
others act, is responsible for their actions. What follows, then, will be a 
phenomenological exploration of the ways in which attribution functions in my 
own pre-formance of the opening paragraphs of "A Rose For Emily."
Attribution in the Experience of Reading
I encounter a new text in much the same way that I encounter a potential 
acquaintance or friend. I have decided to engage that text in some detail or a t 
some length, just as I engage a person to whom I have decided, for whatever 
reason, to give a fair degree of attention. So, the initial "attraction" to the 
poem, the prose, or the play is determined by the degree of my attraction and 
interest in the speaking voice of the text; perhaps I like the title , the implied 
subject m atter, or I like the author because I have encountered him or her in 
other texts, or perhaps I like the form. In most human interpersonal encounters, 
the first attraction is largely physical or based on presuppositions. Of course, 
there is always the important "contact" one "should" meet, the tex t one "ought" 
to know. Such encounters I approach with an open mind (at the beginning). Some 
of my best "friends" and worst "enemies" were assigned rather than selected 
personally. I have grown to love teachers I first thought were pedantic, or 
affected, or even elitist. The same description applies to my maturing readings 
of Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury or "A Rose For Emily."
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As I read a new tex t, I try to keep an open mind. But first impressions are 
powerful. Often, I find I must struggle with difficult language or syntax, with 
archaism, elliptical form or content, verbosity. Despite my rational intentions 
to overcome such obstacles, they often overcome me and I put the text aside. 
Frequently, it is for no other reason than the fact that I do not feel drawn to the 
way the author (or the text) expresses himself (itself). "When the rash mood is 
on" I don't want to have to work too hard.
But the greatest pleasures in my literary "acquaintances" have come, of 
course, from those texts with which I have had to struggle the most. I fear I may 
never have loved Faulkner, Joyce, Chekhov, or Henry James if I had not been 
assigned to read them in college. On the other hand, I somehow made easy and 
early friends of Homer, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Lawrence, and T. S. Eliot.
As I read the first few words or lines of a work, rarely is my imagination 
immediately rivetted. It takes a t least a few seconds for the physical
environment in which I am reading to recede and the text to become 
foregrounded in my consciousness. Works which open with a vivid image, a 
concrete mental picture, are easier for me to "enter," whether they are good 
literature or not. This initial impression on my imagination makes it easier for 
me to fall into the flow or the rhythm of the work, something which seems to 
take more effort somehow than the simple "picturing" of literary images.
In cases of densely rich literature, I must constantly go back, reread, 
change first impressions, "try out" new interpretations and generally enter into a 
dialogue with the work. During this process, I posit causes for the text's 
behavior and am therefore attributing. Once I am engaged, the greater the 
expenditure of intellectual and imaginative energy, the greater the rewards.
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But, again, I must come to these rich works in the proper frame of mind: open, 
refreshed, anticipatory, with a desire to encounter the particular work, just as in 
the social world my desire to understand the other person is the prerequisite to 
my comprehension of her or him. Attributional behavior is most apparent when 
it  becomes the means of knowing an other we have a strong desire to know.
When I engage a story that I intend to perform for an audience I must 
•listen" to the discourse of that story many times. I will first listen to the text 
in order to be able to speak it. I must gain an experiential entrance into the 
story's characters and its world. This encounter exists over a time period 
beginning with the first pre-formative reading and possibly ending a t the 
conclusion of the final public performance. I can hope that during this 
performance I have done more than get close to the text; I can hope that I have 
lived for a time inside it. One means of doing this is to understand the causes 
for the effects of the tex t by reflecting on my own attributions concerning it.
Despite the fact that I might experientially inhabit the tex t while 
performing, during the rehearsal period I have periodically constituted it as a 
separate other to be known and understood. My attributions of causes for the 
story's effects, the narrator's behavior, and the actions of characters have been 
an integral part of my gradual breaking down of this distinction between my self 
as performer and the tex t. As I read and reread the text, I gather the 
constituents of my experience, reflecting on them in turn, thereby enriching the 
experiential matrix of the text as I proceed. During these rehearsals, the idea of 
the tex t as a separate other is gradually broken down as I seek to weave myself 
into the text, to embody that other within myself. In the case of the narrative
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voice, I move from a dialogue with an other—the narrator—to the embodiment of 
that narrator within my self.
Of course, there are many levels of "voice" in a tex t other than that of 
the specific narrator. As readers and performers, we constitute the various 
voices of literary texts in many different ways. The following pages will present 
a partial list of the possible others inherent in a text such as William Faulkner's 
"A Rose For Emily." This investigation is intended t.o focus on the performer's 
experience of only one of those voices. However, by revealing how attribution 
functions in the performer's experience of the narrator's voice, we can devise a 
model that can be generalized to describe the experience of any discrete voice 
on the text. But first it may be helpful to view various literary approaches to 
the question of the "other-ness" of the text.
The Development of the Interpersonal Metaphor in Literary Criticism
A work of prose fiction can be many things to many people. An individual 
consciousness may constitute a text in various different ways. Modern literary 
theory and criticism has been concerned with the problem of different responses 
to texts, especially since the publication in 1929 of I. A. Richards Practical 
Criticism .** This important study showed us that responses to texts not only 
vary greatly with the individual reader, but that the logic (in the sense of making 
logical connections between causes and effects) behind many such readings 
produces misguided or inadequate readings. When we attribute causes to the 
behaviors of others, we are making what we tacitly assume to be viable
**I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Co., 1929), p. 3-16.
92
connections between actions and the situational or dispositional forces that 
impel those actions. These connections may or may not follow rules of formal 
logic; the point is that we assume that they do.
Different readings of texts are what make them exciting, renewable 
sources of creative raw m aterial for the performer. And yet, a story such as "A 
Rose For Emily” cannot be validly read in any way a reader chooses. However, 
the performer can approach the story by alternately foregrounding an astonishing 
number of different elements, levels, or "voices.” This study concentrates on the 
performer's creative experience of just one of those voices: the voice of the 
narrator, the story-teller, the epic speaker. But if the model I am building from 
attribution theory is to be valid and worthwhile, it must also be applicable to the 
performer's constitution of any of the voices inherent in a text. These might 
include the voices of implied authors, characters, or even ideological "voices" 
such as the voice of religious doctrines, social causes, or political movements. 
These la tte r voices, while not literal utterances in the sense of the "spoken 
word" of narrators or directly quoted characters, do exist within the context of 
the tex t. That is, they are dwelling within the language of the text, within the 
words that the performer will embody. They may not "speak" in the literal sense 
tha t a narrator does as he tells the story or that a character does in direct 
discourse, but they inform the literally spoken discourse and are therefore an 
integral part of our experience of the performed text.
Perhaps the most common way in which readers experience a literary 
work is simply to conceive of it as a separate and complete entity, a "thing-out- 
there" that we call the "text" or the book. The New Criticism and its relatives 
(e.g. the Prague structuralists and the Russian formalists) are primarily
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responsible for this view of the tex t during the middle years of this century. 
Edward Proffitt has recently taken the New Criticism to task for the failure to 
balance the idea of the inviolable text with the idea that literary works, 
particularly poems, are experiential, requiring active engagement by a re a d e r.^  
The image of the critic as a scientific close reader studying the poem for its 
meaning may have led to the renunciation of the sanctity of the text by the 
recent schools of reader response criticism and deconstruction.
But the experiential reality remains. Rehearsals for a performance of 
literature are more properly studied as experiences than as the contemplation of 
an object. If I am asked to write a critical essay on some aspect of "A Rose For 
Emily," I would probably begin with some analysis of the constituents of the 
story and end by describing how those parts fit into the text as a whole. In such 
a case I think of the text not as discourse, not as experience, not as 
communication or dialogue, but as an object called the text: a complete and 
separate entity whose parts I must come to understand. But a performance of 
that text goes beyond the understanding of an object, because once the object is 
understood it must be embodied as human experience.
The objectivist approach to literary study is useful in its insistence on 
logical close readings of particular works. But, for the performer who seeks a 
more experiential entrance into the text, the objectivist model is often too one­
sided, suggesting that a systematic analysis of the part of the reader can most 
adequately explicate the work. A performer must always remain open to all of
12Edward Proffitt, "In Mid-Career: Literary Study and Individual
Growth," Journal of Aesthetic Education, 16 (Spring, 1982), p. 29.
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the possibilities of a work in rehearsal, but he or she cannot deny the affective 
experience of that work. To do so would be to suggest that a "right reading" of a 
tex t never includes the reader's response.
The perspective of the symbolic interactionists, particularly that of 
Kenneth Burke, has done a great deal to adapt the objectivist paradigm so that it 
becomes much more felicitous for the performer who views the literary 
experience in terms of interpersonal communication. Burke, Don Geiger and 
their successors extended the objectivist model to include the dramatic context 
of the utterance that is the literary work. Their perspective allows us to view 
the tex t as the comlete and objectified utterance of an implied speaker. 
Because it is based on a theatrical metaphor, this new perspective came to be 
called dramatism. Dramatism was not yet an interpersonal perspective in that it 
focused almost entirely on the speaker of the utterance. But it did represent a 
move in an interpersonal direction.
Dramatism requires that I ask, first of all, who the speaker of the text
13is. This posits a concrete other in the text, a persona to whose discourse I 
listen and respond. I must also ask about the identity of the implied listener to 
this discourse. Answering these questions will cause me to attribute 
dispositional qualities to the narrator/speaker and to the implied listener.
If approaching the text dram atistically, I would also ask quite specific 
questions about the intentions (purposes) of the speaker's actions and about the
13For a concise explanation of the elements of dramatism (who, to whom, 
what, by what means, for what purpose) see Kenneth Burke, "The Five Master 
Terms," View, ser. HI, no. 2 (June, 1943), p. 52.
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situation or context (scene) in which those actions occur. These questions will
elicit my critical attributions concerning environment.
The dram atistic perspective of performance requires the reader to make
attributions about a text’s behavior. I use the term behavior here advisedly as
the symbolic actions of the speaker of the tex t. As I have shown in the previous
chapter, these attributions will concern individual dispositions of speakers or of
characters, and the literary world or environment in which they exist. The
dram atistic analysis of literary works was a t the forefront of an evolutionary
period in literary criticism that focused more and more on the interaction
between texts and readers, thereby increasing the relevance to criticism of
interpersonal communication theories like attribution. A selective glance a t
several other ’’interpersonal" views of literary response will reinforce my
proposed interpersonal model of the act of pre-formance.
It would seem that speech act theory has taken a vital place in the recent
evolution of literary theory. This theory, promoted by scholars such as G. D.
Searle, A. L. Austin, and Mary Louise P ra tt has, like attribution, been
appropriated from the social sciences. Speech act theory can be described as a
focusing on the acts or the actions, both literal and metaphorical, of the literary
utterance. The basic premise of speech act theory is that words often stand for
14real or psychological actions. In literary response, speech act theory could 
lead us to a concentrated examination of literal or metaphorical verbs.
The narrator of "A Rose For Emily" begins his utterance this way:
14J . L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, ed. J . O. Urmson (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 108.
When Miss EmUy Grierson died our whole town went to her 
funera l. . . 5
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Using a speech act approach, the performer of this sentence, seeking to embody 
this narrator and make the narrator's actions clear to an audience, would 
concentrate on the action on this particular line. That is, the performer would 
attribute causes for this particular utterance of the narrator. One performer 
might perceive the action as "to protest," suggesting that there has been some 
negative criticism of the townspeople's reaction to Emily immediately prior to 
this utterance. Another performer might attribute the action as "boasting,” 
implying that one of the narrator's motives in telling this tale is to gain a 
positive reaction from the listener concerning the people of Jefferson, 
Mississippi. Many other interpretations of the action of this line are possible. 
The point here is that we can experience the language of a tex t not only as the 
utterance or the discourse of an other, but also as the actions of that other.
Concentration on the actions of literary others means that we, as readers, 
respond to those actions. As performers, the structure of our response is 
attributional: we infer causes for the interpretated actions of narrators,
authors, or characters. "Why,” we must ask, "is the narrator boasting?" 
Inferring motives is the primary interpersonal dynamic of a performer's attem pt 
to know the other in the tex t. And without knowing there can be no 
embodiment.
15William Faulkner, "A Rose For Emily," in Collected Stories of William 
Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 119.
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The decade of the seventies witnesses an extraordinary growth in reader
oriented criticism. This type of criticism, while it has taken many different
forms, is important to the performer because it seeks to understand the
subjective nature of individual responses to literary works, including the
subjective pre-formative responses of a performer. Again, subjective responses
to others are controlled, to a large extent by attributions. Many disparate
critics have been grouped together under the aegis of reader response criticism.
Their perspectives range from conservative to radical and reveal other ways in
which readers and performers constitute literary others. Dramatism’s objectivist
view has been incorporated into the more pragmatic context of reader response
critics and it is here that attribution theory can be particularly helpful in
informing us about the dyadic communication between the work and the reader.
Many of the so called reader response theorists have also drawn on
interpersonal metaphors to describe our reactions to literary texts. David
Bleich, a radical exponent of the subjectivity of literary response, has based his
subjective paradigm in part on D. W. Harding’s study of the similarities between
16the situation of social gossip and the response to literature. Both, says
17Harding, are in the mode of response of an "onlooker at actual events." In 
characterizing the other in the tex t as analogous to a social gossip, Harding 
maintains that the correspondent of the gossip-reader is not a collection of real 
people "but only a personae created by the author for the purpose of
16David Bleich, Subjective Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press, 1978), p. 101.
17D. W. Harding, "Psychological Processes in the Reading of Fiction," 
British Journal of Aesthetics, 2 (April, 1962), p. 147.
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1 ftcommunication." While this is but one example of the use of an interpersonal 
metaphor in literary criticism, it is not an uncommon perspective. It supports 
the view of the narrator as a definite other for whose verbal behavior we posit 
causes.
Georges Poulet, a leading phenomenological critic, also sees a close 
resemblance between social and literary encounters. He describes the reader’s 
interaction with
. . . the consciousness of another, no different from the one I 
automatically assume in every human being I encounter, except in 
this case the consciousness is open to me, welcomes me, lets me 
look deep inside itself and even allows me, wiHi unheard of license, 
to think what it thinks and feel what it feels.
Here Poulet has identified a fundamental difference between social and literary 
encounters, but this is not a problem. An attributional theory of literary 
response would welcome the fact that we can reflect on literary language more 
carefully than on transitory social discourse. The longer we reflect, the more 
"verbal behaviors" we can isolate and attend to; the more verbal behaviors on 
which we intentionally focus, the more attributions we can make; and the longer 
we study a literary discourse, the more careful those attributions can become. 
The task of the performer is to somehow manage to clarify his or her 
attributions during the performance. When a text is embodied, the literary 
discourse becomes much closer to everyday discourse in its rapid and inexorable
18Harding, p. 147.
19Georges Poulet, "Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority," in The 
Structuralist Controversy: The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, 
ed. Richard A. Macksey and Eugene Donato (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press, 1972), p. 57.
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delivery. In performance, the fundamental distinction between permanent 
written discourse and ephemeral human speech almost ceases to exist. It is for 
this reason that clarity of intention on the part of the performer is so important. 
Whatever methods of literary analysis the performer uses, he or she will embody 
the textual voices for an audience who will not have time to go back and gaze at 
length into an "open consciousness." Performance is never static. That is its 
richness and its danger.
Whether the critical perspective is dram atistic, speech act, 
phenomenological, or some pluralistic combination of all of these, the performer 
must first constitute the textual other in order to embody him, her, or it. And 
somewhere behind the fictional others in a text (e.g. narrators and characters) 
there is the voice of the authors a voice of which we are aware even as we 
attend to narrators and characters.
Wayne C. Booth is a critic who, for the past twenty years, has provided
literary perspectives that are of particular value to the performer. His theories
have grown out to the rhetorical tradition of the Chicago Aristotelian school and
have embraced dramatism as well as ethical criticism (which he refers to as the
20after-effects of a text). Booth’s perspective is remarkably pluralistic and 
tolerant of other critical positions. For the purposes of this study, Booth is 
important as an exemplar of the reader’s constitution of the other in the text as 
an "implied author." We often reflect on authorial intentions when we read. The 
writer's intentions are a valid clue to meaning. Experientially, the implied 
author is yet another of the textual voices that can arise in a reader's
^®Wayne C. Booth, "'The Way I Loved George Eliot': Friendship With
Books as a Neglected Critical Metaphor," The Kenyon Review (Spring, 1980), p. 
4.
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consciousness against the background of the Gestalt experience of literary 
response.
When I prepare "A Rose For Emily" for performance, I concentrate on the 
narrator’s voice. However, I am familiar with other works by Faulkner and a t 
times during my pre-formative reading, I reflect on (or constitute) a voice in the
text as Faulkner’s voice. Gathering Faulkner’s voice into the multi-level
experience of the text is, according to Booth, a requisite critical method.
Particularly when you read three or four books by the same 
author, you s ta rt making inferences [attributions] that go beyond
the individual imaginative act. You can’t resist and I don’t think
you should resist the temptation to start thinking about the 
qualities of the creature behind all that. I think that because of 
certain modern dogmas about ruling out the intentions of the 
author, we have needlessly ruled out some very .interesting kinds of 
criticism by saying that’s none of our business.
Put briefly, the implied author is the reader's perception of the person 
who wrote the story. The implied author, then, is not to be confused with the 
real author, the flesh-and-blood human being who wrote the story. Rather, she 
or he is a construct of the reader of that particular story or work. Booth implies 
that the constitution of this implied author is an integral part of the reading 
experience.
The value systems we attribute to implied authors are most important. 
For example, we might attribute a high degree of intelligence and rhetorical 
sophistication to Faulkner, a sense of humor to Twain, a sense of worldliness to 
Fitzgerald or Thomas Mann, or a sense of detachment to Hemingway or Robbe-
Mary Frances HopKins, "Interview with Wayne C. Booth, Literature in 
Performance, 2 (April, 1982), p. 49.
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Grillet. The social ideologies of a writer are certainly a part of these implied 
value systems, especially in activist writers like Steinbeck or Alexsandr 
Solhenitsyn. The values and attitudes that we attribute to the implied authors of 
literary works are key determinants of our eventual interpretations and 
performances. In terms of attribution, the degree of identification we feel with 
the implied author’s voice, that is the degree of ’’balance'’ between ourselves and 
the implied author, often directs our response to the events and existents of the 
story.
Booth's theories, grounded as they are in the rhetorical tradition,
appropriate the idea of "shared meanings" between readers and the various
voices of a text. Booth takes the idea of like-mindedness or shared meaning
from Plato (whose term is homonoeia) and sees it as a prerequisite for
22establishing "friendship" with implied authors. Booth’s scheme is to determine 
the degree of (1) intensity and (2) reciprocity in the relationship between the 
implied author and the reader based on the work's apparent purposes or 
intentions. These might include the simple production of pleasurable response, 
utilitarian or pragmatic response (as in "social" works such as Upton Sinclair's 
The Jungle or the feminist works of Simone de Beauvoir, works designed to have 
some rhetorical social purpose), or the intrinsic value of the relationship between 
"poem" and person.
Although my project focuses on the constitution of a narrator's voice, it is 
often impossible to bracket the implied author as I form a performance. When I 
prepare "A Rose For Emily" for the public, I cannot forget my previous reading
99Booth, mThe Way I Loved George Eliot'," p. 4-27.
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of and thinking about William Faulkner. A good example is my pre-formative 
choice about how to convey both the narrator’s and the implied author’s 
intentions on the line about how Colonel Sartoris had
fathered the edict that no Hegro woman should appear on the
stree t without her apron: . . .
As I ponder this problematic and ambiguous phrase I position myself
philosophically in relation to two significant others in my life: my father and the
William Faulkner I have come to know through his works. Both are Southern men 
whom I feel that I know, regardless of the fact that one is real to me and the 
other a construct of my own consciousness. I have, in a sense, constructed them 
both in terms of their relationship to the idea of historical racial relations in the 
South. The chief instrument with which I constructed them was attribution. I 
a ttribute their behavior to the contextual influences of Southern racial issues.
My personal reaction to the edict mentioned in the story is to call up the 
concept of ’’inherited guilt.” The concept that all white Southerners are, to some 
extent, guilty for the social persecution of black Southerners was first presented 
to me in Faulkner’s works. Although the concept is not integral to this particular 
story, I cannot help but gather it  into my reading experience, a t least 
peripherally.
I recall, as a teen-ager, discussing these concepts with my father, who 
would often become almost violently angry a t the idea that he, as an individual 
supportive of civil rights, should feel guilty for the racial inequalities produced 
by Southern society. In terms of Newcomb’s symmetry model I (P) was engaged 
alternately with two others (O), my father and William Faulkner, concerning the
9 ^Faulkner, p. 119.
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inherited collective guilt of white Southerners (X). At this time in my typically 
rebellious youth, I felt more affinity with Faulkner on this subject than I did with 
my father. My positive ’’degree of liking,” that is, my respect and admiration for 
the intelligence and accomplishments of Faulkner, brought me into balance with 
his ideas about collective racial guilt. In the language of attribution theory, my 
positive relationship to Faulkner caused a ’’strain toward symmetry" that urged 
my positive response to his ideas about collective guilt.
My stormy relationship with my father was comparatively negative on this 
subject. At the time I did not know how to articulate "why" this was so. Now, 
because of my knowledge of the structures of attribution, I do. I attributed 
dispositional qualities to my father based on the intensity of his denunciation of 
the collective guilt idea. Although I did not have a word for it a t the time, I 
could easily sense or intuit the dissonance, imbalance, and distress the idea 
caused my father. I decided (attributed) that the cause of this intense reaction 
was a suppressed individual guilt that my father felt about racial conditions and 
his personal prejudices against blacks. I believe that my father had brought 
himself into psychological balance with this concept, by insisting on his own 
individual innocence. I attributed Faulkner’s ideas to his egalitarian social 
stance and his admiration for Southern blacks expressed primarily in his famous 
Nobel acceptance speech, a speech that I know well and that I gathered into my 
reading of all his works.
In performing the narrator's comment about the edict in "A Rose For 
Emily," I must gather in my attribution of where both Faulkner and the narrator 
stand in relation to the edict. And, as the symmetry model (P-O-X) requires, I 
must determine where I stand qualitatively in relation to the edict, and why I
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stand there. In performance, I must embody or become the narrator’s voice and I 
must also embody his stance in relation to the constituents of the story. I must 
both "be" the narrator and, somewhere on the horizon of my consciousness, 
objectify that narrator. It is the tensive pull between these two intentions of the 
narrator's character that has long distinguished the essential nature of the 
performance of literature.
The pull between the constitution of the narrator as an objectified "other" 
and the narrator as a voice to be embodied, also distinguishes pre-formance from 
actual performance. As I prepare to perform "A Rose For Emily" I reflect on the 
nature of the narrative voice. I attribute causes or reasons for the narrative 
behavior. I possibly consult outside sources for critical insights into the text. I 
vary performance choices in order to see which ones most honestly support and 
illuminate the text. I seek to understand the words of the tex t as I rehearse 
them. In short I focus my intention on the text as an other; that is, I conceive of 
the narrator as a part I must play, a role I must take on, a t least during part of 
the rehearsal process. But as I near performance, the text as an entity recedes 
as I move closer to an embodiment of the narrative voice. When I successfully 
embody that text, when I "become" the narrative voice, the figure in the ground 
of my consciousness is whatever object or idea is figural in the narrator's 
consciousness.
For example, when the narrator imagines Emily Grierson framed in the 
distance between her father's legs I (as the narrator) "see" this image also. I see 
what the narrator sees because experientially I am the narrator. And yet, a t the 
same time, I am dimly aware of any extrinsic criticism or personal experiences 
during the rehearsals that have prepared me to see this narrative image in the
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idiosyncratic way that I see it. Performance of the speaker's voice always 
gathers in the whole pre-formative experience.
Obviously, shared meanings have a great deal to do with our degree of
attraction for and our communication with the various others in a text, whether
we constitute the principle voice as implied author, an objectified text, a
narrator, or a character within the discourse. Stanley Fish has argued that when
different readers constitute a text they must, of necessity, constitute different
texts. The reason, according to Fish, that different readers' interpretations of a
given tex t are as similar as they are is that the readers belong to shared
24interpretive communities.
I share social tendencies with William Faulkner, but not necessarily with 
the narrator or the characters in his story. An interpersonal perspective on the 
performer’s response to literature allows a performer to reflect on how he or she 
perceives and interprets the behaviors of the individuals who populate the great 
literary works. If we constitute these literary others as beings whose behavior 
we must understand, we may find the attem pt to embody them through 
performance more complex, more relevant to our own human behaviors. In the 
final analysis, performers do more than embody the printed page; they allow the 
others in the text to inhabit their physical selves, making performance a 
synthesis of text and performer.
Attribution theory can provide a viable means of accomplishing this 
synthesis. If, in pre-formance, we reflect on the causes of the verbal behavior of 
the narrator, we are going to think about the pre-reflective mental activity that
24Stanley Fish, "Interpreting the Variorum," Critical Inquiry, 2 (Spring, 
1976), p. 484-85.
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has resulted in the narrator’s behavior—word choice, tone, stance, imagery, level 
of linguistic sophistication, or any other rhetorical device for which we attribute 
a cause. If we can use the structures of attribution as a guide to thinking about 
the causes of a narrator’s discourse, we are doing something similar to what an 
actor does when he or she creates a subtext for the spoken lines of a character. 
When the causes of a narrator’s behavior are attributed to environment, we are 
constituting the world of the tex t. When we attribute verbal behavior to a 
narrator’s disposition we are building the inchoate, pre-reflective basis for our 
own embodiment of that narrator. In both cases, we are seeking a psychological 
balance between ourselves as performers and the narrator with whom we are 
engaged.
Psychological Balance in the Pre-Form ative Constitution of 
Textual Voices
Most of our great literature resists simple interpretation. Perceptive 
readers are constantly finding valid new perspectives on the classic texts 
because these works are open to us only to the extent to which we can infer 
reasons for their contents, strategies, and structures. Analysis and 
interpretation of a given work are in a perpetual sta te  of becoming and this is 
particularly true in the forming of a performance.
When a performer rehearses she or he varies performance choices on 
individual lines or phrases in order to eventually gather some of these 
possibilities into a performance that does not simplify the rich interpretive 
possibilities in the work. Stanley Fish has written that the very act of literary 
criticism often involves a desire to ’’come to the point.’’ This desire is similar to 
what attribution theorists call a ’’strain toward symmetry.” Although Fish
107
apparently does not know attribution theory, he says that if we are to allow the 
text to ’'become,” we must resist the strain to "come to the point:"
Coming to the point fulfills a need that most literature frustrates 
(if we open ourselves to it), the need to simplify and close.
Although Fish seems harsh in his implied criticism of the objectivist 
position, his statem ent is in support of the basic premises of performance 
studies: the performance of literature allows the text to present itself in various 
living modes and, more importantly through as many living consciousnesses as 
there are potential performers. The experiencing of literature is never static. 
And if, in pre-formance, we come to an interpretive point and insist on staying 
there, we run the risk of arresting our experience of the text. Our need for 
balance and understanding is usually enhanced rather than frustrated when we 
allow literary experience to be the essentially temporal thing that it is. The 
linguistic symbols (i.e. words) of a tex t may be static, but our experience of 
them never is.
It is the fact that we communicate through these shared linguistic 
symbols that allows for the much touted "free play" of linguistic meaning in 
recent criticism. Certainly language permits and encourages free play up to a 
point. Still, the fact remains that one could view an infinite number of different 
performers playing Hamlet; no two would be exactly alike; all would be a 
presencing of the text, mediated by an individual performer; but, all would 
remain recognizable as Hamlet; not even a novice critic would mistake the
25Stanley Fish, "Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics," New
Literary History, 2 (Autumn, 1970), p. 150.
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performer for Macbeth. For all its free play of meaning, the language of Hamlet 
presents us with something that is essentially the character of Hamlet and no 
one else.
Performance involves the mediation of the tex t by the lived experience of 
the performer. That performance involves many interpretational choices from 
all of the probable and possible readings of that text. If we bracket or suspend 
the notion of the tex t as a printed page and try to understand the narrative as 
the behavior of a narrator, our readings will be produced largely by way of our 
educated but subjective attributions. An attributional theory of the act of 
performance implies the same. Whether we constitute the text as an object or 
as the utterance of an other, we have only the text itself as the guide to 
interpretation. The only difference is that the performer constitutes the text as 
the utterance of a living other rather than as a printed tex t. The other in the 
tex t can be constituted in a number of ways, by alternately focusing on the 
different voices of that tex t and engaging them as one would another human 
being.
Thus far I have discussed only three primary voices in a narrated prose 
tex t: the voice of the narrator, the implied author, or the characters. All of 
these discrete voices are contained in the text-as-it-calls-forth-a-world (a kind 
of synthesis of all the possible voices, but chiefly constituting the tex t only as a 
text); more important for the performer is the tex t constituted as the voice of a 
narrator and/or an implied author. Recent criticism, particularly that of M. M. 
Bakhtin, has posited many other voices within a text, voices that are not 
necessarily the discourse of a narrator, an implied author, or a character. Often 
there are voices in a tex t of which performers may be only minimally or
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subconsciously aware. A knowledge of these voices can help the performer to 
engage narrators, implied authors, and characters and evolve a rehearsal method 
that is based on the attribution model of an interpersonal encounter. Because 
they identify these non-individualized voices, the theories of M. M. Bakhtin can 
help to provide such a rehearsal method.
The Many Voices of Prose Fiction
The essence of a prose text lies in the manner of its telling, that is, in its 
narrative style. This is what makes prose qualitatively different from, say, a 
play. Since the narrator is the "teller,n the narrator’s behavior is crucial to the 
interpretation of prose texts.
The performer who seeks to use a knowledge of attribution as a critical 
tool must, in the final performance, foreground a narrator’s voice if one is 
present in the text. Other voices, such as those of implied authors or characters, 
are usually embedded in the narrator's voice, but have a living presence of their 
own. Unless the direct dialogue of characters is being presented dramatically, 
the embodiment of the narrator's voice is the performer's intentional focus. 
However, the other voices of the text remain on the horizon of consciousness and 
influence that embodiment.
A Russian critic, M. M. Bakhtin, has developed a theory of the embedded 
voices of a text that he calls "heteroglossia." I will proceed with a very brief 
definition of the theory and its importance, keeping in mind my central metaphor 
of interpersonal encounters: A text is an other that can be thought of as
essentially like the others we met in everyday life. For example, I might tell a 
long narrative a t a party. Embedded within that narrative might be the voices of 
my story's characters, my social conscience, even my professional language—the
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language of performance or communication theory. It is this image of embedded
voices within an apparent narrative monologue, that forms the basis for Bakhtin's
conception of the narrative voice.
As Michael Holquist says in his introduction to The Dialogic Imagination,
a "highly distinctive concept of language" is "at the heart of everything Bakhtin 
9fiever did."*° Holquist goes on to describe Bakhtin's work as based on the 
assumption of a dialectical conflict central to existence: to culture in general 
and to language in particular. This almost violent opposition is characterized as 
a struggle between the centripetal pull towards understanding and "shared 
meaning" on the one hand, and the centrifugal forces of diversity and entropy on 
the other. Bakhtin sees these forces a t work in all cultural and literary 
production, but believes that they are most clearly expressed in the dialogic 
form of the novel. Everything Bakhtin says of the novel is theoretically true for 
the short story.
The novel can be defined as a diversity of social speech types 
(sometimes even a diversity of languages) and a diversity of 
individual voices, artistically organized. The internal stratification 
of any single national language into social dialects, characteristic 
group behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages 
of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of 
the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions, 
languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day 
. . . this internal stratification present in every language a t any 
given moment . . .  is the indispensable prerequisite for the novel 
as a genre . . . .  Authorial speech, the speeches of narrators, 
inserted genres, the speech of characters are merely those 
fundamental compositional unities with whose help heteroglossia
26Michael Holquist, Introduction, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 
ed. Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Holquist (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 
1981), p. xviii.
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can enter the novel; each of them permits a multiplicity of 
voices.27
These various stratified languages form a major part of the experiential field of 
a reader or a performer. Any particular voice can be the figural voice a t a given 
moment in the reading process. As one continues to read there is the constant 
shifting and flowing as one level of voice rises to the intentional focus and others 
recede. Yet, as one voice rises, the others remain on the horizon, forming an 
integral part of the interpretive experience.
M. M. Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia offers the student of performance 
a new method of close reading, a method that can illuminate and form the basis 
for a systematic rehearsal methodology. This methodology is based on the 
conception of the text as a foregrounded other for whose behavior we attribute 
causes. I will describe this application of heteroglossia to the building of a 
performance by using as examples passages from "A Rose For Emily.”
Bakhtin's theory of prose discourse is based on the assumption that all 
language is a complexity of stratified languages such as social, cultural, 
geographical, ethnic, or professional dialects. All people are capable of using 
many of these different languages simultaneously in everyday discourse. Such 
dialects often quite literally include other languages.
For example, Cajun French includes both the French and English tongues 
as well as Southern regional dialects. This simultaneous presence of several 
national languages is what Bakhtin calls "polyglossia.” Furthermore, a Cajun 
lawyer or a Cajun farmer would each be conversant in different professional
27Holquist, "Glossary,” The Dialogic Imagination, p. 431.
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languages. Bakhtin maintains that all language is therefore "polyglot" and, a t 
the same time "heteroglot." Heteroglossia refers to the context in which a word 
or language is used. The same words can take on strikingly different meanings 
when they occur in very different settings, environments, or contexts. 
Heteroglossia, then, is
The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any 
utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over 
text. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of 
conditions—social, historical, meterological, physiological—that 
will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will 
have a meaning different than it would have under any other 
conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions 
of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and 
therefore impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a 
conceptualization as is possible of that locus where centripetal and 
centrifugal forces collide; as such, it is that which a systematic 
linguistics must always suppress.
Not only does this definition have a phenomenological core, insisting as it does 
on the uniqueness of any given utterance, but, in terms of attribution, the 
concept of heteroglossia emphasizes the utterance as a context-bound behavior 
that can always be attributed, a t least in part to the setting or the context of 
the utterance. Not only does practical, everyday language incorporate many 
different voices, but these voices are identifiable and dependent on the full 
context in which they are used. For example, when I, as a storyteller, im itate 
my mother, her voice and all that it reveals of her is incorporated into my voice, 
a listener would simultaneously recognize both of these discrete voices: my
mother’s and mine. The same could be said of a pre-formative "listening" to a 
narrator’s discourse, into which he or she incorporates other voices.
28Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, pp. 262-63.
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According to Bakhtin, the condition of heteroglossia (different voices)
enables the production of the novel and, I would add, to a lesser degree, the short
story. A story such as "A Rose For Emily" might incorporate the dialect of
traditional Southern oratory (as in the use of antiquated adjectives such as
"august"), the language of individual characters (such as the voices of Miss Emily
and the townspeople of Jefferson), and sociological or historical voices (as in the
description of the late Colonel Sartoris as "he who fathered the edict that no
Negro woman should appear on the streets without an apron.") The story
incorporates these as well as other languages and actually exploits the linguistic
phenomenon of heteroglossia. According to Bakhtin, there is a constant
interplay between the various stratified voices of a text and this dynamic,
29tensive relationship he calls dialogism. The dialogic relationship tha t exists 
between different voices of a tex t can offer the performer fresh and useful 
tools, not only for literary analysis but also for the free variation of informed 
performance choices.
It might be wise to pause a t this point and pull together the various 
strands of our proposed theory. We are dealing with the specific situation in 
which a performer tries to embody the voice of a narrated tex t in a public 
performance. In order to "become" the narrator, to live through the narrator's 
experience of the telling of the story, a performer constitutes the narrator as a 
living other, and the narrator's discourse as the symbolic actions of that other.
In seeking to understand how the ubiquitous phenomenon of attribution 
functions in the interpretation of the narrator's actions we cannot forget the
29 Holquist, "Glossary," p. 428.
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essential differences between a flesh-and-blood other and the fictional narrator 
of a text. In real life, we can literally see, hear, feel, smell, and touch the 
other. In literature we can only imagine him or her. We come to know narrators 
through only one sense—we "hear” them tell their tales. Because we apprehend 
narrators only through "hearing" their discourse and interpreting its symbolic 
actions, it is necessary for our theory to do justice to the contents of that 
hearing. For this reason, the theories of Bakhtin are of particular help and 
enlightenment. Bakhtin never fails to view the text as utterance, as statem ent, 
as discourse, in short, as a telling. At the same time, he never allows the riches 
of a tex t to be reduced by a simple "hearing." Like many performers, he keeps 
returning to the text, looking for the embedded voices within the apparent 
monologue of the narrator.
If we are going to think of the tex t as a narrator's verbal behavior, we can 
apply the interpersonal structures of attribution to our reflections about the 
narrator's acts. Our everyday discourse is an incorporation of many different 
languages (social, historical, and professional, for example), and so is the 
discourse of a literary narrator. The way in which a narrator uses language, 
what he is serious about and what he jokes about, what jargon he borrows, what 
ideologies he embraces through language, tell us two things about him: the 
environment of the narrator is often revealed by the languages and words he 
incorporates, and the disposition of a narrator is frequently disclosed by his 
position in relation to these incorporated voices.
For example, in "A Rose For Emily," the narrator uses many legal terms 
as we shall see. We might reasonably attribute that the legal profession is part 
of the narrator's environment, and that his straight, serious, non-parodic use of
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this professional language indicates some stable disposition in his character. 
These primary modes of attribution (i.e. dispositional and environmental) can 
become more obvious to the performer if he knows how to find the languages 
embedded in the narrator’s apparent monologue. Bakhtin’s theories can show the 
performer how to find these embedded voices.
Heteroglossia as a Rehearsal Method
Any performer who has read Bakhtin carefully is in possession of a new 
means of analyzing the discourse of a text. That reader can look for the dialogic 
relationships that exist between the different identifiable voices or languages 
within a tex t. The performer can then rehearse a physical embodiment of each 
particular voice in the text. Then the performer can seek to embody the dialogic 
relationship wherein one voice is an invisible presence with another voice, as in 
parody. This method of repeated readings would, in turn, foreground each 
discrete voice as it was found in the text. All of the different readings of a 
paragraph, for example, would then be blended and be present in the coalescence 
of the actual performance. Perhaps an old anecdote would serve to illustrate 
this coalescence.
An apocryphal theater story describes Orson Welles' difficulty in directing 
Agnes Moorehead in a scene in the film The Magnificent Ambersons. It was a 
short sequence that called for Miss Moorehead's character, who was insane, to 
run down the long corridor of a family mansion. Apparently, Welles was not 
satisfied with the scene because none of the actress’s versions of it  seemed rich 
or complex enough. He told her to improvise and play the entire scene as if she 
were literally one year old. She complied. Then he told her to play it  as an old 
man, as a cat and as a coquette, as a murderer and as a martyr, and so on
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through an exhausting and seemingly irrelevant list. Yet after a few attem pts a t 
combining many of these various versions into one scene, both Welles and 
Moorehead were satisfied that they had achieved the complexity and the reality 
they had wanted. Of course, in the final version, Moorehead played only her 
character and allowed the other performance possibilities to inform that 
character.
After reading Bakhtin on heteroglossia, I tried a similar rehearsal method 
on a section of Faulkner’s "A Rose For Emily." I know the story well. But for 
the performer, familiarity with a tex t can be blinding as well as illuminating. 
However, in this case I read the story in order to look for what Bakhtin might 
call the "sociological voice": that voice which incorporates the language and 
value systems of social classes and customs. But foregrounding this particular 
voice in the text throughout several readings, I was able to recognize new 
performance possibilities as well as new themes in the story. This social voice is 
manifested chiefly in the tension that is implied between the social values and 
customs of Miss Emily's generation and those of the following one ("the next 
generation, with its more modern ideas . . .").
There is a thick layer of ambiguity in many narrational passages in the 
story. Nowhere is this ambiguity more apparent and problematic than in several 
passages that refer to the social phenomena of Jefferson, Mississippi. For 
example, in the second paragraph, immediately following a description of "what 
had once been our most select street," there is this passage:
But garages and cotton gins had encroached and obliterated even 
the august names of that neighborhood; only Miss Emily's house was
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left, lifting its stubborn and coquettish delay above the cotton 
wagons and the gasoline pumps—an eyesore among eyesores.30
It is difficult to decide whether this description is straightforward or parodic, 
whether the narrator is taking sides with Miss Emily's generation or the "next 
generation," with the cupolas or with the cotton gins. Even the choice of the 
adjectives "stubborn" and "coquettish" is unclear. Both words carry positive 
and/or negative connotations. One of this story's great mysteries is the nature 
of the narrator's stance in regard to Miss Emily. Does he admire her 
"stubborness" or disapprove of her intentions? His description of her house 
symbolically defines this relationship as an enigma.
In rehearsal, the performer can experiment with this ambiguity by 
alternately attem pting to embody the negative and positive possibilities of the 
narrator's ambiguous stance towards Miss Emily. Each dispositional quality of 
the narrator is "tried on for size." The final step in this rehearsal method is to 
follow the suggestions of Bakhtin and to le t the disparate connotations exist 
together, simultaneously, in a dialogic relationship. The narrator's admiration 
for Emily can be mixed with a distaste for her "high and mighty" social 
affections.
By gathering the complexities of voice into a coalescence, a performer 
can avoid what many teachers of the acting "method" call "playing a quality" 
rather than finding the "action in the line." In other words, playing the dialogic 
action of approach/avoidance, in this case, will avoid the amateurish trap of 
playing qualities such as "admiration" or "moral indignation," both of which
30Faulkner, p. 119.
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would be reductions of the story’s essential complexities. Playing actions that 
combine two opposing responses a t once, while not the easiest performance 
choice, may be the choice that is the richest and the truest to this text.
It is common for acting teachers to instruct their students to keep the 
audience intrigued with a character by avoiding simplistic, quality-based 
performances. Learning to ’’play" Bakhtin's dialogic relationships seems an ideal 
way of accomplishing this. As in the experience of Agnes Moorehead, the
synthesis of several layers of performance choices based on the dialogic
relationship between various stratified layers of language, can enable the 
performer to live through the complex and often contradictory motives and 
attitudes of a fully realized narrator.
The third paragraph of Faulkner’s story will serve as an excellent final 
example of the heteroglossic approach to forming the performance. It contains 
several different ’’voices” that are unmarked in the tex t and can therefore be 
embodied only through "intonational quotation marks.” This term of Bakhtin’s 
refers to the actual verbal performance of a person, inflected in such a way as to 
make obvious the embedded voices within the discourse.
Alive, Miss Emily had been a tradition, a duty, and a care; a sort of 
hereditary obligation upon the town, dating from that day in 1894 
when Colonel Sartoris, the mayor—he who fathered the edict that 
no Negro woman should appear on the streets without an ap ro n -
rem itted her taxes, the dispensation dating from the death of her
father on into perpetuity. Not that Miss Emily would have 
accepted charity. Colonel Sartoris invented an involved tale to the 
effect that Miss Emily's father had loaned money to the town, 
which the town, as a m atter of business, preferred this way of
repaying. Only a man of Colonel Sartoris' generation and thou 
could have invented it, and only a woman could have believed it.
A close reading of this paragraph reveals a t least several layers of 
heteroglossia that might inform a performance. First, there is the temporal pull 
between the voice of the past and that of the present epic situation. The 
narrator speaks in the immediate present, but his voice exists in a dialogic 
relationship with the historical/traditional past of the town. As a performer I (P) 
must engage the narrator (O) about his stance in relation to this past (X). This 
phenomenon is marked by intonational quotation marks around such constructions 
as
Alive, Miss Emily had been a tradition . . .
. . . dating from that day in 1894 when . . .
. . . —he who had fathered the edict . . .
These constructions suggest an almost valorized past, a past impossible to 
divorce from its rhetorical and oratorical conventions. These sentences seem 
qualitatively different from those in the second half of the paragraph. When the
narrator says, "Not that Miss Emily would have accepted charity," he seems to
extricate himself from a formal, almost oratorical tone, to a tone more 
immediately addressed to the listener or the narratee. Obviously, this temporal 
tension between the events of the story and the telling of those events is crucial 
to  any physical embodiment of this tex t. In rehearsal, the performance might
31Faulkner, pp. 119-20.
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gain much from sustained readings which alternately foregrounded the past 
events and the present telling. Eventually, these voices would be gathered into 
the final performance.
Another language that coexists in this passage is the professional language 
of the lawyer. Constructions such as "Dating from the date . . ." and "the 
dispensation dating from the death of her father on into perpetuity . . ." are 
obvious images of legal language. The same could be said of individual word 
choices such as "edict," "rem itted," and "dispensation." This formal, detached 
language is the language of a man who is well-practiced in retaining his 
professional objectivity and in using his professional dialect. Therefore, that 
language, that symbolic action, becomes the basis for my attribution of 
detachment to the narrator. I sense that the narrator’s use of local jargon is 
understood and perhaps shared by the listener. Not only that, but the use of the 
embedded language of the legal profession, permits me to attribute that the 
narrator is quite possibly a lawyer, a judge, or someone closely related to those 
professions. Admittedly, this la tte r attribution is only a textual possibility, not a 
probability or a certainty. However, it provides a performer with a more 
definite character to portray without violating the text.
Further, this legal language is in a dialogic relationship with the almost 
courtly language of the old South manifested in phrases like "coquettish decay," 
"hereditary obligation," and "Negro woman." In fact, if I pause for a moment and 
foreground the implied author here, I might ask why he has chosen to place this 
description of the "hereditary obligation" that the town has toward Miss Emily 
alongside the description of the edict. I suspect that Faulkner is making some 
subtle comparison between the "white man’s burden" towards Miss Emily and
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towards the Negro women of Jefferson. Traditionally, the white rulers of 
Southern society have paid the white woman's taxes, and they have insisted that 
the black women wear an insignia of their inferior social position. I could never 
have discovered (or attributed) this possible motive of the implied author, had I 
not known to isolate the social voice in the text.
But I must always finally return to the narrator. These linguistic images 
are clues to ways in which this narrator could become more highly defined in 
performance: mature, but not old enough to have been a contemporary of
Sartoris, gracious, aristocratic, involved to some extent in the legal profession, 
and subconsciously racist and sexist in spite of the fact that he seems to realize 
there is racism around him. The la tte r two qualities are in an obvious dialogue 
with the aforementioned historical-social voice.
One step in my definition of the narrator is to occasionally foreground the 
implied author as an other (O) and to make attributions concerning where the 
implied author stands in relation to the narrator who then would become the (X) 
of the basic symmetry model. In most cases these attributions would deal with 
how the implied author is disposed toward the narrator. As a performer I 
intuitively sense the voice of the implied author in the juxtaposition of images 
and in constructions such as "coquettish decay." I must, according to this 
performance method, foreground and reflect on the implied author's voice and
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eventually incorporate it into the foregrounded voice of the narrator during my 
performance. In the final sentence of this paragraph, the previously cited 
ambiguity in the narrator's view of the past returns. It is not clear whether he 
has respect or contempt for Colonel Sartoris ("—he who fathered the edict 
. . ."). There is, however, little  ambiguity in the final, benignly sexist
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comment that "only a woman would have believed it." Clearly, a performer who 
comes to this passage armed with the theory of heteroglossia knows what to look 
for and how to find it. That performer focuses his or her attention on various 
textual voices, attributing relationships between the voice in focus and those 
other voices that form the ground of the voice being attended to.
Bakhtin's conceptualization of prose fiction as a dynamic interplay 
between stratified languages is an especially rich theory for the performer. One 
of its great virtues is its critical generosity. It is able to coexist with other 
theories to a remarkable degree. A performer could use both heteroglossia and 
dram atistic analysis to fully define a narrator, as in the case of "A Rose For 
Emily." But heteroglossia, like attribution, is also compatible with the New 
Criticism and even deconstruction (which could be viewed as a critical 
foregrounding of the centrifugal force that partially animates heteroglossia). 
Heteroglossia as a performance method is particularly felicitous in relation to 
phenomenological criticism and practice. The method I have described is a way 
of "walking around" the immanent tex t and viewing it from as many "sides" as 
possible. The attractions and the repelling forces that constitute heteroglossia 
also, to a large extent, constitute the mutable phenomenon of a performer’s 
creative encounter with a literary tex t.
The Figural Voice
The phenomenological rehearsal and analysis method that I have outlined 
could be clarified perhaps with a simple term that describes the process. I would 
like to propose the term "figural voice" to signify the particular language or 
voice that is the momentary figure in the ground of the performer's 
consciousness during a reading of a text.
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The narrator’s voice is only one of the voices that we attend to when we 
prepare a text for performance. We also engage the obvious voices of characters 
within the story, the less obvious voice of the implied author, and even those 
"voices” within the discourse that we sense only dimly. Eventually a performer 
will gather all of these voices into an embodiment of the narrative voice; in 
order to render our proposed model more generalizable and more able to describe 
the complex act of pre-formance, the term "figural voice" is preferable to more 
restricted terms such as "narrator," "character," or "implied author," because it 
more accurately reflects the many ways in which we constitute narrative voices 
as we form a performance.
If a performer were to follow the methods of heteroglossia, she or he 
would concentrate on or attend to one identifiable language or voice a t a time in 
the readings preparatory to performance. Then the reader would attem pt to 
describe and embody the dialogic relationships between these voices, attributing 
causes for the presence of each discrete voice within the general discourse of 
the narrator. In terms of Newcomb's symmetry model the performer (P) would 
consider the embedded voice part of the content (X) of the narrator’s (O’s) 
discourse, and would try to determine where the narrator stands in relation to 
those contents. As a performer I (P) set the narrator of Faulkner's story (O) in 
relation to, among other things, the legal language contained in his utterance. 
Then I must attribute environmental or dispositional reasons for the narrator's 
use of this language. This process allows me to systematically build up the outer 
circumstances and the internal motivations that control the narrator's behavior. 
Once I have entered this deep level of the narrator's experience, I should be more 
capable of "becoming" that narrator in performance.
Chapter Four
THE FUNCTION OF ATTRIBUTION IN A PRE-FORMATIVE READING
OF "A ROSE FOR EMILY"
All of the major parts of the theoretical model are now in place and the 
method can be applied to a specific work. I will continue to analyze my own pre- 
formative encounter with the narrator of "A Rose For Emily." I must keep in 
mind that, although the narrator's voice is the focus of my critical attention, 
tha t voice also contains the word of the implied author, of characters such as 
Emily Grierson and her father, and various other voices that I can now call up 
into my consciousness thanks to the theories of Bakhtin.
I begin by making a partial list of the voices I can already discern in the 
tex t, voices that I have listed after two or three "diagnostic" readings of the 
story. These voices include
(1) the voice of the narrator as a single personae
(2) the voice of the narrator as a chorus of different persona 
(incorporating the various voices of some possible inhabitants of 
Jefferson, Mississippi)
(3) the voices of individual characters in the story (marked in the 
tex t by direct quotation marks)
(4) the sociological voice (e.g. "the edict")
(5) the historical voice of the Southern past
(6) the legal voice (the professional dialect of the legal profession)
(7) the formal Southern voice or the voice of the Southern 
oratorical tradition
(8) the text-as-entity: Although this voice is almost contradictory 
to my proposed model, it is difficult not to think of the tex t as 
a complete entity, as a balanced and completed object rather 
than as a balanced and completed utterance. This concept 
should be avoided (bracketed) in the initial phases of pre- 
formance in order to allow the narrator’s voice to be presented 
as the voice of a living other. My theory recognizes the great 
value of the objectivist approach but privileges the idea of the
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objectified text as an utterance rather than as words on a page. 
First, though, the performer must reflect on his or her own
attributions about the narrator. This, in turn, will produce 
much valuable information about the objectified text.
During my pre-formative rehearsals of this story I (P) will focus on the 
figural voice of the narrator (O), engaging that voice and seeking, through 
attribution, to understand the causes for the narrator’s verbal behavior. 
Throughout this engagement, the narrator and I will be set in relation to certain 
objects and events (such as the edict, Homer Barron, or Miss Emily herself). 
Subsequent rehearsals will alternately foreground other voices inherent in the 
discourse pf the narrator. By focusing on, say, the sociological voice, I would 
temporarily constitute it as the figural voice; the relationship that I discover, 
through attribution, between the narrator’s voice and the sociological voice, will 
allow me to live through the narrator’s immanent experience and develop a rich 
inner life when I embody that narrator on a stage.
Perform er Figural Voice
(the edict, the house, Miss Emily, Barron, etc.)
Because my analysis will focus on the initial impressions made by the 
narrator of this story, I reprint the first two paragraphs of the story below.
When Miss Emily Grierson died, our whole town went to her 
funeral: the men through a sort of respectful affection for a fallen
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monument, the women mostly out of curiosity to see the inside of 
her house, which no one save an old man-servant—a combined 
gardener and cook—had seen in a t least ten years.
It was a big, squarish frame house that had once been white, 
decorated with cupolas and spires and scrolled balconies in the 
heavily lightsome style of the seventies, set on what had once been 
our most select stree t. But garages and cotton gins had 
encroached and obliterated even the august names of that 
neighborhood; only Miss Emily's house was left, lifting its stubborn 
and coquettish decay above the cotton wagons and the gasoline 
pumps—an eyesore among eyesores. And now Miss Emily had gone 
to join the representatives of those august names where they lay in 
the cedar-bemused cem etery among the ranked and anonymous 
graves of Union and Confederate soldiers who fell a t the battle of 
Jefferson.
One of the more important objects discussed by the narrator is Emily's 
house. The narrator places his description of the house early in his discourse, 
giving it a place of symbolic prominence. As I "converse" with the narrator 
about his description of this house, I must attribute causes to his verbal behavior: 
why he places the description in such a prominent place and why he chooses to 
describe it the way he does. If the structure (in this case the order) of the 
narrator's utterance is important, then I should attribute causes for that order. I 
also must attribute either environmental or dispositional causes for the 
narrator's use of oxymorons such as "heavily lightsome" in his description of the 
house. If I am going to encounter this narrator as an other, I must decide why he 
tells the story in the way that he does.
I must also be aware that the narrator's voice incorporates the voice of 
the implied author. I find that, in the first paragraph, it is easy to foreground 
the narrator's voice because of the almost informal "conversational" style. In
* William Faulkner, "A Rose For Emily," in Collected Stories of William 
Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1950), pp. 119-20.
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this functional first paragraph, the narrator's presence is strong as he seems to 
launch an involved and often-repeated story; the narrator aligns himself with the 
other townspeople ("our whole town") and, because of the conversational feel of 
the utterance, the paragraph offers few problems for the performer trying to 
embody this narrator.
But the second paragraph is another m atter. This long description of the 
house seems formal and very carefully prepared (i.e. "written"). It has more of a 
"literary" feel in that its language is so obviously calculated. It is not 
conversational style, even for a Southern professional man, to use constructions 
such as "the heavily lightsome style of the seventies," or verbs such as 
"encroached and obliterated," or adjectives such as "august." The entire passage 
has more of the quality of oratory than conversation. While I must primarily 
embody the narrator in a solo performance of this story, I must contend with the 
"literary" behavior that distinguishes this paragraph say, from the first 
paragraph. As the discourse is presented to me, I immediately attribute the 
paragraph more to an implied author than to a narrator. I make this 
determination by way of the attributional pattern of consistency (discussed in 
chapter two). I recognize the style of the second paragraph as containing 
something that is essentially akin to the other works of Faulkner that I know. I 
might not think of this during the final performance, but now, in my pre- 
formance, I can. The different figural voices that I constitute in the first and 
second paragraphs, could be the key to solo performance choices or even to a 
group staging of the story.
Let us say that, keeping my attributional perspective on the text, I desire 
to play the narrator as a highly defined character throughout the performance.
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In such a case I would embody the character in much the same way as an actor 
would in a realistic play. That is, I would bracket everything other than the 
narrator’s consciousness. I would seek, through some combination of method, 
technique, intuition, and inspiration, to become that character. In rehearsals I 
find that this approach works well for the first paragraph, but not so well for the 
second.
Real people who are engaged in face-to-face encounters do not generally 
speak through the voice of an implied author. There may be an element of this 
in the everyday situation in which one person tries to get an absent person’s ideas 
across to a face-to-face partner, but it is not generally the way we constitute 
the speech of an other. And yet, the voice of Faulkner seems to be an essential 
element in the verbal behavior of the second paragraph.
How do I know this? I know it the only way a performer can: by
bracketing the existence of Faulkner's voice, that is, by pretending that 
Faulkner’s voice is not part of the second paragraph. I attem pt to doubt 
Faulkner’s presence here in order to justify the discourse as only that of the 
narrator I must embody. I then try to perform this bracketed version, privileging 
only the voice of the narrator. I a ttem pt to speak the sentences in an informal, 
conversational and naturalistic manner, possibly using the old acting technique of 
foregrounding the present lived moment of the narrator and ’’searching for the 
right word.” In this performance a comma would mean a natural vocal pause or 
that the narrator is trying to think of the best word to describe an element of 
the house.
This naturalistic delivery technique works well—up to a point:
It was big, squarish frame house that had once been white,
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decorated with cupolas and spires and scrolled balconies . . .
These words could be spoken naturally in a real-life conversation without 
sounding contrived or ’'written." However, the phrase "in the heavily lightsome 
style of the seventies," becomes problematic when I attem pt to perform it only 
as the word of the narrator. It sounds stiff, formal, and is all but impossible to 
perform naturalistically.
"Why," I must ask, "does the narrator choose these words?" Am I to 
attribute this verbal behavior to the narrator's disposition or to some 
environmental factor? In the former case, I run the risk of creating an affected 
and possibly unreliable narrator; in the la tte r case I must imagine a very formal 
setting for the epic situation—a choice that perhaps could be supported 
textually, but that could also weaken the dramatic immediacy of the 
performance. Keeping my interpersonal perspective in focus, I reflect further on 
the context of this dyadic encounter between narrator and listener. If I place 
myself in the narrator's position, I realize that the narrator's attention is focused 
not so much on the story as on the listener.
Another possible environmental factor could be this implied listener. If I 
focus on the narrative voice, and insist on positing causes for its verbal behavior, 
then I could posit a listener who is also very formal, highly educated, with an 
unusually sophisticated everyday vocabulary: in short, a listener who is in the 
same "interpretive community" as the teller of the story. When the narrator 
speaks of "the next generation with its more modern ideas," for example, he 
signals a narratee who would know the generation being mentioned and probably 
have some definite reaction to it.
^Faulkner, p. 119.
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But if I am to do justice to the text as it is fully presented to me, I cannot 
ignore the voice of the implied author. Therefore, I perform the second 
paragraph once as the narrator and a second time as the implied author. That is, 
I live through the second performance as if I were Faulkner, Eventually, I will 
have to return to the foregrounding of the narrator's voice, but this voice will 
contain the word of the implied author. In performance, I play only the narrator 
and try to live through the experience of the telling of the story. But if, during 
rehearsals, I have also played the passage as the implied Faulkner, I can gather 
Faulkner’s voice into the narrator's by allowing it to "be'’ in the horizon of my 
consciousness. The second reading forces me to deal with authorial intentions by 
insisting that I attribute causes (mostly dispositional) to Faulkner's verbal 
behavior.
I suspect that most good performers already "allow" this dual presence in 
performance. My point is that a discrete and conscious foregrounding of the 
different voices of a tex t during performance, can make the embodiment of 
these voices more clear and a more vital part of the rehearsal experience. This 
clarification of the lived experience of rehearsal is a product of the constant 
questioning by the performer of the figural voice in the text. I must ascribe 
reasons for the behavior of whatever voice I am foregrounding a t a given stage 
of my pre-formance.
The exhaustive questioning of a tex t during pre-formance is rarely a 
teleological process. It is often possible to discover new voices embedded in a 
narrator’s discourse if one looks hard enough for them. I return to this same 
paragraph of "A Rose For Emily" and this time I look for Bakhtin's sociological
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voice. In this text that voice will contain an ideological and sociological 
element. It will call up images of social class, racial distinction, and the 
essential "Southerness" of this regional story. The "dialogue” between these 
voices can become the intentional object of our consciousness, helping us to fill 
in the fictive world of Yoknapatawpha. The sociological voice in Faulkner’s 
story gathers in the history of Southern racism and sexism. Rather than 
remaining in the ground of our consciousness, this voice can become, briefly, the 
figure or intentional object of our reflection, increasing the potential for 
clarifying and vivifying our experience of the text. Remember that Newcomb’s 
symmetry model could diagram this example as a triangular relationship between 
the performer (P), the narrator (O), and the peculiarly Southern social issues (X) 
implied in the text. These relationships are governed by the degree of attraction 
or repulsion between the three entities.
Let us return to that curious "heavily lightsome style" of Miss Emily's 
house. This time, in rehearsal, I foreground the social voice implied by the text. 
I trea t it as a separate voice that will eventually be incorporated into the 
performed embodiment of the narrator's voice. Attribution theory would suggest 
tha t the phrase is a behavior that can be attributed to dispositional or 
environmental factors. An attributional model of this pre-formative encounter 
with the sociological voice requires that the performer (P) ascribe environmental 
or dispositional causes for the behavior of the voice. The social voice (now the 
figural voice in the text) is set in relation to an object (X), in this case Miss 
Emily's house.
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Performer Social Voice
p  ^     - ... ...........  n
Miss Emily's House
"heavily lightsome’
The oxymoronic description could be attributed to an ambivalent feeling 
in relation to the house. The word "lightsome" suggests grace and delicate 
beauty; the word "heavy" is just that, and it suggests something ponderous and 
oppressive. There could be different responses to the narrative use of these 
words, but these are, a t least, very possible reactions on the part of a performer. 
In attribution theory, the degree of attraction or repulsion an other has for his or 
her discursive objects is a crucial element in the attribution of causes for such 
word choices. "Lightsome" seems to place the narrator in a positive relation to 
the house, and "heavily" places him in a negative relationship.
Once the foregrounding of the social voice and the use of the symmetry 
model have clarified this ambiguity, it is up to the performer to attribute 
reasons for the narrator's implied social ambivalence. Actually, two attributions 
are called for, one applicable to "heavily" and the other to "lightsome." The 
narrator seems simultaneously aware of the graceful beauty and the ponderous 
dark weight of Southern tradition.
This dual awareness is again suggested a few lines later in the text by the
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description of the "coquettish decay" of the crumbling facade. Something in the 
voice of the text both pities and loathes the symbolic house. That tensive 
ambivalence could be the key to a performative embodiment of a complex 
narrator, a performance that is primarily an embodiment of a fictional 
character, but that does not betray or ignore the complexities of this great text. 
The duality of this narrator, his love/hate relationship with the central events 
and existents of this story, while not the only interpretational possibility, could 
provide the necessary consistency of behavioral objective so important to a 
performer's building of a character.
Attribution theory and common sense tell us that individuals tend to 
behave in consistent patterns. This is the basis for our attribution of 
"personality traits" to individuals. It is quite possible that the most important 
consistency in this narrator is his ambivalent feelings about the principle 
character in his story. A focus on this consistent behavior could help the 
performer create a more accessible and concrete embodiment of this narrator. 
Ambivalence towards Miss Emily could become a consistent through-line, a 
general direction in which to develop the performed character.
As a storyteller, this narrator does not try to direct the listener's reaction 
to Miss Emily by making simple moral pronouncements about her. He seems to 
take pains not to bias the listener for or against Emily. His goal in the telling, 
his "through-line," if you will, is simply to keep the listener intrigued until the 
final, carefully prepared moment. At the same time, the narrator seems 
determined to allow the listener to make up his or her own mind about Miss 
Emily and would therefore be keenly interested in his listener's reactions, 
especially a t the "shocking" end of the narrative.
134
This analysis is only one more example of how the phenomenological 
perspective of attribution can inform and illuminate the act of pre-formance. 
One could perform similar attributional analyses of such problematic phrases as 
"the cedar-bemused cemetery" or the two references to Miss Emily as an "idol." 
The point is that the performer must first determine whether the verbal 
descriptions can be attributed to the disposition or the situational context of the 
narrator. Then, the performer must determine whether the behavior of the 
narrator is an example of one of the several possible patterns of attribution such 
as distinctiveness, consensus, or consistency. To illustrate, I will use another 
example from the problematic second paragraph.
Twice in the paragraph, the narrator refers to the "august" names of the 
former neighbors of Emily Grierson. He never uses the word again. Therefore, 
the verbal behavior of the narrator here is distinctive. It is also consistent in 
that he only uses the adjective "august" to refer to the names of the former 
owners of the houses on Emily’s street. It would be unlikely to attribute the use 
of the word to social practice or "common usage," that is, to see the word choice 
as an example of consensus. Even in the upper classes of the South a t the time 
of the story, the word "august" was becoming an affectation or an archaism and 
it is certainly often viewed that way by the contemporary reader. That is why, 
incidentally, that the use of the word seems more a choice of Faulkner’s than the 
narrator's, and why the word becomes problematic for the performer who must 
essentially play the narrator rather than Faulkner. Faulkner's word must be 
made to "work" as the narrator's word; that is, the performer must gather his or 
her attribution for Faulkner's use of the word into the narrator's use of that 
word. The performer can engage Faulkner concerning the word "august;" the 
narrator cannot.
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As a performer, then, I am forced into a dilemma. I know that this 
particular word is not uncommon in other works by Faulkner, who consistently 
and distinctively uses a style redolent of the high flown rhetoric of the ante­
bellum South. Faulkner both censures and embraces the traditional South and I 
must preserve this dialectic pull, this essential ambiguity in performance. 
Faulkner appropriates archaisms for stylistic purposes. But I must justify the 
narrator’s use of these words without distorting the probabilities of the text.
I do this through the process of free cognitive variation of interpretive 
ideas. I posit different motivations for the narrator’s use of the word and try 
these motivations out in performance. For example, the word ’’august’’ could be 
intimidating to some listeners. Therefore, I ’’question” the narrator to see if he 
is possibly trying to intimidate the listener. I quickly reject this interpretation 
because it is not consistent with the straightforward, engagingly suspenseful 
development of the story-line by the narrator. The last section of the story is 
anything but intimidating. Rather, it has the feel of a rehearsed, quietly 
effective, master story-teller. The narrator certainly seems consciously to 
control the effects of his story, but he does not intimidate.
Another possibility for the narrator’s use of the word might be to ’’test" 
the listener's reaction to it. I come to this possibility by incorporating the 
aforementioned ambiguous use of the word "august" by Faulkner himself, whose 
implied voice I must incorporate into the narrator's. I try to find a way to 
preserve this ambiguity in embodying the narrator’s intention of the word 
"august." I attribute ambivalent feelings about Miss Emily to the narrator based 
on his alternate descriptions of her which are sometimes positive ("She 
vanquished them," "She carried her head high . . .") and sometimes negative (as
136
in the la tte r descriptions of Miss Emily as "bloated" and her voice as "dry" and 
"cold.")
As I discussed in chapter two, one of the most common causes of 
attributions is the close proximity of two items in one’s experiential field of 
vision. The narrator seems ambivalent towards Miss Emily; therefore it is not 
unlikely that he might equate the "august names" of her neighborhood with Miss 
Emily herself, extending his feeling of ambivalence to all that Emily’s generation 
represents. The word "august," if it were played as a testing word for the 
listener, could then be allowed to be non-commital. The narrator waits to see 
how the listener will react to it. This performance choice, while not the only 
possibility, lends immediacy to the scene and preserves the essential ambiguity 
of Faulkner’s voice by incorporating it into the narrator’s.
Preserving the narrator's ambiguous relationship to Emily and her house 
can preserve the authorial intention without sacrificing the lived immediacy of 
my performance as the narrator. Any performer of literature knows that 
creating a subtext or an "internal monologue" for a character frequently involves
Q
the mental creation of textual possibilities as well as probabilities. In fact, the 
fully lived performance often involves more possibilities than certainties or 
probabilities because of the prodigious amount of imaginative "filling in" 
required of the performer. In this particular case, I could attribute the 
narrator’s use of the word "august" more to the situation of his face-to-face
3
Beverly Whitaker Long has clearly distinguished between interpretive 
certainties, probabilities, possibilities, and distortions in "Evaluating Performed 
Literature," Studies in Interpretation, n, ed. Esther M. Doyle and Virginia 
Hastings Floyd (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1977), pp. 267-81.
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engagement of the narratee than to his ambivalent disposition towards Miss 
Emily herself. I might play the action on this line as a testing action. The 
narrator (like Faulkner) could be deliberately non-judgmental in his use of the 
word in order to observe his listener's reaction to it. This is hardly unlikely 
behavior for a man involved in the legal profession, as I have posited this 
narrator to be. More specifically, the narrator might use the term even jokingly, 
or with a slight wry smile, in order to see if the listener shares a tolerant yet 
critical opinion of the "high and mighty" upper classes of the previous generation 
in Jefferson, Mississippi.
I do not mean to suggest that this is the only right interpretation of the 
narrator's motivation. Indeed, I do not even suggest that it is necessarily the 
best interpretation. It does, however, provide the performer with a clear 
motivation for the use of an unusual word; it is a valid possibility of the tex t that 
does not simplify the essential ambiguities of the story; and, it is an 
interpretation that gathers the authorial voice into the performer's singular 
embodiment of the narrator.
Focusing on the voices of the others in a text, primarily the figural voice 
of a narrator, can help the performer to reflect upon his or her own attributions 
about that narrator and to avoid possible distortions of the text that can result 
from unexamined subjective responses. There is ample evidence that individual 
readers often allow their subjective reading styles to a ffect their interpretive 
responses. Much of this evidence has come from psychologist Norman Holland.
Norman Holland's continuing work in the psychoanalytic investigations of 
readers' responses to literature has presented persuasive evidence that when 
readers' expectations (of a text or of their world) are violated, they tend to
138
construct psychological defenses against these violations. When a tex t violates 
our expectations, Holland argues, we mentally defend ourselves by justifying or 
ignoring the literary elements (the Xs of my model) that were incongruent with 
our expectations. These defenses, according to Holland, lead to interpretational 
patterns that fulfill conscious or subconscious fantasies on the part of the 
reader—fantasies from which readers construct the story’s theme. Holland does 
not use the language of attribution, but he is obviously postulating a 
psychological strain toward symmetry that directs the interpretational pattern 
of a given reader.
In his book 5 Readers Reading, Holland analyzes the interpretational 
strategies of five readers of "A Rose For Emily." He presents the experiential 
record of these readers as transcripts of his interviews with them concerning the 
story. Holland himself is a psychoanalyst, and makes an admirable (if not always 
successful) attem pt to minimize his own influence on the readers' responses.
It is interesting to note that all five readers intended the narrative voice 
of "A Rose For Emily" as primarily that of the author. That is, they constituted 
the speaking voice in the text as William Faulkner's rather than as a fictional 
narrator. They seem to relate more to the implied values and intentions of 
Faulkner than to the narrator as a well-defined other. Of course, none of these 
readers intended to perform the story; they read it silently in the traditional 
manner. This fact undergirds the often stated hypothesis that silent readers do 
not approach a tex t in the same way that a trained performer does. The 
attributional theory that I am proposing, while it is designed specifically for the 
performer, is also a valid method for the general reader, who might not reflect 
consciously on his or her own subjective attributions about the tex t until he 
knows the structure of those attributional patterns.
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General readers and even those readers who are considered experts in 
literature may constitute texts in ways that are fundamentally different from 
the methods of a performer. In terms of the symmetry model, non-performing 
readers may be more inclined to focus on the contents of the utterance, the Xs 
of the model, rather than on the act of utterance itself or, rather, the 
consciousness that produces that utterance. Of course, the contents of the 
utterance are of paramount importance in interpretation, but we may often 
overlook the relationships between the narrator and the contents of his or her 
utterance. It is precisely this perceived relationship between a speaker and the 
contents of her or his discourse that is the concern of Holland, of Bakhtin, and of 
attribution theory.
Readers who intend to perform a work often must find ways in which to 
make the artifice or the "literariness" of style viable as actual speech. As I 
sta ted  previously, one way to handle this problem is to bracket the notion of the 
tex t as a printed page and to justify the discourse entirely as an utterance, 
letting  the tex t become the utterance of an other whom the performer will 
embody in performance.
In order to justify the style of the tex t as an utterance, I might constitute 
tha t very style, not as "literary style" but, rather, as verbal "behavior." This 
would allow me to use the attributional paradigms as theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings for a rehearsal method. A knowledge of how 
humans tend to perceive each other, then, can greatly inform the performer 
about how he or she perceives the other in the text. This is particularly true of 
the perception of a narrator.
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The silent reader, that is, the non-performing reader such as those 
interviewed by Norman Holland, may "lose" the narrative voice in the reading 
experience and concentrate only on the events and existents (the contents) of the 
tex t. If so, that reader might forget to look "behind" the text and attribute 
motives to the verbal behavior of the narrator (or even the implied author).
On the other hand, the pre-formative reader, armed with a knowledge of 
the structures of attribution, may be more inclined to develop complex motives 
for a narrator's actions because he or she is intending to embody that narrator 
and live through that narrator's behavior on a stage. Attribution then, can help 
the pre-formative reader look behind the tex t, and a t the same time bring the 
printed text into the world of interpersonal encounters: Speaking the tex t and 
living through it during performance is a way of allowing the text to fully 
disclose itself to us.
The claims that silent readers tend to de-emphasize the narrator as an 
other is supported by Norman Holland's ongoing work in the psychoanalytic 
investigations of readers' responses to texts such as "A Rose For Emily." One of 
the readers, whom Holland calls "Sebastion," is representative of the tendency to 
think of the text as an object rather than as an other consciousness. He speaks 
of "its" (i.e. the story's) preparation for the surprise ending, rather than as his 
(i.e. the narrator's or even Faulkner's) intended final effect in the text. Holland 
interprets this objectification of the tex t as a defensive strategy growing out of 
a fear of total engagement with the story. While Holland's views are extreme, 
they offer another perspective on the feeling of balance that readers seek with a 
literary  work—a feeling that motivates attributional behavior. Holland writes 
that
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Where a reader’s projections do not fit easily into a story, he will 
tend to drive himself away from th^ story as most people conceive 
it, creating distortions or tangents.
Holland’s interpretation of Sebastion’s response to ”A Rose For Emily" 
suggests that Sebastion insists on constituting the story as a coldly objective 
"work of art"® in order to "remain outside it"® or to avoid an intimate 
experiential involvement with it. Still, Holland had spent a great deal of
t
professional time with Sebastion prior to his reading of the story, and had
already detected Sebastion’s tendency to insulate himself from strong emotional
reactions and involvements with others.
Sebastion's reading was consistent with Holland’s professional
expectations. Indeed, Holland’s ability to predict the kinds of readings that his
clients will present is intriguing evidence that responses to literature are highly
subjective and subject to the idiosyncracies of the individual personality.
In terms of the proposed model, it is interesting to see how Sebastion
exhibits both dispositional and environmental attributions to the behavior of Miss
Emily in the story. For example, Sebastion attributes Emily's murder of Homer
Barron to her dispositional quality of shame, the shame she feels after being 
7
rejected by him. This is an intriguing point. This same interpretation could 
also be viewed as an environmental attribution if we foreground the sociological
4Norman N. Holland, 5 Readers Reading (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 
1975), p. 176.
5Holland, p. 177.
^Holland, p. 177.
7Holland, p. 184.
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voice as well as Miss Emily’s voice in the story. Her shame could then be 
attributed to the traditional Southern code of behavior for aristocratic 
unmarried women a t the time of the events of the story. To be single, or to be
rejected by a man, especially after a certain age, was, in the South, a severe
social stigma. My proposed performance method could not only incorporate both 
the feminist viewpoint and the subtextual individualization of Miss Emily as a 
character, it could project these attributions that originate inside the reader, 
into the performed narrator, creating a full presencing of the text, and one that 
is dramatically viable as the single embodiment of the narrator.
The experiential record of Holland's readers provides information that can 
easily be illuminated by the attributional perspective. By way of example, let us 
look very briefly a t several of Holland's readers reactions to another problematic 
line in the tex t—the inserted information about Colonel Sartoris' "edict:"
Alive, Miss Emily had been a tradition, a duty, and a care; a 
sort of hereditary obligation upon the town, dating from that day in
1894 when Colonel Sartoris, the mayor—he who fathered the edict
that no Negro woman should appear on the streets without an 
apron—rem itted her taxes, the dispensation dating from the death 
of her father on into perpetuity.
Sebastion, who would be the P in our model, a ttributes Colonel Sartoris' 
"fathering" of the edict entirely to environmental or situational pressures. He 
sees the Colonel as a Southern ruler and maintains that
Even the rulers have no choice, because they're so completely 
determined by the system that they work under.
O
Faulkner, p. 119.
9Holland, p. 176.
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Sebastion went on to interpret the edict as referring to the sexual victimization 
of Southern black women by white men. Our model might analyze this reaction 
as an example of misattribution based on distinctiveness information. The 
distinction exists in the narrative use of the word "fathered." Because the word 
has sexual connotations, Sebastion linked it to a racial issue that is, a t best, only 
tangentially related to this story.
Structurally, misattribution is no different from attribution. The current 
theories of attribution deal only with person perception; they do not address the 
validity of those perceptions. Likewise, my model is perception-oriented in that 
it describes how attribution functions in the performer’s response to a literary 
other. A knowledge of the structures of attribution cannot assure the performer 
of a valid interpretation of that other’s behavior; but it can show the performer 
how to analyze his or her own reasoning concerning the causes of the other's 
verbal behavior. That is, attribution theory can inform the performer about the 
quasi-logical connections that create his or her interpretation of the others in 
the text. If we, as performers, know attribution theory, we can reflect on our 
attributional patterns as we try to interpret texts. By allowing our own 
attributional behaviors to become the intentional focus of our consciousness as 
we read, we may indeed avoid some misattributions and overcome some of the 
idiosyncratic blocks in our perceptions of literary others.
Another reader, whom Holland refers to as Saul, also singles out the 
distinctive use of the word "fathered" in the third paragraph of the story. Saul 
translated the verb as "sponsored" which, according to Holland, was consistent 
with Saul's other "safe" interpretations of possibly controversial or
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uncomfortable interpretations.*® Likewise, during the interviews Holland had to 
remind Saul that the edict refers only to "Negro women." Saul consistently 
lumped the women into the generic category of "Negroes,"*1 thereby divesting 
the word of any sexual connotations.
Holland’s analysis of these responses suggests that individual readers tend 
to read works with consistent defenses, biases, interpretational patterns, or 
doctrinal adhesions (to borrow I. A. Richards' term). Had Saul had the benefit of 
the attributional paradigm and the method of foregrounding the different voices 
of the text, he would have been forced to come up with an answer for any 
narrative behavior that struck him as distinctive or consistent.
If, in rehearsal, my figural voice is the implied author Faulkner, I might 
ask why he seems so caught up with "fathers" in this story. The use of the word 
"father" and the employment of other paternal imagery is a consistent behavior 
of Faulkner in this story. He has a good deal to say about Emily’s stern, 
autocratic father and he evokes striking images such as the ’’picture" of Emily in 
the doorway in the distance framed by her father’s foregrounded legs as he 
wields a horsewhip. More importantly, if my figural voice is that of the 
narrator, I must attribute the word choice of the narrator to some stable 
disposition in him, or to some environmental factor. Although the word 
"fathered" is used distinctively, it can be made consistent or brought into 
balance with the aforementioned ambiguous social stance of the narrator. 
"Fathered" is an ambiguous word in this case. It could have a warm, positive
*°Holland, p. 176.
11 Holland, p. 176.
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paternal feel, or it  could call up all the negative associations about historical and 
racial paternalism. The execution of the heteroglossic rehearsal method, allows 
me to play both actions (e.g. "to warm" and ’to force"), while privileging the 
viewpoint that is critical of Colonel Sartoris.
This attribution might bring about a little  laugh after I (as the narrator) 
refer to the edict. It is a critical laugh, on that places me in a slightly negative 
relation to the edict. But, I also look up into the eyes of my listener and "check" 
his reaction before proceeding. This not only gives the scene dramatic 
immediacy, it preserves and justifies the narrator's ambiguous relationship to key 
elements in the story. In terms of the model, I have achieved a symmetrical 
relationship between all the paired elements in the triangular relationship: 
myself (P), the narrator (0), and the edict (X). (Remember that, according to 
Newcomb, the relationships between the different elements do not all have to be 
the same, either positive or negative, but the valences of the relationships define 
the performer's experience).
Through this detailed analysis of some isolated behaviors of the narrator 
of "A Rose For Emily," I have tried to make a case for the recommendation that 
performers encounter the narrators of texts much as they would encounter other 
human beings in everyday life. By adopting this interpersonal metaphor, and by 
learning the universal structures of human attributional behavior, the performer 
can come to know a tex t and his or her own response to it in a clearer way, and 
can then use that knowledge to feed a concentrated embodiment of the 
narrator's voice.
But in adopting this method, the performer is cautioned not to reduce the 
rich experience of pre-formative reading by searching the tex t only for narrative
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behaviors. Narration occurs by way of language, and that language calls the 
world of the text into living presence. We need to define and reflect on the 
world that is summoned by the language of a text, and to ask to what degree our 
attributions about narrators are a function of that language. No intentional 
object, including the voices of narrators, can exist independently of the ground 
from which it emerges and to which it is inextricably bound. The attributional 
model that I will now describe seeks to embrace rather than reduce the rich 
complexities of our experience of textual language and the worlds they summon 
and in which they exist.
The Purposes of the Model
The performer who reads a tex t with the intention of performing it for 
some audience is approaching that tex t with a fundamentally different purpose 
than that of the general reader. Because they plan to embody the text, pre- 
formative readers often intend the text more as an utterance than as an object.
Before pre-formance, that is, before the reader decides to perform a work 
for the public, he or she often does think of the work as an object. The poem, 
story, or novel is often perceived as a complete entity, a thing-out-there that is 
to be presented to the reader’s consciousness. This is the foundation of 
objectivist criticism. The text is though of as a written structure of parts that 
make up a whole and the structure as well as the individual parts must be 
understood by the reader.
The act of interpretation, oral or written, is an attribution. Academic 
critics, as well as performers, spend a great deal of their time and efforts in an 
attem pt to understand the causes of a tex t’s symbolic (i.e. linguistic) behavior.
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They may attribute this behavior to characters, implied author's, or narrator's 
within the tex t. Attribution can be used as a central analogy that forms the 
basis of a "performance aesthetics" in regard to narrated texts. Further, the 
attribution paradigm of Theodore Newcomb, when applied to the act of pre- 
formance and used in conjunction with Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia, can 
suggest a performance methodology of unusual versatility and heuristic value. 
Newcomb's model (the P-O-X model controlled by the "strain toward symmetry") 
diagrams the perceiver's social encounter with a flesh-and-blood other. In order 
to adapt this model to the act of pre-formance, we must add to it the perceiver's 
phenomenological field of experience. That is, we must include in the model not 
only the performer's intentional focus a t a given moment, but also any part of his 
or her peripheral consciousness that might affect the attributions of cause for 
the other's behavior. This peripheral consciousness is what Martin Heidegger 
calls the "horizon" and what Edmund Husserl refers to as the "co-present margin" 
of the perceiver's experience.
As I develop this experiential model, I will apply Newcomb's interpersonal 
diagram towards the perceiving performer by placing it  in the ever-present 
context of the perceiver's field of experience.
The Phenomenological Experience of the Text-as-Utterance
I decide to allow a text to present itself to me as the utterance of a living
other. I le t this other "speak" to me as in a conversation. In doing so, I allow the
text to open itself to me. Martin Heidegger defines the word "say" as "to show,
12to le t appear, to let be seem and heard." I not only listen to the text, I also
12Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, tr . Albert Hofstadter 
(New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), pp. 29-30.
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speak to it, question it, argue with it, court it, frustrate it, and in short, attem pt 
to interpret it. This hypothetical "conversation” between a performer and a 
narrator is a complicated phenomenon, for, as Heidegger explains:
. . . speaking is a t the same time also listening. It is the custom 
to put speaking and listening in opposition: one man speaks, the 
other listens. But listening accompanies and surrounds not only 
speaking such as it takes place in conversation. The 
simultaneousness of speaking and listening has a larger meaning. 
Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is a listening to the 
language that we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before 
we are speaking.
I have tried to show, in the previous chapter, how the narrator of "A Rose 
For Emily” listens to the narratee's reactions as he tells his carefully prepared 
story, a story that the narrator "hears" even as he speaks it. The performer does 
the same: his listening to the narrator's discourse is also a critical speaking to 
tha t discourse. My hypothesis is, that the essential dynamic of this 
"conversation" is determined by the attributional behavior of the performer.
The attributional perspective requires, then, that the performer/listener 
must perceive the narrator's discourse as verbal or symbolic behavior. This, in 
turn, requires the performer to consciously posit causes for any narrative 
behavior on which he or she consciously reflects. If we remember that we tend 
to take notice of and attribute causes for "non-common" effects or behaviors, it 
is not difficult to see the similarity between attributional behavior and what is 
commonly called "interpretation." When, as we read, we "notice" a stylistic 
device, an unusual viewpoint, a striking word choice, we are intentionally
1 ^Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, tr. Peter D. Hertz, (New 
York, Harper and Rowe, 1971), p. 122.
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focusing on "non-common" elements of textual discourse. When we attribute 
causes for these narrative "behaviors," we are interpreting the text.
Attribution theory deals with the ways in which we interpret everyday 
interpersonal events. For many attribution theorists such as Jones and Davis, 
the term "interpretation," when applied to person perception, simply means the 
degree to which the effects of an action are non-common.1 ^  We interpret 
unusual (i.e. non-common) behaviors according to the degree and force of the 
motivation for that behavior. The behavior in question might be highly specific, 
like a narrator's use of an unusual word, or it might be a more generalized 
perception of the narrator's behavior. For example, the narrator of James 
Joyce's Ulysses or the Benjy section of Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury differ 
from expected or traditional norms of narrative behavior; and, it is precisely 
their behavior that allows me to form an experiential record of their interior 
selves. I look behind the language, I listen to it, to discover the essential 
character of the narrator. I do this anytime the narrator's "style" becomes the 
momentary object of my attention and I do this primarily through the process of 
attribution.
Some narrators, like the traditional omniscient ones, do not seem to 
deviate from the norm to the extent of those mentioned above. Many writers, 
Hemingway for example, cultivate a kind of negative capability; as implied 
authors they "disappear" behind their seemingly conventional use of the narrative 
voice. In any case, traditional or nontraditional, the "style" of the narration 
determines what I am referring to as behavior. We, as performers, often must
14Albert Hastorf, David Schneider, and Judith Polefka, Person Perception 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970), p. 69.
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deal in some way with any unusual stylistic devices of a text, and justifiably 
incorporate those devices into the embodied "speech" of the narrator. If a 
narrator is verbose, or even seems so, we would do well to justify that verbosity 
in our performance by attributing specific causes for it. Likewise, if the style is 
lean and sparse, we might look for attributes that give rise to that aspect of the 
narrator’s style.
To summarize, the attributional theory of the act of pre-formance insists
that in the final stages of rehearsal the performer must concentrate on the text
as the utterance of the narrator. All that has been learned through the
application of any other critical methods must finally be gathered into the
embodiment of a narrator who is conceived of as the speaker of the text, and to
whose symbolic behavior, especially problematic behavior, we must attribute
causes. A knowledge of the structures of attribution can help the performer
reflect on his or her own critical response to the text. As Mary Louise P ratt
says, "our knowledge of the selection process is one of the most important sets
15of presuppositions we bring to bear when we read a literary work."
Balance or the Strain Toward Symmetry as the Principal Dynamic of the 
Response to a Text
I have determined that the narrator of "A Rose For Emily" has decidedly
ambivalent feelings about Emily Grierson. I have also, during my imaginative
attem pt to live through the internal experience of the narrator’s discourse,
attributed very positive dispositional qualities to him. These include courtesy,
intelligence, authority to tell the story, and great relish in the telling of it.
15Mary Louise P ra tt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse 
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1977), p. 117.
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Because of my conscious attem pt to constitute the narrative voice as a living, 
breathing, human other, I have come to understand him more and more. As my 
understanding of him increases, my assimilation of his ambivalent feelings about 
Emily not only grows but becomes more comfortable to me.
What I have just described is a good example of psychological balance 
principles a t work. It is well to remember that attributional behavior is usually 
motivated by feelings of psychological imbalance or dissonance. Similarly, when 
two people discuss an object, the balance-seeking individual will exhibit a 
"strain" toward symmetry, a strong desire for a comfortable triangular 
relationship between himself (P), the other (0), and the object (X). In the 
language of attribution theory, if P has a high "degree of liking” for O, then P is 
more likely to accept and even assimilate O's attitudes, beliefs, and values. If I 
respect "Emily's" narrator and am attrac ted  to him, I tend to make his 
ambivalent feeling my own.
Theodore Newcomb's symmetry model is the core of my attributional 
model of pre-formance. Newcomb diagrams the interpretational dynamics 
resulting from an assymetrical relationship among the three elements. For the 
purposes of illustration, le t us suppose that, on a first reading, a person found 
Miss Emily repugnant.
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Performer
P
_ ^ x  
"Emily Grierson"
Then, suppose that reader decided to perform the story for an audience, and read 
the story again, this time bracketing all the possible textual voices other than 
the narrator's. This reading develops a very positive relationship between the 
performer and the narrator—a relationship similar to the one described above. 
The narrator's positive estimations of Emily become apparent, as do his less 
numerous negative ones. We now have an assymetrical relationship.
Performer + Narrator
"Emily Grierson"
The essential imbalance is the performer's negative view of Emily and the 
many positive feelings about her that the performer attributes to the narrator 
based on his symbolic behavior in the text. The easiest way to achieve symmetry 
is to allow one's perception of the other person (O) influence his or her
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perception of the object (X). I gather so much of the narrator’s apparent respect 
for Emily into my own vicarious experience of her, that my perception of her 
also becomes a t least ambivalent, if not altogether positive, so that we now have 
a symmetrical relationship.
Performer + Narrator
’’Emily Grierson"
Newcomb himself presents the idea of this "strain towards symmetry" as an 
attributional law:
In propositional form, the stronger P's attraction toward O, the 
greater the strength of the force upon P to maintain minimal 
discrepancy between his own and O's attitude, as he perceives the 
la tte r, toward the same X; and, if positive attraction remains 
constant, the greater the perceived discrepancy between his own 
and O's attitude, the stronger the force to reduce it. We shall 
refer to this force as strain.
Performers who know about this interpersonal tendency to reduce 
dissonance can reflect more critically on their own responses to narrators. They 
might ask why the narrator seems to respect Miss Emily. The answer comes
16Theodore Newcomb, The Acquaintance Process (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 12.
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from the narrator's utterance, from the text itself. For example, when the 
narrator says "She vanquished them, horse and foot, . . . "  I intuitively sense 
that the narrator's behavior on this line (his speech act, if you will) is "to praise" 
or "to grudgingly admire;" in fact, I can "hear" a faint chuckle behind the 
utterance, a laugh that seems to say "the little  lady was too much for the town; 
she was more than a match for them." I have attributed this dispositional quality 
to the narrator based primarily on his use of the verb "vanquished," a strong word 
that suggests complete and utter victory, and the colloquialism "horse and foot," 
which not only brings the narratee into a friendly, comfortable relationship with 
the narrator, but also implies that the narrator is "pretty sure" that the listener 
will agree with his estimation of Emily. I have attributed the behavior of the 
sentence, that is, the narrator, to the dispositional and environmental qualities 
that lie behind the language. My performative interpretation is a direct result of 
my specific attributions—attributions that might give rise to exciting and 
creative performances or, admittedly, that might, if I am not extremely vigilant 
in pre-formance, result in misguided interpretations.
The Fundamental Attribution Error
The performer using this method must constantly remember to foreground 
the text as a narrator's verbal behavior, in order to avoid projecting his or her 
own presuppositions onto the narrator without textual reinforcement. Projection 
is understood here to mean the attribution to others of attitudes that are really 
our own. Too much projection is aberrant, and can lead to misattributions and 
gross misinterpretations. In performance, I must embody the narrator and not 
the other way around.
Norman Holland's work has produced much evidence that readers do
PAGE MISSING IN NUMBER ONLY.
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project a great deal of themselves into the texts they read. He concludes that
any individual shapes the materials the literary work offers him 
. . .  to give him what he characteristically both wishes and fears 
. . . and he also constructs his characteristic way of achieving 
what he wishes and defeating what he fears.
Conceiving of the text as the utterance of an other who may be quite 
unlike ourselves, can help us as performers to remain rooted in the text, rather 
than in our unexamined responses to it. Both tex t and response are important, 
but the reasons for interpretations must be inherent in the textual voice. By 
questioning our own attributional response to the narrative voice, that is, by 
asking the tex t "why" we have attributed dispositional qualities such as courtesy 
and admiration to its narrator, we can insure that there are always textual bases 
for our characterization of the narrator in performance.
The most recent theorizing about the attribution process has identified
18the "fundamental attribution error," a cognitive pattern of which the 
performer should be wary. Essentially, the error involves the tendency to focus 
on only one of the two most general types of attribution—dispositional 
attribution—and to selectively forget the environmental or situational reasons 
for an other’s behavior. As Shaw and Costanza s ta te  it,
. . . there is a pervasive tendency in pereeivers to "overattribute" 
behavior to the personal dispositions of actors.
17Norman Holland, "Unity Identity Text Self," in Reader-Response 
Criticism , ed., Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Univ. Press, 
1980), p. 819.
18Marvin E. Shaw and Phillip R. Costanzo, Theories of Social Psychology, 
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 249.
19Shaw and Costanzo, p. 249.
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Living through the complex experience of an other takes an extraordinary 
amount of time and reflection. Often, in our necessary rush to build a 
performance, we do have to concentrate on the essential character of the 
narrator, but we must always remember that the narrative personality and its 
behavior can result from situation as much as from disposition. The atmosphere 
of comfort, the masculine social milieu, the fact that the telling takes place in 
Jefferson, Mississippi, and so forth, all contribute to the narrator’s behavior in 
"A Rose For Emily.” The degree to which the performer imaginatively fills in 
these situational details can inform and define a performance more fully, and 
bring the world of the tex t into a richer presence.
In other texts, situational constraints may override dispositional qualities. 
In Eudora Welty's short story ’’Why I Live a t the P. O.,’’ the narrator, a grown 
woman who has just run away from home, has set up a ’’permanent’’ residence in 
the local post office, where she is the sole employee. The fact that she has only 
been there three days, and that she is probably addressing a hapless customer, or 
a t least some generalized listener, may have more to do with her behavior than 
any inherent dispositional quality she may possess. While it is obvious that she is 
a paranoid person by disposition, the situational factor of her favored sister's 
return has a great deal to do with the story's hysterical tone (she even begins 
with the phrase, "Thing's had been fine until . . . ").
Many of Dorothy Parker’s stories, such as the often-performed "The 
Waltz" and "The One on the Right," when analyzed according to attribution 
theory present the performer with an intriguing blend of situational and 
dispositional reasons for the narrator's caustic verbal style.
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In short, the attributional perspective on the act of pre-formance requires 
the rehearsing performer to reflect on his or her own attributions concerning the 
narrative voice. This means that the performer will, a t some point in the 
rehearsal process, stop and ask whether particular narrative behaviors are the 
result of situation, disposition, or a combination of both. These constraints on 
the narrator’s behavior can then become definite elements in the performer's 
"inner monologue" or subtext during the actual performance. An understanding 
of the causes of a narrator's behavior can allow us, as performers, to fully live- 
through and embody the narrators and characters we meet in fiction and poetry.
Our questioning of the narrative will often bring forth into our 
consciousnesses individual behaviors that might have gone unnoticed had we not 
reflected on our attributions during pre-formance. Focusing on interesting or 
unusual behaviors of narrators can obviously aid the performer in individualizing 
and concretizing the persona he seeks to embody.
Non-Common Narrative Behavior
Thus far, the attribution model of the act of pre-formance has 
concentrated on the performer's constitution of the narrator, and the 
complicated triangular relationship that exists between the performer, the 
narrator, and the various events and existents (Xs) in the text. The model has 
also detailed how the "degree of liking" or the attraction level between these 
three elements can create an asymmetrical relationship that produces a strain 
toward symmetry that, in turn, motivates the attributions of the performer.
We should keep in mind the fact that no performer could reflect on every 
discrete "behavior" of a narrator. In pre-formance, some performers will single 
out some narrative behaviors as the most important or "non-common" while
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other performers might concentrate on different actions of that same narrator.
The point we must emphasize is that people tend to attribute causes more 
to "non-common,” (that is, unusual or non-characteristic) behaviors. I have 
shown how the non-characteristic use of the term "august" led me to make 
attributions about the narrator and the implied author of "A Rose For Emily." 
Non-common textual behaviors are often problematic for the performer. During 
pre-formance, the performer must, of necessity, attribute causes for the non­
common effects of the discourse, and must justify those attributions only 
through the symbolic action of the text itself. When the non-common behaviors 
of a tex t force the performer to recognize levels of textual voice other than that 
of the narrator, the performer must deal with those voices before incorporating 
them into the final embodiment of the narrator. This is where the concept of 
the figural voice must be added to the pre-formance model.
The Figural Voice
Because we are appropriating the attribution model from the social 
sciences and, more specifically, from theories of interpersonal communication, 
we must account for and adapt that model to the situation in which one member 
of the dyad is a written text. It is not enough to say that, experientially, the 
performer must constitute the text as an other's utterance. There is still the 
objectified text, the printed page, to contend with in the pre-formative 
experience. In many ways the interpersonal analogy will still hold. However, the 
tex t as an objectified "work of art" is, in its permanence and stasis, essentially 
unlike a living other. It is like the printed text of a public address: its linguistic 
constituents are the same as those of the delivered speech, but our experience of 
the two modes, written and oral, is quite different. In order to preserve the
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sanctity of the text, and to avoid the inevitable accusations of relativism, I have
proposed that the concept of the "figural voice" be added to the model. This
perspective, suggested by the theories of M. M. Bakhtin, allows us to deal with
the various "voices" that exist within the narrator"s discourse. Such voices
might include the sociological voice, the voice of history, the ethical voice or
the voice of the implied author, character voices, even specific sociological
20voices such as Marxist voices or the "feminist voice."
By including in our pre-formative strategy, the discrete questioning of 
each identifiable voice in the tex t, particularly the voice of the implied author, 
the performer does not run the risk of reducing the tex t to a simplistic reading 
or privileging his or her own response to the text over the authorial intention. 
All can exist together and be incorporated into the final, crucial embodiment of 
the narrator, as I have shown.
The model, as it now stands, closely resembles the original symmetry 
model of Theodore Newcomb and the dynamics are the same as his.
(O i,  0 2, O3, . . .)
"degree of liking'
x2> x3> • • •)
on
Wayne Booth has pointed out an interesting omission in Bakhtin’s 
otherwise inclusive list of possible textual voices—that of the feminist voice. 
See Booth's article "Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and the Challenge of 
Feminist Criticism," Critical Inquiry, 9 (Sept. 1982), pp. 45-76.
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As we look a t the model in terms of literary response, we should keep in 
mind that the attributional behavior of the performer is motivated by the "strain 
toward symmetry" that results from feelings of psychological imbalance. 
Imbalance could be a function of many types of emotional responses to the 
literature, lack of literal understanding, inability to empathize with the narrator 
or characters, personal distaste for the subject m atter or other works by the 
same author, even the mood the performer is in a t  the time of a particular 
reading of the text. The strain toward symmetry causes the mind to make quasi- 
logical connections based on consistency information (how often has the actor 
done this in the past?), distinctiveness information (how often has the actor done 
this in different circumstances?), and consensus information (how many other 
people have done that sort of thing in those sorts of circumstances?). Behaviors 
that violate our expectations about consistency, consensus, or distinctiveness 
will often initiate our attributions of causes for those behaviors. We tend to 
attribute behaviors to one of two general sources? dispositional or internal 
causes, and environmental, contextual, or external causes.
These la tter two patterns, dealing with internal or external causation, are 
the most common attributional styles in humans. This is true whether we are 
responding to social others or to the others we encounter in the reading 
experience. We might illustrate this point with an example of one of the most 
basic determinations about dramatic literature—whether or not a tex t can be 
said to fit into the category of a tragedy or not. Internal versus external 
causation is still the test for whether a tragedy can be called a tragedy of fate 
(external causation) or a tragedy of character (internal causation). But there are 
several other attributional patterns of which it is helpful to be aware as we focus
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on the interconnecting lines of our model.
Closely related to internal/external causality is the concept of impersonal 
versus personal causality. This dimension of attribution requires that the 
performer decide whether or not the narrator is consciously trying to cause the 
effects that he or she produces. This perspective, sometimes referred to as the 
"perception of try" was first articulated by Fritz Heider, the founding father of 
attribution theory.
Heider also divides perceptions of causality into instances of 
personal causality and impersonal causality. Perceived personal 
causality is a subset of perceived internal causality and 
encompasses only those events which the other intended to 
produce.
Conversely, "perceived impersonal causality" refers to actions that the
22narrator "did not try to produce." A person, in this case a narrator, would be 
held responsible only for effects that he or she consciously tried to produce. 
Only such internally motivated effects would yield information about the 
dispositional properties of that narrator.
Consider, for example, the central mystery of "A Rose For Emily." This 
story shares an essential quality with all "mystery stories" in that the answer to 
the major dramatic question is withheld until the carefully prepared ending of 
the story. The essential presence in such stories is the absence of the answer to 
the mystery. Indeed, what happens up in Miss Emily's bedroom on the night of 
Homer Barron's death remains a mystery a t the close of the narrator's tale. The
21 Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 65.
22Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 65.
163
reader must ask, then what the central mysteries or absences are that keep the 
reader reading or the listener listening. In Faulkner’s story, the narrator 
continually drops hints throughout the discourse that point toward the concluding 
sentence. One such device is the narrator's teasing references to "the smell” 
around Miss Emily's house. This smell is mentioned several times in the story, 
but it is essentially developed in the page-long inserted report about the 
nocturnal liming of Miss Emily's yard by four men of the town. At this point in 
the narrative, the cause of the smell is a mystery and the listener might wonder 
why the narrator makes such a point of it.
At any ra te , the references to the smell become obvious (i.e. distinctive, 
noticeable, or "non-common”) actions of this narrator. As a pre-formative 
reader using the proposed attributional model, I am required to reflect on and 
attribute causes to any behavior that I notice as unusual or distinctive. "What,” I 
ask, "is the narrator up to here?" As a listener, I sense that this and other 
seemingly irrelevant details (such as the rat-poison episode) are leading up to 
something. I interpret the narrator's symbolic behavior in this passage as a 
"teasing" or a conscious attem pt by the narrator to keep me guessing. He is, in a 
sense, preparing me for the story's climax. The references cause me to think 
forward briefly to that point in the story a t which the narrator will explain the 
smell. Following the method I have outlined, I must then ask whether or not the 
narrator is behaving this way because of the epic situation, because of some 
internal disposition, or some combination of both.
My first impulse is to attribute the narrator's teasing references to his 
own relish in telling a romantic and gruesome story—a telling that he may well 
have perfected through years of practice. But I know that the "fundamental
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attribution error” is to overattribute behaviors to dispositional qualities of an 
actor and therefore I "ask" the text whether or not there could be less obvious 
situational causes for the teasing references of the narrator.
I have already described the easy, masculine, professional context in 
which this narration seems to occur. If I empathetically put myself in the 
narrator's place, looking out a t the epic situation through his eyes, I find that the 
focus of his attention must be the listener. The most powerful situational factor 
in the narrator's environment is the listener.
The listener, I decide, is new to Jefferson. Otherwise, he would already 
know this famous local legend. As I try to enter the narrator's experience of the 
listener I develop an inner monologue that goes something like this:
Here is a fine young man who is new to the town. I suppose he sees 
me as a kind of mentor, or a t least his initiator into the ways of 
Jefferson. What good fortune'. He has asked me about Miss Emily 
Grierson. So, he doesn't know the story. Well, he's certainly come 
to the right place.
This subtext is a possibility in the tex t. As a performance choice it has 
two benefits. First, it helps me to create a concrete world for the story and a 
highly defined context for the epic situation. Secondly, in attributing the very 
presence of the listener as the chief cause of the narrator's teasing references to 
the end of the tale, I provide myself with a dynamic partner in the scene. 
Whether I decide to "place" the imaginary face of the listener somewhere on 
stage, or to use the various faces of the actual audience as my listener(s), I have 
given myself a face to which I can react and whose reactions I can constantly 
monitor during the telling of "my" story. By attributing the narrator's behavior 
to the situational factor of the naive listener's presence, I have provided myself
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(as performer) with actions to play and with a definite focus for those actions. I 
have known how to vary my performance choices by consciously attempting to 
avoid the fundamental attribution error—that is, to avoid the overattribution to 
disposition. By consciously attem pting to foreground the epic context of the 
telling, I can do more than enter the narrator’s internal experience, I can 
construct the epic world called forth by the language of the tex t and transfer 
that world from the page to the lived experience of performance.
The most important result of the conscious avoidance of the over­
attribution to disposition is that it channels the performer’s attention toward the 
world of the story. The context or environment of Faulkner's story is manifested 
on two levels. First, there is the aforementioned epic situation, the world-of- 
the-telling. And there is also the context in which the past events of the story 
occur. This is the world of the American South, of Jefferson, of Yoknapatawpha, 
the world in which Miss Emily lives. Both levels of world are essential to the 
story and essential to the successful realization of the text in performance.
The concept of the figural voice is the means by which a performer can 
allow the world of a text to fully disclose itself. If, during pre-formance, I keep 
in the back of my mind the less obvious levels of textual voice, levels such as the 
sociological, the historical, the feminist, or the parodic, and if I attend to each 
one as I notice it, I am allowing the contextual world of the story to fully present 
itself to me. A trained reader often does this intuitively, but it is a complex 
experiential process and must be included in the model. This is accomplished by 
the simple surrounding of the "figural voice" with the matrix of "all co-present 
textual voices."
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The model now becomes a phenomenological description of the hetero-
glossic performance method I have outlined. Whatever level of voice happens to
be the momentary focus of my intention, exists and is experientially defined by
the co-present ground of voices from which it arises. For example, if I focus my
attention on the feminist voice in "A Rose For Emily," I will experience that
23voice in a dialogic relationship with the social and historical voices in the text. 
The implied sexism in the narrative voice of this story, must be analyzed in 
term s of the socio-historical context from which it arises—the context of 
Yoknapatawpha in the early years of this century.
And yet, if we continue this example, it is obvious that a complete 
description of the performer’s experience of this feminist voice is also influenced 
by the context or world in which the performer exists—the world of the post­
feminist decade of the nineteen-eighties. The performer's attributions and
23M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. 
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 
411 ff. The basic idea of Bakhtin's theory is the interconnectedness of or dialogue 
between the various embedded voices within a discourse.
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possible feelings of dissonance or imbalance might be heavily influenced by the 
social milieu in which he or she has lived. The world of the performer 
encompasses the world of the text and enters into a dialogue with it during pre- 
formance. We represent this graphically in the model by surrounding the 
performer with all of his or her ’’co-present lived experience," because our 
readings of texts are inextricably bound to our experiences as human beings in 
our own world. As a person prepares a performance, the co-present lived 
experience of the performer includes the moment-by-moment reading-in- 
program as well as any previous reading of the text during the performer’s 
lifetim e. Analogically, the pre-formance model is bounded by this lived 
experience. The performer, within the context of his or her experience, 
constitutes or attends to one of the possible figural voices in the text. As the 
arrows show, that performer then attributes causes to the "verbal behavior" of 
the figural voice. The attentive reader might well ask a t this point why the 
arrow is a double arrow. This study has concentrated almost exclusively on 
attributions made by a performer concerning a narrator; but the attributional 
model is an analog of a social experience and is therefore dyadic. A narrator 
may also make attributions about a reader or listener to his or her discourse. 
The speaker of "A Rose For Emily” has been shown to make several minor but 
important attributions about his listener. These attributes were detailed in 
chapter three and include masculinity, professionalism, and relative 
unfamiliarity with the local legends of Jefferson, Mississippi. Attributes made
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by a narrator about his or her listener are not new to critical theory. They are
24most clearly dealt with in recent criticism as a "signaling of the narratee."
24Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse; Narrative Structure in Fiction 
and Film (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 253-62.
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But our focal concern is more with the act of pre-formance than with 
narrative theory in general, even though the model has obvious applications in 
both areas. As we analyze the attributional behaviors of the performer in regard 
to the narrative voice, we must include the subject m atter of the encounter, for 
it is this content that sets up or resolves any psychological imbalance on the part 
of the performer, motivating his or her attributions.
This final element in the model is difficult to nominate. When we 
encounter an other and speak with that other, we always speak about something. 
The discourse of a text always contains subject or objects. A tex t may produce 
images, events, characters, objects, and it may also produce concepts, ideas, 
dialogues, tones, attitudes, beliefs, values, symbols, and any number of other 
constituents.
When we engage an other in a "dialogue," the other’s discourse contains 
(symbolically) certain subjects or objects. These may be concrete, such as a 
house, the image of a woman a t a window, or the description of an event such as 
the nocturnal spreading of lime around an old house. Or, the contents of a 
discourse may be conceptual, such as a description of death as "the long sleep
A C  A t f
that outlasts love," or "the newer generation, with its more modern ideas." 
The point is that, when we "listen" to a figural voice, we always place it in 
relation to its specific subject. And the strain towards symmetry that motivates 
our attributions to a narrator is controlled by the tensive relationships that exist
95Faulkner, p. 130.
26Faulkner, p. 120.
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between ourselves and the narrator, ourselves and the subject of the narrator's 
discourse, and the narrator's relationship to the subject of his or her discourse.
Seymour Chatman provides a helpful perspective on this quality of 
narrative when he distinguishes between story and discourse. A story, says 
Chatman, is composed of events, characters, and details of settings, as well as 
conceptual ''things'' such as love, death, and honor. He refers to story as 
"contents” and distinguishes it from discourse, which he calls "expression."^ In 
an attributional theory of literary response we would include all contents of a 
narrative as the Xs of the model. We would characterize the discourse or 
expression of those contents as the "verbal behavior" of a narrator, an implied 
author, or a character. These individual contents become the momentary focus 
of our attention as we read through the text. They exist, not alone, not 
discretely, but as figures called up and viewed against the ground of all the other 
contents of the story. It is not possible to focus the intentional consciousness on 
Emily Grierson's house without setting it against the "garages and cotton gins" 
that surround it. The attributional model would graphically depict the house as 
an object (X) that is called into a presence by the narrator and is configured 
against the background of the described setting.
27 Chatman, pp. 23-26.
171
All
Co-present Lived Experience of 
the Performer
A ll_ ^  
Co-Present 
Textual Voice:
attribution
Performer Narrator
T E X T
house.
"garages and 
cotton gins".
Conclusion
The completed model now highlights the psychological process of 
attribution in the pre-formance of a tex t, and also places that attributional 
behavior in its appropriately phenomenological context. At the critical moment 
of pre-formance described in the above model, the figural voice is constituted by 
the performer as the voice of the narrator, and the performer's valuation of the 
object in question, Emily's house, is a function of the "degree of liking" or 
empathic understanding that the performer has of that narrator. If the narrator
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calls the house "an eyesore among eyesores" the performer is likely to 
experience the house in somewhat the same way, since this narrator has been 
shown to be credible and fair-minded. Furthermore, the performer would, either 
consciously or subconsciously, make attributions about the narrator based on the 
le tte r’s verbal behavior in describing the Grierson home in this particular way. 
The performer comes to know the narrator as he would come to know an other in 
a face to face engagement—by attributing causes for the verbal behavior of the 
other.
Attributional behavior is the principle mode of the human perception of 
28others. As Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka have summarized it,
We begin with the phenomenological fact that our perception of 
others does not stop with observations of their behavior. We also 
perceive other people as causal agents or a t least as capable of 
being causal agents. The perception of causality is central in our 
perception of other people.
When performers constitute a tex t as a series of utterances, they
experience the same psychological patterns in determining the attributes of the
speaker of that utterance. This critical method of focusing on the speaking
voice in a text is similar to the method of dramatism and has been shown by such
30critics as Kenneth Burke and Don Geiger to yield valuable insights for the 
performer who desires to embody a narrative voice.
28Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 89.
29Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, p. 89.
30Geiger’s principal statem ent on the subject of dramatism is The 
Dramatic Impulse in Modern Poetics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 
196751
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The attributional model of pre-formance embraces the perspective of 
dramatism but also goes beyond it phenomenologically. Whereas dramatism 
focuses on the personae of the narrative voice, this model allows for and includes 
all possible perceptions of who is speaking the text. The figural voice might, a t 
various dynamic moments of pre-formance, be conceived of as the implied 
author, a character, or the narrator. These are the principle others in an uttered 
tex t, but the human experience of these others is configured by any and all 
experience that bears on our perception of them. As Susan Lanser has said, "The
textual voice must be reconstructed by taking into account all levels of narration
31and focalization in their hierarchical relationships. This is why the 
introduction of Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia was necessary to the model. 
Less obvious levels of voice such as sociological or political levels, make present 
to us the world in which the epic and dramatic events of the story occur. 
Letting this world fully disclose itself through textual voices makes it possible 
for us to avoid over-attribution to dispositional qualities of a speaker and to 
focus on context and situation as equally important factors in our attributional 
behaviors, thereby improving the quality and fullness of those attributions.
When we (P) engage a narrator (O) or an implied author (O), we let him or 
her speak to us concerning "things" (Xs). Any dissonance we might feel in this 
engagement is likely to result from assymetrical relationships among the three 
principles of the model: performer, narrator (or whatever figural voice is
constituted by the performer), and whatever "things" the figural voice is bringing 
into presence through the language of the text. If we constitute this language as
3*Susan Sniader Lanser, The Narrative Act (Princeton: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1981), p. 146.
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verbal behavior and consciously vary possible situational and/or dispositional 
causes for that behavior, we are reducing psychological dissonance and "looking 
behind" the uttered text while remaining firmly rooted in it.
While not the only valid approach to pre-formance, the attributional 
model provides a perspective and a method that can create a socially immediate 
atmosphere for the engagement of a narrator by a performer. In this atmosphere 
we deny nothing that might influence our attributions to the narrative voice. It 
is hoped that this perspective can help a performer to balance his or her own
OO
responses to a tex t with a  "passionate attention" to the text itself, so that, in
the words of Theodore Roethke, we might "greet a poem, now, like a living
33person: with curiosity and respect."
32Richard Maguire, Passionate Attention: An Introduction to Literary
Study (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. viii.
This term is used by Mary Frances Hopkins and Beverly Whitaker Long 
in the afterword to Performing Literature (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1982), p. 357.
33Theodore Roethke, "Five American Poets," New World Writing (May 
1953), pp. 83-84. Quoted by Long and Hopkins in Performing L iterature, p. 357.
Chapter Five 
CONCLUSION
The Performing Consciousness
The consciousness of performers is a t the heart’s core of everything that 
the discipline of performance studies seeks to know. A full description of the 
performing consciousness would gather in everything that influences a particular 
performance, regardless of whether those influences come from the printed 
page, extrinsic factors, or even the relevant lived experience of the performer. 
When we "take on" a work of literature in performance we are manifesting a 
desire to encounter that work in a way that is essentially different but still 
similar to critical writing about literature. Like the publishing critic, 
performers wish to make informed critical judgements that will illuminate the 
tex t, and, like the critic, they need to articulate their judgements clearly and 
fully. But performers need to be able to do more than articulate their 
understanding of a text; they must also be able to embody it.
Performers, of necessity, must express the tex t in terms of their own 
human behaviors. Their performance behaviors, in turn, are the result of 
attributions about the tex t gained during various pre-formative engagements 
with it. The study of narrative theory has proven particularly fruitful in regard 
to this translation of critical judgements into the behavioral dimension of 
performance. Part of the reason for this may be that its focus is on the 
narrative voice in the literary text, a perspective that privileges the behavioral 
communication channel of voice or utterance. When we focus our attention on 
the narrative voice, we are essentially willing ourselves to constitute that text
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as an other, usually human, consciousness; how we perceive that consciousness, 
the motives we posit for its verbal behavior, form the spine of our critical 
understanding of the text. This is especially true for the performer who will 
"take on" the epic voice and embody it.
Attribution in the Performer’s Engagement With the Text
It would seem logical that one of the most credited theories in current 
social psychology, a theory concerned with how people perceive each other,* 
might illuminate the experience of a performer seeking to come to an 
understanding of the speaking consciousness of a text. In a sense, both the social 
encounter and the literary encounter are dyadic. When we seek a deep 
knowledge of a narrator, an implied author, or a character in a text we need to 
examine critically our own subjective reactions to him or her. That is, we would 
do well to reflect on our attributions about the other more closely than is usually 
possible in the face-to-face social engagement.
Wolfgang Iser characterizes the essential difference between social and 
literary engagements as a function of "ascertainability." Iser reminds us that in 
face-to-face engagements both parties constantly monitor each other and 
regulate their communication according to their perceptions of "how far their 
images have bridged the gap of the inexperiencability of one another’s 
experience." Texts cannot constantly adapt and regulate themselves to the 
reader's experience. Readers cannot ask a tex t for the simple answer to the
* Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, Person Perception, pp. iv-v. The major 
chapter in this book is devoted to attribution theory.
2
Wolfgang Iser, "Interaction Between Text and Reader," in The Reader in 
the Text, ed. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1980), p. 109.
direct question, "What is your intention here?" In his attem pt to articulate the 
text-reader relationship, Iser unconsciously uses the language of attribution 
theory:
. . . it is the very lack of ascertainability and defined intention 
that brings about the text-reader interaction, and here there is a 
vital link with dyadic interaction. . . .  it is the gaps, the 
fundamental assymetry between text and reader, that give rise to 
communication in the reading process. With dyadic interaction, 
the imbalance is removed by the establishment of pragmatic 
connections resulting in an action, which is why the preconditions 
are always clearly defined in relation to situations and common 
frames of reference. The imbalance between tex t and reader, 
however, is undefined, and it is this very indeterminacy that 
increases the variety of communication possible.
Iser, then, sees the imbalance between the reader and the voice of the 
tex t as the motivator of communication between them just as Newcomb's 
symmetry theory sees such imbalance in social encounters as the motivator of 
interpersonal attributions. Other critics have also evoked symmetry theory in 
defining the communicative act of literary interpretation, but have described the 
voices of a text as being more, rather than less "ascertainable." Their arguments 
suggest that attribution may be even more important to literary encounters than 
they are to interpersonal perception.
Because of the essential stablity of a text, (see Chapter Three) the 
relative permanence of its written discourse, we can examine our attributions 
about its strategies more fully than we can in the temporal flux of the social 
world. Both pre-formance and social discourse are temporal acts, but the former 
is essentially different in that the linguistic contents of one side of the
3
Iser, "Interaction Between Text and Reader," pp. 109-10.
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’’conversation"—the textual side—are permanent and unchanging. This is why 
Georges Poulet can say that a text is different from a flesh-and-blood other 
because its discourse
. . .  is open to me, lets me look deep inside itself and even allows 
me with unheard of license to think what it thinks and feel what it 
feels.
The degree of "ascertainability" of a given text, the degree to which a 
figural voice allows me inside itself, is a function of the essential communicative 
nature of the individual text. For example, the central consciousness of Isabel 
Archer, the heroine of Henry James’ The Portrait of a Lady, is remarkably open 
to  the reader who engages it. However, the central consciousness of that 
author's governess in his The Turn of the Screw is infuriatingly closed to the 
reader, a fact that has allowed for a variety of possible communications and 
attributions by readers about this character. While we are best advised not to 
make sweeping generalizations about literary others, it is nonetheless obvious 
that attributions are always a part of our perception of those others. And it is 
also true that, in pre-formance, we are in control of the temporal aspects of the 
reading process and are more able to focus on our own attributions to characters, 
implied authors, or narrators.
Time is the enemy of valid attributions in the social world. 
Communication with other humans is dynamic and ephemeral; a given moment of 
social intercourse is impossible to freeze and analyze. This is also true of our
4
"Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority," in The Structuralist 
Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugene Donato (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1972), p. 57.
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encounters with literature, but to a significantly lesser degree. The language of a 
literary other is stable. The words of a text do not change. Our perceptions of 
those words may alter drastically on repeated encounters with them, but the 
words themselves are immutable. It is for this reason that attribution theory is 
so valuable to interpretation.
We have time, during pre-formance to reflect on and examine the 
behaviors of, say, a narrator. We are not bound by the inexorable phenomenon of 
social conversation. Rather, we can stop in the middle of a narrator's sentence 
and reflect on inconsistencies, word choice, valuation, or any other aspects of 
the narrator's disposition and environment. In social discourse, attributions often 
remain subconscious due to the rapidity with which they must be made and the 
constant influx of new information as the conversation progresses.
Attributional behavior is ubiquitous and almost constant in everyday 
social life. Because it is pre-reflective and intuitive we tend to overlook it. So 
it is not surprising that it has also been overlooked in investigations of literary 
response. And yet, ironically, it is here that attributional behavior can more
successfully be focused on and analyzed due to the objective nature of the
textual language and the control the reader has over the temporal aspects of the 
reading process. Finally, the fact that a text has an objective quality does not 
preclude our simultaneous constitution of it as both object and as an other 
consciousness. As Walter Ong has stated it,
. . .  in a valid but not exclusive sense, each work of a rt is not 
only an object but a kind of surrogate for a person. Anything that 
bids for attention in an act of contemplation is a surrogate for a 
person. In proportion as the work of a rt is capable of being taken
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in full seriousness, it moves further and further along an asymptote 
to the curve of personality.
The purpose of this study's attributional model of the act of pre-formance is to 
describe and illuminate the gestalt experience of a text. It privileges the 
reader's constitution of the tex t as the utterance of some other, but does not 
deny our simultaneous constitution of that utterance as a balanced and complete 
"thing-out-there" that is presented to our consciousness and about which we 
make attributions.
Reflections on our attributions is a means of exploring deeply the 
psychology of our responses to literature. Examining our attributions about texts 
is self-reflexive and yet it keeps us inextricably connected with the other, that 
is, with the tex t. It is, like Husserl's pure cogito performing the 
phenomenological reduction, a rigorous means to a fuller knowledge, not just of 
our selves, but of the others we encounter and with whom we are connected by 
the tissue of experience. An attributional perspective on literary response is 
phenomenological in its breaking down of distinctions between self and other (or 
object). However, in its focus on person perception, it allows that other, in our 
case the figural voice of a text, to remain a complete other, for whose behavior 
we infer causes. The process of attribution, then, is phenomenological, and its 
methods have been applied throughout this study. But I hope I have shown that 
the perspective of phenomenological attribution also preserves the sanctity of 
the tex t by focusing on its intrinsic ''behavior” as the source of our attributions 
about it. We are concerned here as much with the discursive tex t itself as we
Walter J . Ong, S.J., "The Jinnee in the Well Wrought Urn," in The 
Barbarian Within; And Other Fugitive Essays and Writings (New York: 
MacMillan, 1962), p. 24.
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are with our responses to it.
David Bleich has said that "interpretive knowledge . . .  is constructed 
from the uncontrolled experience of the interpreter, and the rules of 
construction are only vaguely known by anyone observing the interpreter."® The 
attributional model I have proposed does not deny the "uncontrolled pre- 
reflective experience" of the interpreter: It is determined by all of the co­
present experience of the interpreter. This is what keeps the model from 
reducing the complex experience of literary response. What the model does 
accomplish is to render less "vaguely known" those "rules of construction" that 
directed the interpretation. Like dramatism, the attributional perspective 
centers on the speaking voice in literature; but it does not stop there. The 
concept of the figural voice takes this theory beyond dramatism into a more 
holistic description of literary experience. It keeps the dram atistic elements of 
speaker and context, yet allows for the inclusion of a reader's subjective 
response into the paradigm.
Attribution as an Aid in Forming a Performance
Attribution is perhaps the most important principle in the psychological 
construction of a response to a literary tex t. Human beings in the social world 
engage in attribution almost constantly as they posit causes for the behaviors of 
others. A knowledge of this fact is implicit in all human behavior. But when this 
generalized awareness is coupled with a more specific knowledge of the most 
common attributional patterns (e.g. consistency, consensus, distinctiveness, and
g
"The Subjective Character of C ritical Interpretation," College English 36 
(March 1975), p. 740.
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the "fundamental attribution error"), we are better equipped as interpreters to 
focalize and validate significant attributions that we make. A knowledge of how 
people attribute can lead us to a fuller knowledge of one of the most important 
means by which we construct experience.
rj
Three of the major claims in current attributional research will serve to 
summarize the phenomenological importance of this theory to the act of pre- 
formance. The first claim is that there is an essential difference in the way 
actors and observers make attributions (see chapter two of this study). Research 
suggests that the performer, who is principally an observer of a narrator’s
O
discourse, might "tend to attribute behavior to stable dispositions of the actor." 
rather than to contextual or environmental causes. This brings us to a second 
major claim in recent studies of attribution—the claim that the "fundamental 
attribution error," the tendency to over-attribute to disposition and under­
attribute to environment, is a primary cause of misinterpretation. Finally, the
claim that people are largely unaware of the cognitive processes that influence
g
and explain their behavior suggests that anyone who wishes his or her 
perceptions of others to be more accurate and less superficial or idiosyncratic, 
may be helped by findings of attribution research. This is certainly also true of 
the performer who attem pts to embody the often enigmatic others contained in 
great literature.
7
Don Locke and Donald Pennington, "Reasons and Other Causes: Their 
Role in Attribution Processes," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42 
(February 1982), pp. 212-23.
Q
Kelly G. Shaver in William D. Wilmot, Dyadic Communication (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1980), p. 58.
g
Locke and Pennington, p. 223.
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Attribution theory, then, offers the performer a perceptual perspective on 
his or her response to a tex t. It provides a theoretical model that describes the 
cognitive patterns we use in our perceptions of others. A sound knowledge of 
these attributional processes can help the rehearsing performer to more 
systematically analyze important attributions about narrators, characters, and 
implied authors. This is why the model is perhaps most valuable in the formation 
of a performance, the rehearsal process that I have designated ’’pre-formance.1' 
When we embody a tex t we are providing an audience with an instance of that 
text; a full understanding of both the text itself and our experience of it is 
necessary if we are to avoid reducing the tex t as we in-stance it. A final 
example will serve to summarize the performer’s use of attribution in such an 
instance.
A Final Example
Let us suppose that a performer is rehearsing the final ac t of King Lear. 
He is engaging the character of Edmund a t a problematic (non-common) moment 
in the tex t—his final, uncharacteristic ’’good ac t.” A performer would very likely 
reflect consciously on Edmund’s motivations for this apparently significant 
action. This is a good example of the violation of consistency patterns that, 
according to Theodore Newcomb, produce the strain toward symmetry that 
motivates attributional behavior in the observer. Just before he dies, Edmund, 
who up to this point in the play has exhibited an apparent disposition of 
consummate evil, tries to save the lives of Lear and of Cordelia by rescinding his 
writ of execution on them.
I pant for life. Some good I mean to do 
Despite of mine own nature. Quickly send—
Be brief in it—to th1 castle, for my writ 
Is on the life of Lear and on Cordelia.
Nay, send in time.
(V, iii, 244-48).
It is not uncommon to see this moment played as the genuine repentance 
of a man who has had some spark of good in him all along; that is, to attribute 
the action to Edmund’s inherent disposition. This is a possible interpretation. 
But let us, as Heidegger suggests, le t Edmund’s words themselves, his verbal 
behavior if you will, speak to us. Let us reflect on them fully and, a t the same 
time, make a conscious effort to avoid the fundamental attribution error of 
emphasizing disposition over context as the primary cause of Edmund’s action. 
This effort, rather than imposing attribution theory on our interpretation of 
Edmund’s action suspends the usual human behavior of dispositional attribution. 
This suspension of the writs of behavioral convention remember, is the primary 
operation in the phenomenological reduction.
Edmund's speech occurs as he sees the bodies of Goneril and Regan, his 
compatriots in evil, covered in death. He has linked himself to them in death 
with his previous speech (’’. . . all three/Now marry in an instant.”). If we 
attribute the ’’good" tha t Edmund "means to do" here to a dispositional 
repentance, we may well be correct, but we have probably not been complete. 
We must also look to context for the cause of Edmund's act if we are to avoid 
the fundamental attribution error. He knows that he is dying and his "Nay, send 
in time . . ." suggests a sincere desire to see Lear and Cordelia saved. If we
William Shakespeare, The Complete Works, ed. Alfred Harbage 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 1102. All subsequent citings are from this 
edition.
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allow Edmund’s repentant language to resound in the world of the play, and in the 
contextual moment of this scene, we may remember that he has, much earlier, 
repudiated all influences of "the gods" or "fate." He is a man who has placed 
himself rhetorically in the philosophical camp of existential free will, refuting 
any notion of divine intervention in human life.
Thou, Nature, a rt my Goddess;
0, ii, 1)
I should have been that I am
had the maidenliest star in the universe
twinkled on my bastardizing.
0, ii, 127-29)
And yet, as soon as Edmund’s body is invaded by his brother’s sword, he 
seems to do a philosophical and moral "about face," saying,
The wheel has come full circle; I am here.
(V, iii, 175)
This line (this speech ac t, if you will) evokes the medieval Christian world view 
of the inexorable wheel of fortune and the mutability of individual human 
achievement. In a sense, Edmund’s speech is in a dialogic relationship with that 
medieval world picture precisely because he has rejected it earlier in the play. 
If we consciously look to the context, the world in which Edmund "repents," and 
attribute a t least some of his motives to the pressures exerted by that world, we 
are lead to an interpretation that sees the very philosophy that Edmund has 
previously rejected as executing a final and crucial influence on him. He is a t 
the bottom and realizes he will not rise again. The results of his unnatural 
disposition are all around him, and prompt him to this repentance. As 
interpreters we can allow the moment to live fully by partially attributing
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Edmund's act to the tragic victory of the medieval Christian world of the play, a 
world that expels the evil in it, but a t great cost. And as we speculate on this 
point, the voice of Edmund may well recede in our consciousness as the implied 
voice of Shakespeare becomes figural.
Edmund may well be surprised a t his own utterance when he says "Some 
good I mean to do . . ." What I am suggesting here is that the motivation for 
the utterance is much more complex than a simple death-bed repentance. The 
phenomenological context of Edmund's world is exerting more of an influence 
here than any element of his disposition. The performer who decides to play the 
scene with this interpretation in mind, that is, to let Edmund be surprised a t his 
utterance and to experience the epiphany of the triumph of the medieval world 
picture, possesses all the ingredients of an instructive, critically sound, and 
dramatically vibrant performance moment.
Other Applications of the Attribution Model
The performance situation described above exemplifies the practical use 
of attribution theory by a performer. When a performer engages a figural voice 
in a text, usually the voice of a character, a narrator, or an implied author, that 
performer needs to fully live through any problematic or non-common behavior 
of the figural voice. As we have seen, such non-common moments often result in 
an assymetrieal relationship between the performer (P), the figural voice (O), 
and the object of the discourse (X). A basic knowledge of attributional 
structures helps the interpreter to investigate whether the behavior of the 
figural voice violates expectations of consistency, consensus, or distinctiveness. 
The motives for that behavior can then become the object of the interpreter's 
reflection as he or she seeks a balanced relationship with the figural voice in
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relation to the object of the discourse. But attribution theory can aid in the 
performance of literature in several other ways.
Intrinsic Applications
First, there is the possibility of using the model to explore the intrinsic 
qualities of a tex t. Not only do characters engage readers, they also engage 
other characters. Others within a text can therefore make attributions about 
each other and it is important to our understanding of a work that we understand 
the attributions they make. The narrator of "A Rose For Emily" engages his 
central character in a sense—he certainly attributes motives to certain actions 
of Emily Grierson. For example, when he describes Emily's refusal to allow her 
father to be buried, he says
We did not say she was crazy then. We believed she had to do that. 
We remembered all the young men her father had driven away, and 
we knew that, with nothing left, she. would have to cling to that 
which had robbed her, as people will.
Whether we intend this voice as that of narrator or implied author, an 
attribution is being made about Miss Emily—an attribution that denies the 
dispositional cause ("She was crazy") but that attributes her action to the 
situational presence of having "nothing left." Perhaps more important is the 
narrator's implication that Emily's behavior does not violate consensus 
expectations; she merely behaves "as people will." Placing the elements on our 
model may tell us a great deal about the world of this text. The narrator, and 
probably the implied Faulkner, do not condemn Emily for her behavior here:
^Faulkner, p. 119.
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rather, they seem to agree that this is usual (that is, common) human behavior 
for someone in Emily's situation. Such a perspective makes it more likely that 
the narrator, a t least, views Emily as a tragic figure, a victim of her world and 
her times.
Another intrinsic aspect of a tex t that would be illuminated by the 
attribution model is the relationship of implied authors to narrators. As always, 
when we focus our consciousness on one literary element, we see it in relation to 
a background of related elements. In the example above, the narrator's 
discourse, and the implied author's discourse are both contained in the text. 
They exist in a dialogic relationship with each other. One of the ways in which a 
critic  would determine the essential nature of this relationship is to set both 
elements, narrator and implied author, in relation to some important element in 
the discourse.
Implied
Narrator Author
Emily
In this case we return to our heteroglossic rehearsal method and 
constitute the text first as the utterance of a narrator. We determine that the 
narrator primarily respects Emily and attributes some degree of tragic stature to 
her. This is a positive valuation. Then, we bracket the narrator and attend to 
the voice of the implied author. We have already noted several passages, such as
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the one in the first paragraph of the story, in which Emily's house is described, as 
sounding more "literary,” more "written," and attributed them more to the 
implied author. We have also noted ambivalent valuations in such oxymoronic 
adjectives as "heavily lightsome." If we, with the help of our model, determined 
that the narrator's attributions to Emily and her house were essentially positive, 
and that the implied author's attitudes towards them were ambivalent, we could 
want to determine how the implied author feels about the narrator.
The model would direct us to look for the "degree of liking" or 
identification between these two levels of textual voice. Without it the model 
would look like this:
Implied
Narrator Author
Emily's
House'
Until a relatively positive or negative attribution by the implied author 
toward the narrator is determined, we cannot determine whether our tripartite 
psychological relationship is in or out of balance. We search the tex t for any 
negative attributions made by "Faulkner" to the narrator. In terms of tone, the 
two voices seem to merge rather than to diverge a t any point. We decide then 
that the implied author is sincerely "in balance" with his narrator. We place a + 
in the attributional channel between the two voices and the model describes a
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1 2symmetrical relationship but one that reveals an implied author who is slightly 
more critical of Emily than the narrator seems to be. In order to fully embody 
this text, the performer must place the narrator’s figural voice, with all its 
attributions to Emily Grierson, against the ground of the implied author's 
estimation of her. The performer may focus on the narrator's voice in the actual 
performance, but the tensiveness of the tex t depends on that voice containing 
the word of the implied author as well.
Extrinsic Applications
A great deal of highly specific clinical work has been done in inter­
personal attribution (or person perception). These studies open up vast heuristic 
possibilities for the study of psychological responses to texts. A specific 
example will illustrate the structure of such inquiries.
Forsyth and Pope (1983) recently conducted a study of students moral 
attributions to certain human behaviors such as telling the truth and keeping 
promises. The subjects were presented with the behaviors through written 
narratives. The findings, while admittedly not conclusive, strongly suggest that
(1) Moral character is assumed to be a prime cause of behaviors 
that are low in distinctiveness and high in consistency, (2) actions 
that are high in distinctiveness and low in consistency are less 
likely to be attributed to the actor's moral character, and (3)
1 o
A*Theodore Newcomb, The Acquaintance Process, p. 12.
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consensus inforniation has a lesser impact on moral 
judgements. > 14
Such findings suggest normative patterns in our moral evaluations of 
others; a knowledge of such evaluational patterns may alert us to human 
tendencies in literary response as well. Edmund’s aforementioned "good deed" in 
King Lear is a good example of behavior that is "high in distinctiveness but low 
in consistency," and is therefore, according to Forsyth and Pope, less likely to be 
attributed to some moral quality of Edmund’s character. Forsyth’s and Pope’s 
study is experiential human evidence of Shakespeare's mimetic authority—a 
clinical reinforcement of the view that Edmund's attem pt to save Lear's life is 
externally motivated by the situational crisis in which he finds himself.
These examples remind us to look to the fictional world for causes of the 
actions of its characters and narrators, for it is here that we are more likely to 
find fuller, less stereotypical judgements. The findings of social psychologists 
can affirm or deny our assumptions about how we perceive others; and these 
assumptions are the basis of literary as well as of social attributions.
Conclusion
Robert R. Hellinger has said that to read well we must make vulnerable
13Donelson R. Forsyth and William R. Pope, "The Attribution Cube and 
Moral Evaluations," Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 21 (March 1983), pp. 
117-18.
14Similar findings were reported in Jennifer Crocker, Darlene B. Hannah, 
and Renee Weber, "Person Memory and Causal Attribution," Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 44 (January 1983), pp. 55-56.
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our id en tity .^  To do this we must enter the world of the text as fully as 
possible, but we must still be able to come out of that world and, in our own 
persons, attribute causes for the behavior of the shifting voices that sing the 
song or tell the tale. Obviously, a knowledge of the cognitive structures of 
attribution can help us to analyze our response to the frequently unusual (non­
common) behaviors of the great texts.
When we are aware of attributional patterns we can bring into fuller 
presence the consciousnesses of the literary others we embody, lending those 
consciousnesses mimetic authority and deep psychological life by the textual and 
subtextual embodiment of their attributions. As performers of literature we
need to, as one critic has recently suggested, look into experience rather than at 
16it.” Looking into experience is the purpose of the attribution theorist as well 
as the purpose of the poet and the performer. By sharing what they have learned 
with each other, all three can perhaps more deeply and humanly realize that 
noble purpose.
^"W hat is Literary Experience Like?" New Literary History, 14 (1982), p.
115.
16William C. Johnson, Jr., "Literature, Film, and the Evolution of 
Consciousness," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 38 (Fall, 1979), p. 
37.
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